CONCLUSIONS

Next Generation Democracy: Looking Forward
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Between the 23rd and the 25th of November 2014, under the framework of the Next Generation Democracy Project (NGD), the Club de Madrid and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights (RFK Center) partnered to facilitate a policy dialogue -“Democracy and Human Rights in Decline? A Call to Action”- hosted by the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Forty Club de Madrid Members and 100 renowned experts on democracy from academia, international organizations, think tanks, the private sector and civil society jointly assessed the quality and state of democracy around the world and discussed transformative ideas and practices that could contribute to preventing its decline.

The policy dialogue launched the NGD Project, a Club de Madrid-led, two-year, multi-stakeholder process that will progressively identify key elements and develop both regional and global action-oriented agendas aimed at advancing democracy. The Bertelsmann Stiftung, one of our main NGD partners, drafted preliminary regional reports on recent trends and prospects in democratic development. These were then reviewed and enriched by NGD regional partners including the Atlantic Council, the Observer Research Foundation, the Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE), the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), the Carnegie Middle East Center and the Institute for Security Studies. These initial reports constitute the starting point of the NGD Project and can be accessed at www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org

See the Photo Gallery of the Policy Dialogue at https://www.flickr.com/photos/clubdemadrid/
FRAMING THE DEBATES
ON THE STATE AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Working group discussions and plenary sessions during the policy dialogue offered additional elements relevant to a diagnosis of the current state and the future of democracy. These elements will complement and enrich initial NGD regional reports and thus help frame and guide future NGD debates and the project’s final outcome:

◆ The scope of freedom and democracy has expanded decisively worldwide, particularly during the last quarter of the 20th century. This process has, however, slowed down since 2006, when we begin to witness a steady, if regionally uneven, deterioration in political rights and liberties. Since good news is exceptional these days, the proposition that democracy and respect for human rights are in crisis has become a truism. Growing radicalization, extremisms and the re-emergence of terrorism in different parts of the world are becoming fundamental challenges to democracy. Moreover, even if the net number of persons enjoying freedom from want continues to increase worldwide, albeit at the expense of non-renewable resources, inequality within countries is deepening, a major trend that further endangers democracy and political freedom.

◆ Citizens in various regions of the world are challenging the way democracy is being practiced, while demanding more democracy as a means of fulfilling their expectations and needs. Even if there is no paradigm replacing democracy as a common aspiration, discontent with the present state of democracy and political disaffection are both on the rise. A transition beyond the traditional liberal, democratic scheme seems to be taking shape. There is, in this sense, an additional risk, particularly in democratic countries for in as much as the response of governments to mass protests undermines basic principles of human rights, democracy itself could be further challenged.

◆ The quest for democratization has triggered conflict in Syria and a regression to authoritarian rule in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Governments are devising subtle forms of social and political control over citizens, often in association with private actors, a situation that can fuel further corruption. In this context, incentives for transitional or less-consolidated democracies to deepen reforms is wanting, and little support or inspiration can be offered to them while democracy is under overall stress. In terms of foreign policy, double standards in efforts to foster democracy and human rights have damaged the prestige of consolidated democracies, with the
growing focus on “economic diplomacy” blurring differences between democratic and authoritarian regimes.

◆ The consequences of the failure of democracies to deliver as promised or expected are also becoming apparent at the global level. The fact that radicalization is taking root in the context of conflict is exacerbated by a decrease in multilateral initiatives protecting human rights and the basic needs of victims. Unprotected, local populations are often bound to seek protection from groups opposing democracy and human dignity. Abuses in the use of force and the recourse to torture in the name of democracy, starting with the so-called ‘war on terror’, provide further ‘justification’ to groups that use force to oppose democracy. Efforts to export and impose democracy, even by force, has proven counterproductive. A new consensus is needed on how democratic countries can effectively support and foster democracy through foreign policy and multilateral action.

