NOTE TO THE READER

NGD regional reports for Track I, ‘People and Communities’ analyze trends and projections in democratic governance from a predominantly socio-political perspective on the basis of a multidimensional template specifically formulated by the Club de Madrid, with the collaboration of the Bertelsmann Stiftung, for this purpose.

NGD regional reports have been written by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) Regional Coordinators and extensively discussed with the BTI team, the CdM Secretariat and NGD regional partners. They constitute the first step of the NGD process, which will progressively organize transformative practices and ideas according to the same template, and subsequently draft NGD regional agendas to react to signals of democratic decline and advance democracy worldwide.

NGD regional reports start with a summary of regional indicator trends according to the NGD template. The summary includes colored boxes and arrows expressing the present state of affairs and the evolution during the last 15 years of democratic governance for each relevant indicator. The sources for trend calculations are the BTI and the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI), also developed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

For a detailed explanation of the calculations, see NGD Methodological Note at: www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org

The NGD Regional Report (Track I) for Sub-Saharan Africa has been written by Siegmar Schmidt, Professor of political science at the University of Koblenz-Landau and BTI Regional Coordinator for Southern and Eastern Africa

This report benefitted from the feedback of Gareth Newham, Head of Governance, Crime and Justice Division at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. The edition was made by Luis Peral, Senior Analyst, Club de Madrid.

*The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) supported the production of this publication. The views in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council Members.
### Political participation

**Electoral process**
The record of political participation is mixed: Most countries are holding elections more often than in the past, but quality often remains questionable.

- The region’s mixed record will continue due to structural factors such as deficits in democratic cultures, abuse of state resources by incumbent parties, and weaknesses within opposition parties that affect the quality of elections.

**Association/assembly rights**
The freedom of association and assembly rights are mostly guaranteed by constitutions, but in reality are often restricted by governments.

- There will be contradictory trends. Most autocratic systems will continue to limit individual rights and freedoms, and many will be successful. However, civil-society strength will increase in many states due to economic development and progressive democratic consolidation. Civil society will probably fight to deepen these rights in these countries.

**Freedom of expression**
The freedom of expression is respected by those countries with a positive democratic record. In other countries, media restrictions and subtle forms of government interference is evident.

### Rule of law

**Separation of powers**
The executive dominates the other two branches of government in most countries.

- African presidents will continue to hold a superior position of power. The strengthening of checks and balances will need external support, particularly with regard to the judicial branch. The independence of the judiciary is often deliberately undermined by executive branches.

**Independent judiciary**
JThe level of judicial independence is generally low, despite some evident improvements. Primary deficits include interference by the government and a lack of resources and trained personnel.

- Popular resistance against the unnecessary use of force by police will intensify, resulting in some improvements except in failing and civil-war-torn countries.

**Civil rights**
Civil rights are not widely and consistently respected. Security forces often violate basic rights and are not prosecuted adequately.
## Values and Institutions

### Access and Inclusiveness

<table>
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<td><strong>Political and social integration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Party system</strong></td>
<td>- The ideological vagueness and high degree of personalization within most parties will persist. Dominant parties will face more competition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party systems are generally weak, but improvements from a low level are evident.</td>
<td>- Economic progress will strengthen interest groups.</td>
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<td>- Economic success in some countries will increase identification with the state if social polarization is reduced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>- Social capital will increase slowly in post-conflict countries. Social polarization will hamper the development of higher levels of trust.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only a handful of countries have strong formal-economy interest groups (labor and capital).</td>
<td>- Socioeconomic barriers will continue to hamper transformation. There, income inequality will persist or even increase, undermining social and political stability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>- Economic success in some countries will increase identification with the state if social polarization is reduced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>From a low starting point, social capital has increased in general. Interpersonal trust is high among members of ethnic or community-based groups, but mostly on the local level.</td>
<td>- In most less successful countries, structurally anchored socioeconomic barriers will continue to hamper transformation. There, income inequality will persist or even increase, undermining social and political stability.</td>
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### Inclusiveness and non-discrimination

| **State identity** | - Economic success in some countries will increase identification with the state if social polarization is reduced. |
| Despite artificial borders and multiethnic societies, the identification with the state is relatively strong. | - In most less successful countries, structurally anchored socioeconomic barriers will continue to hamper transformation. There, income inequality will persist or even increase, undermining social and political stability. |
| **Socioeconomic barriers** | - Economic success in some countries will increase identification with the state if social polarization is reduced. |
| Sub-Saharan Africa includes most of the continent’s poorest countries. Socioeconomic barriers are massive, as large portions of the population are excluded by poverty and inequality. | - In most less successful countries, structurally anchored socioeconomic barriers will continue to hamper transformation. There, income inequality will persist or even increase, undermining social and political stability. |
| **Equal opportunity** | - Economic success in some countries will increase identification with the state if social polarization is reduced. |
| From a low starting point, equality of opportunity, in particular for women, has increased. | - In most less successful countries, structurally anchored socioeconomic barriers will continue to hamper transformation. There, income inequality will persist or even increase, undermining social and political stability. |
## Values and Institutions

### Prioritization
Prioritization is more developed in eastern and southern Africa than in western and central Africa. Capacity problems prevent governments from prioritizing reforms successfully.

### Implementation
Implementation is generally weaker than prioritization, but progress has been made by many governments.

### Efficient use of assets
Available recourses are used efficiently in only a few states, mainly in southern Africa. Many countries waste their resources due to consumerist or rent-seeking elite behavior and weak capacities.

### Anti-corruption policy
From a very low level, with many disastrous episodes, progress has been made, particularly with regard to the construction of institutions and the definition of rules.

## Access and Inclusiveness

## Management and Policies

### Trends 2000 – 2015

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### Projections 2015 – 2030

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prioritization</td>
<td>Constant donor support will assist countries in developing efficient and realistic reform strategies, particularly in the field of poverty reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Better and more effective governance will be difficult to realize, and will require external support in many countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient use of assets</td>
<td>Corruption will remain a serious challenge. The progress made so far may not be sustainable in some countries. Increasing awareness and accountability may be the first step in a more serious fight against corruption.</td>
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## Consensus-building

### Cleavage/conflict management
Growing political polarization and the increasing number of often-violent conflicts are not adequately addressed by many governments, overstraining the capacities of civil society.

### Civil-society participation
Participation levels are often low because civil societies are weak. Civil-society participation is welcomed by governments mainly in development-related fields.

### Consensus-building

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<td>Cleavage/conflict management</td>
<td>Successes in consensus-building will be uneven between states and regions. Some states, particularly in western and central Africa, will have grave difficulties in finding a new middle ground. Polarization and violence will remain on a high level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-society participation</td>
<td>Increased civil-society participation is necessary to broaden support for reforms and to integrate popular preferences into policymaking.</td>
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Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

Only a small group of countries in this region (Botswana, Mauritius, and to some extent Senegal) democratized before 1989. The third wave of democratization underway since the end of the 20th century has fundamentally changed the political landscape in sub-Saharan Africa. The record of democratic development is rather mixed. 20 of the 38 sub-Saharan states included in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) can be regarded as democracies. Only 10 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries assessed by Freedom House are considered “free,” and another 19 as “partly free.” However shaky their institutional frameworks, more than one-half of all sub-Saharan countries are considered democratic. Despite this progress in historical terms, 18 states are nonetheless governed by autocratic rule or are failing states (e.g., the Central Republic of Africa (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia).

In general, the development of the state of democracy has varied between the four sub-regions of West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa. West Africa has made much more progress than Central Africa, and in general, democracy in East Africa and particularly Southern Africa is more developed than in West and Central Africa.

More than half of the states classified by the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index as falling within the low human development group are in sub-Saharan Africa. Living conditions in these countries are characterized by widespread poverty, an absence of social protection, and enormous income gaps between a few wealthy individuals and the poor masses. The small island state of Mauritius is the only African country belonging to the UNDP’s high human development group. Underdevelopment has led to a high dependency on external support, mainly in the form of bi- or multilateral aid.

Many states are weak with respect to an effective monopoly on the use of force and a functioning administration. The degree of state weakness varies: Whereas the monopoly on the use of force has been absent in Somalia for over 20 years, state erosion is currently taking place in the CAR, the DRC and most recently in Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone. In some countries of West and Central Africa, the monopoly on the use of force is contested by warlords, criminal gangs and Islamist extremists (Nigeria). The root causes of the state weakness are structural in nature, and include the legacy of colonialism and decades-long dictatorships, weak institutions, failures in governance resulting in a loss of legitimacy, and political elites that are not oriented toward development. Hence, it is not surprising that the 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) states that “personal safety remains one of the lowest scoring sub-categories”. The rise of fundamentalist Islam in many West and Central African states is also a reaction to these issues. Moreover, these various forces have in many cases been responsible for political instability that has produced coups, attempted coups and governmental breakdowns.
With regard to the institutional “hardware” of democracy in Africa, two apparent trends are initially visible. For one, there is a clearly detectable problem zone ranging from the Horn of Africa toward Central Africa. **Chad**, **the Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Eritrea**, **Ethiopia** and **Somalia** show abysmally low levels of political participation and rule of law, and are either failing states or hard-line autocracies. Next to **DRC** and **Somalia**, a high degree of state fragility is also a matter of concern in the **Central African Republic**, **Mali** and both **South Sudan** and **Sudan**. In such a context, neither meaningful elections nor an effective protection of political and civil rights is possible.