◆ More generally, the growing stress experienced by democratic institutions is to a great extent due to their inability to meet citizens’ increasing expectations, a phenomenon exacerbated in a context of economic crisis. While traditional middle classes in Western Europe and the United States see a bleak economic future for themselves and their children, the new middle classes in Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa are demanding access to more information and education, as well as non-discriminatory access to the market economy. The social contract on which democracies have been traditionally grounded is proving elusive in both cases.

◆ Corruption has in many cases undermined trust in traditional political actors worldwide and is increasingly affecting democratic institutions themselves. This may, in turn, have long-lasting repercussions for the future of democracy. The growing gap between institutions and citizens can easily be exploited by populist and nationalistic leaders to confront the principles of democracy while gaining votes, and this is
taking place even in consolidated democracies. In this context, certain groups and minorities are being threatened, either directly by the State or as a result of increasing social tensions. Democratic disaffection can, in this way, have a direct impact on the protection of human rights and the social cohesion and inclusion intrinsic to genuine democratic governance.

◆ Should present trends not be reversed, few new democracies will emerge or consolidate, while some consolidated democracies will face the dilemma of adapting or collapsing. It is thus imperative to find ways of channeling citizens’ quest for political participation, so that democracy is not reduced to the sole provision of electoral legitimacy. In this sense, technocratic governance through regulatory bodies may represent an unreasonable or even undemocratic constraint on political flexibility, as well as on the healthy and necessary exchange of ideas regarding appropriate and satisfactory economic models. As some participants stressed in various working groups during the policy dialogue, democracy should prevail over vested economic interests, and participatory democracy should in some instances complement representative democracy.

◆ Some of the key challenges facing democracy cannot be tackled solely at the national or even regional level. Globalization, driven by forces that include neoliberal policies and new communication technologies, has weakened the power of national governments without generating more democratic global institutions able to act effectively. Global action is imperative in order to strengthen democracy. The illegitimate marriage between politics and money must be nullified and this will, in turn, require actions such as the elimination of tax havens, better international monitoring of extractive industries and joint action against international trafficking.
A comprehensive and comparative consideration of the state and future of democracy will help strengthen efforts to face current challenges. The growing disenchantment with democracy among youth is a disturbing trend in regions where the struggle for democracy either recently failed or took place decades ago. We need to find ways to fine-tune democracy so it can better meet new demands and realities: this includes changing the way in which we discuss and practice democracy, and may lead to broadening its scope. The frustration and disenchantment of citizens is to some extent a reflection of the inability of democracies to incorporate and act in accordance with and respond to new values. For example, the inability of industrialized democracies to effectively address the challenge of climate change must be overcome so that other countries may more readily follow suit. This requires that a clean and healthy environment needs to be broadly considered and accepted to be a basic human right. It is also necessary to develop ways to embed the values of deliberation and shared decision-making within the realities of new technology. Also, it is necessary to create conditions able to usher in a new kind of democratic political leadership, not solely focused on the short term but instead capable of meeting the challenges of the future.
ELEMENTS FOR NGD REGIONAL AGENDAS

As initially conceived, the NGD Project aims to better identify and help tackle disturbing trends and scenarios affecting the future of democracy at both regional and global levels. The global agenda will focus on commonalities identified through the work of the various regional teams, as well as on aspects known to require global action. Regional work will be led by Club de Madrid Members and NGD partners from the individual regions, and may entail a consideration of sub-regional trends and related proposals. As an initial input to this process, participants in the policy dialogue identified broad regional aspirations and democratic-development needs to which the NGD project may contribute:

In Sub-Saharan Africa, a focus on peace and stability as a precursor for democracy should not negate the need for democratic developments such as judicial independence. The active involvement of the African Union may be required in the implementation phase of these developments. A common challenge to the deepening of democracy in Africa, and one that a regional NGD agenda could help tackle, is the need for a better understanding of the links between economics and sustainable democratic development, as well as of the importance of qualitative and not just quantitative measures and indicators of inclusion. This should strengthen a sustained expansion of African middle classes, enabling them to play a transformative role in their countries.