The African average score for Participation has shown the most improvement of all sub-categories in the IIAG in the past four years [2011-2014], however it remains one of the lower scoring sub-categories on the continent. This progress has been driven by dramatic gains in certain countries, most notable the post-Arab Spring countries **Libya**, **Egypt** and **Tunisia**, but also in countries such as **Lesotho**, **Madagascar** and **Cote d’Ivoire**. Apart from these problematic cases, among which the autocracies in **Angola**, **Cameroon**, **Madagascar**, **Togo** and **Zimbabwe** must...
degree of political progress in terms of 1) political participation (relatively more advanced in about half of the sub-Saharan African countries) and 2) the rule of law (which is severely deficient in almost two-thirds of the countries). This means that even in countries where free (if not necessarily fair) elections take place and participation rights are granted, the separation of powers and the protection of civil rights are not well developed. This pattern can be seen in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique and in the post-civil war states of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The large group of defective democracies in which the separation of powers is neither seriously impaired nor simply defunct demands a closer look, as the range of indicators employed allows a precise search for strengths and weaknesses. Even high-ranking Niger shows some deficiencies regarding judicial independence, while Uganda heavily restricts association and assembly rights, and Liberia, Nigeria and Zambia offer insufficient protections for civil rights.

Generally speaking, Southern Africa can be regarded as the democratically most advanced sub-region. Apart from Ghana and Mauritius, the continent’s top performer in terms of democratic consolidation, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa evince both political stability and progress. However, these three last-named countries face the challenge of further maturing their political systems, as overly dominant parties with a longtime hold on power tend to create ossified structures, complacency and a party clientelism. This is not the case in Ghana, where the ruling party has changed repeatedly in recent years.

Analysis

Political participation

Electoral process
To what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and fair elections?

Multiparty elections have been introduced in nearly all the region’s countries. The only two countries that have not held any recent elections are Eritrea and Somalia. In general, however, the scope and quality of electoral processes has stagnated. Improvements in some countries and regressions in others were largely balanced.

In several West and Central African states, the quality of elections has been stable. Deficits remain in the area of organization (voter registration, low technical standards) and due to the frequent harassment and intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters. Manipulation and fraud is evident (Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria), but the manipulated results have failed to mirror the general tendency of the election in only a few cases such as Zimbabwe. Access to state resources provides government parties with strong advantages; campaigns can be financed easily, the attention of
the state-owned mass media is guaranteed, and supporters can be “rewarded” with access to public offices.

A negative trend concerning election quality is evident in the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. Here, elections cannot be regarded as free and fair. In some countries, elections have not been conducted regularly, either having been postponed for years by governments for opportunistic reasons (Angola, Madagascar), or been made impossible for years by civil wars and instability (Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone). The weakness of opposition parties – caused by internal strife, a lack of programmatic alternatives, a high degree of personalization, a lack of resources, and a limited ethnic and regional support base – as well as an unwillingness to accept electoral defeats has also contributed to the unsatisfactory quality of elections. Elections are often regarded as a zero-sum game by African elites.

Democracy is also endangered in several countries which hold more or less democratic elections. In the CAR, Guinea, Lesotho, Niger and Nigeria, military coups have either already taken place or remain a real threat. In Burundi, Chad, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, powerful veto players – mainly the security forces, militias or the presidents themselves – have hindered democratic progress and in some cases have suspended formally existing democratic procedures.

**Association/assembly rights**

To what extent can individuals form and join independent political or civic groups? To what extent can these groups operate and assemble freely?

In comparatively democratically advanced countries such as Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, citizens are free to form groups, and can usually assemble without interference by the government. Apart from these positive exceptions, however, the overall trend is toward more restrictions by governments, especially with regard to politically active NGOs. This is particularly visible in East and Southern Africa. In many countries, association and assembly rights are guaranteed by the constitution but are not respected or are only partly respected in practice. The situation has deteriorated in Ethiopia and Rwanda. Repression of opposition parties and their supporters has intensified elsewhere as well, particularly in election periods (Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Some countries prohibit the foundation of organizations and parties based on ethnicity or regional identity (Rwanda). In the autocratic state of Eritrea, the ruling party does not allow independent organizations at all, and in Somalia, NGO activists are often kidnapped and physically attacked.

**Freedom of expression**

To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?

The record with regard to freedom of expression is mixed. In general there are no serious differences between West and Central Africa on the one hand and East and Southern Africa on the other. Media conditions have improved strongly in Guinea and Niger over the years. In Southern Africa, government interference has increased in Angola, Burundi and Madagascar, and to a much lesser extent in Botswana and Uganda. But in some democratically more advanced countries too, such as Namibia and South Africa, authorities have become increasingly intolerant, and restrictive media regulations and cases of journalist intimidation are reported from time to time. Overall, interference has become much more subtle; laws on defamation and libel suits, security laws and advertisement bans by governments today threaten critical journalism in countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania, Rwanda and Tanzania. The state-owned media is often biased. Internet access is generally uncensored, but in many countries only a minority has access despite a sharp increase in use overall. Although the media can report relatively freely in many countries, the quality of reporting is affected by a low level of professionalism and low quality standards, in particular within the tabloid press.
**Rule of law**

**Separation of powers**

*To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?*

Although African constitutions usually guarantee a separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the political reality is different. A system of checks and balances functions in only a minority of states. In East and Southern Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa have relatively advanced systems of separation of powers, though Namibia and South Africa show negative tendencies in practice. Some restrictions on the separation of powers exist in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. In West and Central Africa, only Benin and Ghana have achieved a working separation of powers. Weaknesses are evident in Liberia, Niger, and Nigeria. All other countries show serious deficits, up to the point where checks and balances exist only on paper.

Parliamentary systems with strong national legislatures can be found in only a few countries (Mauritius and South Africa, for example). In most African countries, a strong executive dominates the two other branches. In some cases, this has historical and cultural roots. Most systems are presidential or semi-presidential (French model) systems. Presidents hold the central position in these political systems, with vast constitutional powers and broad opportunities for patronage. In countries without free elections, members of parliament are dependent on the executive and do not criticize the government or pursue their own goals (Burkina Faso, CAR). Insufficient parliamentary resources (Lesotho, Togo), a lack of experience (Liberia) and weak party discipline (Ghana) further limit opportunities to control the executive. Overwhelming majorities held by government parties also limit the role of the opposition in parliament (Mozambique, Namibia).

**Independent judiciary**

*To what extent does an independent judiciary exist?*

Judicial independence levels are generally low, especially in West and Central Africa (with slight improvements in recent years). The judiciary faces three serious challenges: external intervention, insufficient resources and corruption. Intervention by the government, and sometimes by powerful non-state actors (business, military) is a serious factor in Chad, the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Lesotho, Togo, and Zimbabwe. In Malawi, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia, interventions are less systematic and are often related to important decisions with political significance. In authoritarian states, the judiciary is under the strict control of the executive and is subject to manipulation (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe). Insufficient resources, a lack of trained personnel, and long trials contribute to general judicial inefficiency in the CAR, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, and Zambia. Judicial corruption is visible to a certain degree in all countries (except Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa). Judicial systems within the DRC, the Republic of Congo, and to a slightly lesser extent in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are notoriously corrupt, especially on the lower and middle levels.

In the absence of a parliament that can effectively exercise oversight and represent popular interests, judicial systems are subject to an increasing amount of pressure as civil society and other groups seek to hold political elites accountable.

**Civil rights**

*To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these rights?*

There are no countries in sub-Saharan Africa where protections for civil rights are fully realized. Only Benin, Botswana, Ghana, and Mauritius have a consistent record of effective protection of their citizens. Some countries, including Angola, Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, have made clear progress, albeit mostly from a low level. In turn, the situation has worsened in
Burundi, Madagascar and Mali. Improvements in most cases result from a general restoration of political order (as with the end of a civil war), whereas deteriorations can often be traced to extraconstitutional interventions such as a military coup.

Although civil rights are usually constitutionally codified, serious de facto shortcomings can be observed in various states. Brutal overreactions by the police are reported from Angola, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. Even in Namibia, some cases of excessive police violence have occurred. Violence by the police is often directed against demonstrators, as well as against alleged criminals. Inhumane treatment of prison inmates is a problem in many countries. In Angola, Burundi, Chad, the DRC and the Republic of Congo, women and girls are often sexually harassed or even raped. LGBT communities and members of ethnic minority groups face prosecution and violence in many countries, with the threat of archaic punitive laws overshadowing any potential general improvements. Supporters of the political opposition are targeted by security forces in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Abuses of power by security forces are only rarely prosecuted.

Projections 2015 – 2030

Political participation

In most states elections have become the primary mode for constituting a government. However, the quality and significance of elections varies substantially. In authoritarian states, elections are often manipulated by the government, and elite groups use them to build façade democracies. The weakness of opposition forces furthers the stability of autocratic systems and prevents changes in government. In West and Central Africa, coups and political and religiously inspired violence will continue to produce instability that could undermine the relevance of elections. These trends will continue in many weak states in West and Central Africa, as their instability has structural causes (historically weak stateness, inefficient administration, bad governance) that are not susceptible to short-term change. The persistence of instability does not mean that democratic progress is impossible. But development will continue to vary strongly between states. The African Union's (AU) strict regulations against unconstitutional shifts in government have not as yet prevented coups, but the AU has taken an active role in supporting a return to democratic practice via negotiations and diplomacy (as in Madagascar, CAR, and Mali). The situation in Southern and East Africa will continue to be more stable than in the other sub-regions, with the notable exceptions of Somalia and South Sudan, both of which will continue to straddle the line between functioning and failed states. The surprising persistence of autocracies in these parts of the continent is closely tied to the “strong men” (Eritrea, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) ruling several of these countries. Change can be rapid when succession does take place. In the more democratic states, dramatic change is unlikely. Whether these states make substantial progress will depend firstly on governments’ abilities to foster economic development and the reduction of social imbalances, and secondly on whether civil societies can play an active role as watchdogs for democracy.

As elections (regardless of whether they are free and fair) have become an indispensable part of the political process, the normative effect of these regular elections can play a key role in promoting popular demands for accountability. Perhaps in recognition of this, many ruling parties are becoming more reliant on rural populations to sustain their dominance. As Africa rapidly becomes more urbanized, however, capturing the urban vote will become more of a challenge.