See Sub-Saharan Africa Working Group Conclusions at page 13

In the Americas, the formulation of the NGD regional agenda may serve as a platform for the discussion on meaningful regional integration and a new, constructive relationship between South and North. A focus on democracy should facilitate this process. New political actors and regional leaders, genuinely loyal to democracy, are thus direly needed. The Organization of American States, which has played a central role in democratic development in Latin America, along with other relevant organizations in the region, must emphasize the...
need for cooperation in the prevention of organized crime, a very real threat to democratic institutions in certain countries. Moreover, meeting the needs of a flourishing middle class in the Southern Hemisphere requires renewing the design of social policies. Today, this stands as a litmus test for democracy in the region.

See The Americas Working Group Conclusions at page 16

**Working Group Asia-Oceania**

Despite the region’s heterogeneity, NGD could also serve as a platform for dialogue in Asia-Oceania, particularly on issues of access and inclusion. The region’s most acute, general need is to strengthen institutions tasked with achieving inclusiveness, particularly with regard to protecting and empowering minorities and marginalized groups. Regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have yet to take a formal role and pledge their commitment to democracy-building. In very practical terms, the region needs to create regional and sub-regional resource centers on democracy in order to foster an open exchange of ideas and best practices associated with democratic values and policies.

See Asia-Oceania Working Group Conclusions at page 20

**Working Group Wider Europe and Post-Soviet Eurasia**

Diversity is the common denominator in the Wider European and Post-Soviet Eurasian space, where democratic systems need be updated in order to meet new challenges, and democratic transitions must be given renewed vigor if they are to be sustained. The European Union is today considered part of the problem, with its intrinsic democratic deficit becoming ever more apparent, in spite of its proclaimed values, as a result of the economic crisis. This has, in turn, brought enlargement - the most powerful EU tool to foster democratic development in the wider region - to a halt. The crucial work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe does not appear to be enough to fill this vacuum in the EU neighborhood and beyond. A NGD agenda should thus take a differentiated approach and consider the management of the economic crisis and the geopolitical situation as factors that have eroded trust and democracy.

See Wider Europe/Post-Soviet Eurasia Working Group Conclusions at page 24
In the MENA region, where Tunisia today stands as the only democratic outlier, the need to reconcile the democratization process and the foreign policies of democratic countries appears as a priority. The NGD project could also serve as a platform for discussion of the relationship between Islam and politics, enabling regional stakeholders to reach the basic level consensus needed for the successful functioning of democratic processes. A regional NGD agenda should additionally include proposals to facilitate greater autonomy for sub-national entities. This could help diverse communities become more involved as citizens, while countering radicalization. Decentralization, tailored to each country’s reality in the broader MENA region, may also contribute to retain and expand feelings of national unity, thus preventing internal conflict.

See Broader MENA Working Group Conclusions at page 28
LOOKING FORWARD

The focus and specific elements of NGD regional agendas will be determined in workshops that will take place during the first half of 2015 at the regional level. Comprehensive reports on trends and prospects in the relationship between the economy and the environment, and between each of these and democratic governance will progressively be added to the NGD knowledge base. NGD regional partners will identify transformative practices and ideas developing in each region, which will in turn inspire the drafting of the agendas. As indicated during the policy dialogue’s break-out sessions, NGD agendas should have a strong regional component while taking differentiated, sub-regional realities and approaches into account when necessary. Both regions and sub-regions must become actors in preserving democracy. Likewise, the committed engagement of regional organizations is considered critical for the overall future of democracy.

NGD agendas will serve as an effective basis for social, economic and political stakeholders in each region to reinvigorate and, if necessary, reshape democracy, only if they fully consider all relevant perspectives. Club de Madrid Members and NGD partners aim to work towards that end, facilitating cross-learning and cross-fertilization through the open exchange of transformative ideas and proposals.

During the second half of 2015, NGD will also undertake the drafting of a global agenda, which to a great extent will draw upon and complement the regional agendas. As agreed during the policy dialogue, the state of democracy today needs to be assessed in the context of globalization and deep interdependence. These processes tend to create constraints but may also offer opportunities to democratic actors. New technologies and social media, for example, are by definition global in scope, and thus demand a basic level of global regulation. Such activity may contribute both to enhancing public debate and increasing the transparency of policymaking at the national, regional and global levels, making national and international institutions increasingly accountable through the public information policies and open data.
NGD will thus analyze the impact that social, economic and global trends may have on the future of democracy in order to determine what actions taken at the global level might contribute to the prevention of democratic decline. Today’s networks and interests are increasingly transnational. This exacerbates the difficulty of aggregating the increasingly diverse political views of empowered individuals and issues-based groups. In parallel, sovereignty is becoming functionally dispersed across territorial units and agencies not territorially based, but spanning local, regional and global institutions. Democracy, as it is being practiced, needs to integrate certain cosmopolitan aspects of political representation in order to keep up with the global nature of today’s politics and economics, as well as the various transnational juridical institutions that enforce order and human rights. Multilateral treaties, as contracts among states, do not alone appear to be a sufficient vehicle to guide transnational democratic action. However, the present trend toward the bilateralization of international relations, which has included a steady decrease in state contributions to multilateral funds and agencies, seems to move in a direction counter to what is required.

The NGD global agenda will, on the one hand, incorporate proposals emerging from commonalities identified during the regional drafting processes and, on the other, respond to challenges and identify opportunities deriving from globalization. All Club de Madrid Members and NGD partners will actively participate in this process. A global agenda for democracy aiming at achieving the “full participation of citizens in all aspects of life”, as stated in United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/62/7, must be in tune with and contribute to the work of the United Nations. In this sense, the regional and global NGD agenda must pay particular attention to the Post-2015 Development Agenda process, as well as to the various democratic development and governance initiatives being undertaken by the various United Nations’ agencies, programs and related organizations, such as UNDP, with which NGD is already cooperating closely.
Sub-Saharan Africa Working Group Conclusions

The overall progress made in Africa and by Africans over the past three decades is the first element that must be openly recognized. While many challenges remain, there are visible signs of ongoing improvement in many sub-Saharan countries and, even if there is a strong sense that democracy is irreversible in Africa, much can be done to deepen its quality and impact on the lives of its citizens.

Values and Institutions

Africa has become a focus of interest for many outside the continent. This has contributed to a policy arena now seen as quite crowded and, while well-meaning recommendations are often made, they often ignore local realities and constrain African governments’ options.

Particular emphasis must be placed on ways to measure and understand the challenges to, as well as the quality of democracy from the perspective of African citizens. This will require the development and utilization of qualitative tools that will allow us to enhance assessments that are often based primarily on quantitative measurements and indicators.

An additional focus moving forward must be on better understanding of the ‘how’ - what is working and what is not, and why. This will by definition require a deeper understanding of local-level initiatives and experiences and therefore greater engagement at that level.

Peace and stability are often seen as preconditions for democracy to take hold. Greater focus could perhaps be placed on democracy-enabling conditions that
foster consensus and facilitate conflict resolution, rather than engendering tensions, as moving too quickly towards elections may, for example, do.

Once democracy is achieved, strengthening the rule of law will be necessary in most African countries. This requires promoting and building independent judiciaries that can mediate the potential excesses of the executive and legislative branches of government.

We need to better understand the link between democracy and development. A widespread challenge to deepening democracy in Africa is the fact that it is not always seen as effective in delivering material benefits to populations hungry for development. It would thus be useful to develop a better understanding of the economic fundamentals of sustainable democracy.

Access and inclusiveness

Current economic models and indicators such as GDP do not adequately address the realities of many African countries. A future focus must contemplate models and methodologies that better measure social inclusion and cohesion.

Inequality is today a key challenge both globally and in Africa. This fundamental challenge cannot be adequately understood or addressed without promoting inclusion, not only of the socio-economically disadvantaged but of those that are excluded and marginalized on the basis of race, religion, gender or identity.