More broadly, the question of whether democracy is in fact appropriate for Africa is a matter of increasing debate (mainly spurred by African politicians themselves), with some arguing that an authoritarian style modeled after the “Asian Tigers” would lead to more successful
Sub-Saharan Africa
devlopment. Rwanda's political elite has certainly subscribed to this approach. Despite rhetoric avowing a commitment to democracy and human rights, there remains an undercurrent holding that democracy and elections promote rather than resolve conflict, and that democracy is a governance system imposed by the colonizers (for example in Zimbabwe).

Rule of law

There are no signs of a general trend toward the strengthening of the rule of law across the continent. In many states, the executive will continue to dominate politics with few oversight mechanisms, and institutions and rules will continue to be ignored. Judicial reforms, often initiated in response to popular demands and donor support, have commenced in few countries.

Africa has shown a positive trajectory in Rule of Law in the past four years [2011-2014], registering an average continental improvement [...]. However, although half of the countries in Africa have shown progress in this sub-category, the other half of the continent has seen deterioration in performance, with some of the steepest declines occurring in already low-scoring countries such as Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and South Sudan.

Disrespect for civil rights and day-to-day violence by state and non-state actors will remain a constant threat in many countries. In these areas, the culture of impunity for members of the security forces will not change in the foreseeable future, because these forces often guarantee the existence of the political system, particularly under autocratic regimes. The weak rule of law will continue to undermine the legitimacy of political systems, whether democratic or not. Only in countries with a strong civil society, a relatively independent judiciary and an attentive media can citizens expect to be protected or seek redress for violence and injustice. In general, this is and will remain possible in Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa.
Sub-Saharan Africa

Access and inclusiveness

Regional overview

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, intermediary systems between regimes and civil society, particularly with regard to political parties and interest groups, show serious deficits. In Angola, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe political parties are often too weak to articulate and aggregate popular interests. Despite progress in a few states, party systems are generally unstable and parties remain programmatically weak. Although Angola and Zimbabwe are electoral autocracies, socially rooted political parties do exist. This contrasts sharply with other autocratic systems in which parties face repression (Ethiopia), have not managed the transformation from a militant group to a party (Burundi, South Sudan), or simply do not exist (Eritrea, Somalia).

The weakness of interest groups in most countries aggravates the weakness of parties, which often lack a social base or support by interest groups. In most states, the range of interest
groups is rather small, or their work is hampered by autocratic governments.

The evidently high levels of state identity are surprising if one considers that most states are both comparatively young and have inherited artificial borders created by colonial powers. Even in failing or war-torn countries (CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Somalia), the legitimacy of the nation-state is rarely questioned, and in most states, individuals and groups enjoy the right to acquire citizenship without discrimination.

Nearly all states in sub-Saharan Africa belong to the group of least-developed countries. Only Mauritius is categorized by UNDP as a country with high human development, while Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia are ranked in the group of medium-developed countries. Widespread poverty and inequality complicate efforts to engage in political and economic transformation. The situation is in general more unfavorable in West and Central Africa than in Southern and East Africa. Large portions of the populations, particularly in rural areas, are excluded from the formal sector of the economy and are politically marginalized. High economic growth rates in many states have not altered living conditions for the majority of residents.

Equality of opportunity is a goal achieved only in part in Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Uganda. In many states, women lack equal access to education and the labor market. The equal-opportunity record is in general worse in autocratic states than in democratic states, with the exception of Rwanda, where the government has successfully reduced gender-based discrimination.

Social capital has increased slightly across the region. Interpersonal trust has emerged in the more open systems. Social capital is highest on the local and regional levels, particularly between individuals of the same ethnic group.

**Analysis**

**Political and social integration**

**Party system**

*To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and aggregate societal interests?*

Party systems are weak in most African states, although slight positive changes are evident. There are clear differences between West and Central Africa on the one hand and East and Southern Africa on the other. In West Africa, relatively stable party systems exist only in Ghana, Niger and Sierra Leone. In all other countries there, party systems are fragile. This also holds true for the comparatively democratically advanced countries of Benin, Senegal and Mali (until the coup in
Sub-Saharan Africa

2012). In East and Southern Africa, by contrast, nine of the 20 countries – Angola, Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe – boast a more or less stable party system. However, many of these systems are dominated by a single party that holds overwhelming electoral majorities and a strong influence on the society at large. In Angola and Mozambique, the dominant parties exhibit autocratic practices. The weaknesses of African party systems are to a large extent the result of programmatic deficiencies and vagueness, underdeveloped organizational capacities, and flawed electoral systems. Parties are often characterized by vague political programs, ethnic and regional orientations (DRC, Republic of Congo, Nigeria), and a high degree of personalization. They often mirror the ambitions of elite members (Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania and Zambia). The fragility of the party system often results in high levels of voter volatility and unstable coalition governments.

**Interest groups**
To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?

Only six states in East and Southern Africa (Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Uganda) show a comparatively broad range of interest groups and associations representing most groups in society. As the region's single semi-industrialized country, only South Africa has a highly differentiated system of interest groups in the classic sectors of capital, labor and religion.