Furthering inclusion will, by definition, require contemplating the views and experiences of groups that are often marginalized, such as the poor, women, ethnic groups and youth. Given the large proportion of the African population that is under the age of 35 (65%), it is essential that initiatives encouraging the engagement and participation of young people be explored and implemented. Kenya, for example, has introduced innovative policies to promote youth development.

In addition, as the African middle class grows, consideration must be given both to ensuring the sustainability of this sector, given its vulnerability to economic shocks, and to fostering its potentially transformative role in African countries.

Civil society can contribute to enriching African democracies, but many governments are concerned with what they perceive as simple opposition. This can result in efforts either to undermine or ignore the presence and activities of non-governmental organizations. Practical initiatives to create an appropriate space for the effective engagement of and consultation with civil society must be considered. Mozambique, for example, has established an annual forum for such discussions.
Management and Policies

While governments have, in many cases, adopted good national development plans and policies, implementation often remains an important hurdle. Many challenges facing African democracies require continental and sub-regional efforts.

In an increasingly interconnected world, efforts to reduce inequality at the national level may easily be undermined by regional or global realities, a fact that has been directly experienced in a number of countries. Botswana, for example, found that lowering public-sector salaries with the aim of reducing inequality can result in the loss of important skills and expertise to countries outside Africa.

Similarly, efforts to impose fair taxes to retain revenue for African development can be undermined by a lack of capacity, and sometimes will, by African governments to impose appropriate taxation for certain economic activities, such as the extractive industries.

Strategies for developing real capacity within the African Union, sub-regional bodies and national governments should be developed, so as to better facilitate implementation. Moreover, a new focus must be placed on measuring the impact of democratic institutions, rather than simply assessing whether they are in place or not.

Conclusion

We need to recognize that many of the challenges facing Africa have long histories and are structural in nature. It will take time and possibly generations to see results in some areas. The Next Generation Democracy Project, led by democratically elected, former African heads of state and government, constitutes an opportunity to identify potential remedies to disquieting trends in African democracies. The direct involvement of key regional stakeholders, however, including the African Union, will be required for this process to bear fruit.

See NGD Track 1 Report - Sub-Saharan Africa at www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org
The Americas Working Group Conclusions

Latin America has made great strides in consolidating democracy in recent decades. Nevertheless, even if military dictatorship is today largely a thing of the past, democratic institutions, with a few exceptions, remain weak, and constraints limiting civil society participation in political decision-making processes appear set to continue. Moreover, populism is again on the rise and organized crime has not been overcome.

Inequality and a lack of broad-based inclusiveness remain the main obstacles to genuine democracy in the Americas, as more prosperity has not led to greater equality. The middle class has done relatively well in the last few decades, but it is today uncertain whether this momentum can be continued. If this is not the case, instability may again appear. If economic progress slows down in the decade to come, middle classes are likely to blame democratic governments.

Institutions abiding by or supporting the rule of law are not yet well established in most Latin American communities. In Central America and parts of Mexico, organized criminal groups have trampled over the judiciary and the police, and de facto rule has taken the place of elected governing bodies. Moreover, civil society continues to be comparatively weak in Latin America, while party structures are rudimentary or frail, at best. As a result, consensus-building is very difficult.

The deterioration of democracy in the United States constitutes a main concern. There is increasing polarization within the electorate and growing indecisiveness in the federal government. Sustained inequalities and legislative dysfunctions, with elites directly influencing political action, point to fundamental deficiencies from a democratic perspective. Although the United States used to be and still is a resilient society, it is becoming increasingly disaffected and distrustful of national government. In spite of pending problems and disquieting trends, regional institutions such as the Organization of American States seem progressively less able to do their job of pointing out governments’ shortfalls and exerting
pressure on them and on civil society to advance democracy. Considering also that the presence of the international and multilateral institutions has decreased in Latin America, there is potential for a further slide in democratic practices. Thus, the picture has entirely changed relative to a decade or so ago, when Latin Americans were taking big strides toward democracy and regional integration.