In West and Central Africa, only Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali have relatively strong interest-group systems, with public-sector trade unions being of particular importance. In many countries throughout all sub-regions, the range of formal interest groups is rather narrow. In contrast, the range of associations and NGOs is often wide. Urban interest groups tend to dominate this sector, while rural aspirations remain underrepresented.

The interest-group and NGO scenes are weak in countries that have experienced civil war (Burundi, CAR, Chad, DRC, Republic of Congo and Rwanda) and in hard-line autocracies (Eritrea, Ethiopia). Politically active NGOs often face mistrust or even repression on the part of the state. Many NGOs are financially dependent on external support (Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Uganda). Informal networks exist alongside formal organizations in many countries.

**Social capital**
To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced?

Social capital has increased slightly in general, but in an interregional comparison, the level of trust in sub-Saharan Africa is still low. Relatively high levels of trust can be found only in Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius and Senegal. The formation of social capital has proven difficult in countries experiencing civil war, decades-long white-minority rule, and in most ethnically heterogeneous countries. In countries that have experienced civil war or state failure, the reemergence of mutual trust will take considerable time. Trust and feelings of solidarity within ethnic groups are much stronger than between ethnic groups. The formation of self-help groups and solidarity-based organizations is stronger on the local level, in particular within villages, and is often based on kinship networks. These numerous networks are often a reaction to the state's inability to provide even basic services for the population.

**Inclusiveness & non-discrimination**

**State identity**
To what extent do all groups in society have access to citizenship and naturalization? To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate?
Although most states remain confined to the artificial borders inherited from the colonial powers, state identity is not questioned in most countries. Identification with the state is on average stronger than in other regions of the world. However, there are clear differences between West and Central Africa and East and Southern Africa. Due to the repressive character of the central government, state identity is weaker in some multiethnic states in East and Southern Africa, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Zimbabwe. It is also weaker in some countries of West and Central Africa; substantial portions of the population or minorities in Cameroon, the CAR and Côte d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent in the Republic of Congo and Mauritania, feel disadvantaged and alienated, often because the government does not offer sufficient protection from violence or discrimination.

**Socioeconomic barriers**

To what extent are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality?

Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s least developed region overall. Poverty and inequality are structurally ingrained in all African regions. Moreover, the situation in West and Central Africa, as well as on the Horn of Africa, is worse than elsewhere on the continent. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), only one country, the island state of Mauritius, belongs to the groups of countries with high human development, while those few countries belonging to the group of medium development are primarily located within the Southern African sub-region (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia). Socioeconomic barriers to transformation have shown little change, as they are in large part structural. However, improvement has been evident in Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia. Most of the region’s countries have stagnated at a very low level of development, leaving the bulk of the population with very few or no chances to better their lives.

**Equal opportunity**

To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?

Only a few countries – Botswana, Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa – are able to provide for equality of opportunity to an extent somewhat greater than elsewhere in the region. Income inequality in South Africa is extreme, producing the highest Gini Index value globally, and there is some discrimination against minorities in Botswana. Nevertheless, the overall situation has improved. This is in large part the result of rising literacy rates and a growing share of women receiving education. Countries where civil wars or periods of violence have ended (Angola, Burundi, Guinea, Liberia and Togo) have also made some progress. The greatest recent progress was achieved in Guinea and Rwanda. In both countries, opportunities for women have improved substantially as a result of increased government efforts in the educational sector. In most countries, however, equality of opportunity for women in the education system and on the job market, both in the formal and the informal economy, does not exist. Gender shows an average continental improvement over the past four years, albeit to a lesser extent than in Participation. Despite this progress, only half of the countries on the continent are on an upward trajectory, while the other half show either deterioration or static trends.

**Projections 2015 – 2030**

**Political and social integration**

The development of intermediary organizations will continue to follow very different paths in different countries. The strength of interest groups and the formation of political parties will be strongly influenced by economic development. If economic growth persists, incentives for articulating popular demands through organized groups will be stronger. The development of
political parties will depend to some extent on generational shifts. But it will be difficult for the incoming generation of politicians to reduce the currently clientelistic logic of politics. However, trust can increase only if this happens, and if governments pursue a less particularistic path. Overall development will be uneven. States in turmoil (CA R, DRC and Somalia) cannot be expected to strengthen intermediary organizations. Meanwhile, hard-line autocracies (Eritrea, Ethiopia) are not interested in having functioning intermediary organizations, as this implies a loss of control. The survival of NGOs and many civil-society organizations will additionally depend to a large extent on external support.

**Inclusiveness & non-discrimination**

The exclusion of large parts of the population within sub-Saharan Africa is the result of deeply ingrained poverty and inequality. The region is very unlikely to catch up with other continents with regard to inclusiveness in the next 10 to 15 years. The reduction of socioeconomic barriers is possible only through high economic growth rates (a minimum of 7% annually) in the long run. In addition, a fairer distribution of the fruits of economic growth is a precondition for the reduction of socioeconomic barriers in many countries. Consistent engagement by donors could further reduce inequalities between boys and girls in the educational system. The end of discrimination against ethnic, regional and religious minorities will depend on governments’ willingness to strengthen inclusive institutions and mechanisms.
In general, political management is better in democracies than in autocracies. Moreover, governance is more advanced in Southern Africa (with some exceptions such as Zimbabwe) and in some West African states than in the other two sub-regions. In Central Africa, a very low degree of steering capability is visible, with a number of failing states with severe violent conflicts. Public Management registers a negative trajectory over the past four years (2011-2015). Despite this, Public Management has shown less deterioration than the other constituent sub-categories that have shown deterioration. “The ten countries to show the largest improvement in Public Management are diverse; Southern African countries (Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Namibia), large African economies (Morocco, Tanzania and Nigeria), post-conflict countries (Rwanda and Sierra Leone) and countries showing gains from a low base (Democratic republic of Congo).

* The IIAG indicators for Public Management are: Public Administration, Statistical Capacity, Diversification, Budget Management, Ratio of Total Revenue to Total Expenditure, Fiscal Policy,
Sub-Saharan Africa


Democracies perform better than autocracies in terms of defining priorities, implementing policies and using resources efficiently. Improvements are needed particularly in the categories of prioritization and implementation. Governments have often made progress in designing and carrying out programs and measures in the field of poverty reduction. In the autocratic camp, only Ethiopia and Rwanda perform relatively well. Chad, both of the Congos, Eritrea, Somalia and Zimbabwe show poor or even a lack of management. In these and several other countries, resources are wasted to a large extent. The reasons behind this low efficiency are not only political in nature. Often, a lack of capacities, particularly in (post-) conflict-ridden countries or failing states, hampers efficient reform policy.

Many states have realized the destructive character of large-scale corruption, and have introduced integrity mechanisms. Despite some success in a few states, only Botswana has shown the ability to fight corruption effectively.

Domestic conflict management and efforts to build consensus are stronger in Southern Africa than in the other three sub-regions. Progress has been made in countries where violent conflicts have ended or where conflict intensity has been reduced. The opposite trends are evident in countries with militant Islamist groups such as Mali or Nigeria.

Some governments, as in Chad, the two Congos, Eritrea, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, neglect conflict resolution or even manipulate grievances between groups to weaken potential opposition forces and strengthen their hold on power.

Civil-society participation is encouraged in some of the more democratic countries. However, many governments are reluctant to cooperate with civil-society groups and limit cooperation to development projects.

Analysis

Strategic capacity & efficiency

Prioritization

To what extent does the government set and maintain strategic priorities?

Governmental capacity and the ability to define and maintain priorities is particularly strong in Southern Africa, specifically in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, as well as in Malawi and Mozambique. Other strategically capable governments include Ghana, Liberia, Mauritius, Rwanda
and Uganda. Some of these governments lack the necessary endogenous capacities to prioritize effectively, so realization is possible only with external support.

Prioritization is usually strong in the field of poverty reduction, where IMF, the World Bank and other international institutions offer support. In some countries, ambitious, well-prepared papers proposing (unrealistic) reform programs are aimed more at pleasing donors than at planning realistic and appropriate reforms (DRC, Republic of Congo). Other countries desperately lack capacity (CAR, Chad). Short term considerations – how to win the next elections and stay in power longer – often take precedence over strategic plans.

Implementation
How effective is the government in implementing its own policies?

In contrast to prioritization, the implementation of planned reforms is a huge challenge for many governments. All in all, the ability to implement policies has grown. But progress is uneven, and capacities and abilities are again more significant in Southern Africa than in other regions. Whereas governments achieve most of their own strategic priorities in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, only Ghana, Mauritius and Uganda have a similar record elsewhere. Implementation has improved in Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Togo and Zimbabwe. Policy implementation heavily correlates with low conflict intensity. The main impediments to implementation can be found in a lack of capacity (Chad, Lesotho, Niger and South Sudan), inefficient administration (Nigeria) and corruption (DRC, Republic of Congo and also Benin).

Efficient use of assets
To what extent does the government make efficient use of available human, financial and organizational resources?

Again, there are notable differences between the regions with regard to efficiency. While all governments in West and Central Africa waste most if not all of their available resources, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and Rwanda show a comparatively advanced level of governmental efficiency. Positive developments from a low starting point can be seen in Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Zimbabwe. In these countries, some reforms have borne fruit, and Budget deficits have been decreased (often with external support). The primary reasons for inefficiency and waste are the misuse of funds, non-transparent budgets (as in Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda) and an oversized public sector – as in Uganda, where the cabinet consists of 81 ministers. The overstaffing of the administration with frequently underqualified employees is part of an elite clientelistic practice aimed at buying support.

Anti-corruption policy
To what extent does the government successfully contain corruption?

Corruption is widespread throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and is deeply rooted in many countries. With the exception of Botswana, and to a lesser extent Ghana, Liberia and Namibia, the region's countries struggle unsuccessfully against or simply fail to combat corruption. Accountability shows a negative continental trend, alongside being the lowest scoring sub-category in the IIAG. In total, less than half of the countries on the continent have registered progress in this sub-category in the past four years. Progress in establishing integrity mechanisms and introducing binding norms have been made in Guinea, Liberia and Niger, but each of these started at an extremely low level. Less success in containing corruption can be noted in Benin, Burundi, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mali and South Africa. This list of countries shows that corruption continues to be a severe problem in democratic and autocratic states alike. Poverty and underdevelopment provide a fertile ground for a culture of corruption, and the power structure of many countries is based on its continuance. Any fight against the clientelistic system would fundamentally threaten political leaders' power base. Therefore, elites
often not only lack the political will to fight corruption effectively, but themselves tend to drive much of the public-sector corruption (as in Angola or Kenya) while paying lip service to fighting corruption. The proliferation of anti-corruption institutions is sometimes a façade in reaction to pressure from donors.

**Consensus-building**

*Cleavage/conflict management*

*To what extent is the political leadership able to moderate cleavage-based conflict?*

Most African societies are divided by often-overlapping ethnic, regional, social and religious cleavages. However, these do not automatically result in conflicts. Despite substantial diversity in many countries, for example, there is generally peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups. Still, the politicization and manipulation of ethnic (including intra-ethnic) and regional grievances by political elites is one causal factor in many conflicts. In the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Togo, governments and elites have exacerbated existing conflicts by privileging or neglecting groups from certain regions or ethnicities. In states such as Chad and Sierra Leone, the governing elites’ home regions receive state privileges. Many governments are unwilling to build consensus by forging compromises and depolarizing existing conflicts. The intensity of local, ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria has increased because government crisis management was ineffective, and was not always backed by the necessary political will. The potential instability there now threatens regional stability. Only a handful of governments – largely Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa – have had some success in moderating existing conflicts. Nor does a tradition of moderation and compromise necessarily prevent conflicts; Mali, traditionally a strongly consensus-oriented society, recently experienced a high level of polarization and civil strife. Social cleavages in Namibia and South Africa have been moderated by the governments through an active social policy, but are still present.

*Civil-society participation*

*To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?*

There is no clear trend with regard to civil-society participation in sub-Saharan Africa. Few governments actively include civil society in their decision-making processes. In Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, and to a lesser extent Benin and Niger, governments encourage the participation of civil society in planning and implementing reforms. However, civil-society participation is often constrained by groups’ organizational weaknesses (Malawi, Togo).

Civil-society organizations are often concentrated in an urban environment, especially in the capital. Many groups lack a mass base, and a great number – especially NGOs active in sectors such as human rights, environment or social rights – are dependent on external funding. Ties between the government and groups are weak, as governments are hesitant or outright opposed to cooperation, or are only willing to cooperate in selected areas.

When civil-society groups demand to be allowed to participate, governments often either ignore the groups or even suppress and hamper their activities. Civil society in Cameroon, CAR, DRC, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania is largely ignored by the government. In Burundi, the Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, independent civic groups often face repression, and their activities are restricted by law. Other governments are more open to such demands if the groups pursue developmental aims. In these more technical and largely nonpolitical areas, participation is tolerated or even welcomed (Rwanda). Greater openness to civil-society participation is often the result of donor pressure. Aid-dependent governments that want to benefit from poverty-reduction strategies often accept donors’ recommendations to include civil-society groups in the planning.
of anti-poverty measures (Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, and to a certain extent Cameroon). The governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea have shown increasing openness following the end of periods of national turmoil.

### Projections 2015 – 2030

#### Strategic capacity & efficiency

The management of political and economic reform has improved over the years. Still, the level of effective governance is very low compared to other continents. Prioritization is usually more successful than actual implementation. Supported by donors, some countries have been able to realize reforms. A mixture of a lack of capacities, ineffective administration and a lack of political will continues to hamper progress. Instability, civil unrest and civil wars with negative effects in neighboring states will postpone further reforms.

Implementation is more strongly realized in the comparatively more democratic countries than in authoritarian states (with the exceptions of Ethiopia and Rwanda in the field of economic reforms). The democracy/autocracy distinction to a large extent loses its significance with respect to corruption: Even democratic forerunner countries such as Mauritius are challenged by corruption, and the fight against it has not been successful so far.

#### Consensus-building

The management of conflicts and the creation of strategies to mitigate often-overlapping social, regional and ethnic cleavages is one of the greatest challenges Africa faces. Conflicts that escalate into violence and civil war are one of the main impediments to development and democratic progress. Violent conflicts in the DRC and South Sudan, as well as the fragile situations in Burundi, CAR, Chad, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, need comprehensive strategies to regain or maintain a minimum of stability. This aim can only be reached through close cooperation between internal and external actors in building consensus. Due to recent experiences (such as that with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or the chaos in Libya) it is likely that external actors will in the future be more willing to act before conflicts escalate into disastrous civil wars. Civil society groups will play an important role in conflict management and processes of reconstruction and reconciliation, because they often are accorded higher levels of trust than political elites.