The region is increasingly divided. Countries on the Pacific and northern rim are attracted to US and Asian trade potential and initiatives. By contrast, Brazil and other countries on the continent’s eastern side, used to looking towards Europe, are today also swinging towards Asia. There are also crucial differences with regards to development models: 50% of regional GDP originates in countries promoting free and open markets, while the other half is associated with regulated economies in which governments retain controls on domestic and international transactions.

Values and Institutions

There is a strong trend in the Americas toward increasing the power of the Executive, in part as a result of increasing political disaffection and public apathy. Some Latin American Executives are in parallel growing more sophisticated in how they wield and retain power, often by changing constitutional norms to lengthen their terms in office.

If genuine political participation in the Americas is to be enhanced, it will be crucial to strengthen political parties as independent political actors and to develop a culture of loyal opposition. One of the main disquieting trends in this sense is the lack of respect for dissenting political opinion and even more for criticism. This has led in part to an increasing intimidation of journalists. The media needs to be divorced from parties and government.

The present context is far from conducive to meaningful political participation. Social networks as mechanisms of social expression tend to distort reality by offering a biased version of the political situation. Today, citizens seem more interested in prosperity than in participation per se, and thus seem willing to sacrifice democracy if a government is able to deliver economically, even with a heavy-handed approach. Reforms may, for this very reason, be unlikely. Indeed, prosperity has to some extent fueled antidemocratic practices in the Americas, by sustaining regimes with strong Executives, ultimately leading to domination by caudillos.

Rule-of-law institutions have proven ineffective in combating organized crime, a direct threat to democracy that further undermines social cohesion. Latin American relations with the United States have not improved sufficiently in this sense, as arms flows undercut Mexico’s and other countries’ efforts to counter organized crime.
The region has to a large extent abandoned the enthusiastic discourse of past decades on regional integration, a fact that further impacts democratization negatively. Welfare and productivity, which are essential for the consolidation of democracy, can hardly be achieved when countries in one continent are increasingly isolated from each other and looking elsewhere for development.

Access and inclusiveness

Since threats to civil and political rights are located in a few countries, regional efforts should concentrate in collective rights, minority representation problems, and economic and social issues that have to do with access rather than with the very survival of human beings or direct abuses by government authorities.

Economic growth fueled by commodities trade with China alleviated poverty in but did not bring about a diversification of the economy which could significantly improve social cohesion. Hence, as Chinese demand for minerals and energy began to ease, economic growth suffered in the region. Without continued growth, age-old class divisions are likely to grow again.

There is no public strategy for solidarity in this more challenging economic situation. Middle classes press on governments to provide better public services—such as education and health—, especially as they became vulnerable due to the slowdown in economic growth. Even if there is potential for governments to increase taxes, it may give rise to new protests if quality of services is not promptly ensured.

Latin American countries have not invested sufficiently in building human capital, particularly in the field of technology innovation. With citizens lacking the skills to fully implement emerging technologies into their industries, Latin America would not be able to compete in the global economy.

Management and policies

Highly vulnerable groups in society generally suffer most from the deficient capacity of the State in the Americas. The continuing regional emigration, particularly strong in certain Latin American countries during the last two decades, is a clear reflection of this issue. The presence of underdeveloped sectors indicate that polices have not been successful in integrating vulnerable and/or marginalized groups. This has, in turn, affected economic development. A major obstacle in this regard, as relevant as the lack of adequate tools and institutions, is the lack of political will to tackle these problems in many countries. The struggle to establish the rule of law should thus incorporate the struggle for inclusiveness as an integral part of a democratic agenda for the region.
Gender is a case in point, starting with the inadequacy of programs to educate and integrate young girls into the workforce. This situation is particularly serious, since several Latin American countries have had teenage pregnancy rates higher than countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The problem is that after these young mothers give birth, there is no effort to bring them back into the classroom to prepare for a career. The economy thus suffers greatly from an undereducated female population.

Satisfying the expectations of the new middle classes in Latin America is proving harder than lifting them out of poverty in the first place, a fact that goes a long way towards explaining today’s increasing political indifference. Social policies must therefore be redesigned, taking the new economic and social cycle into consideration.

One serious obstacle to the improvement of public-policy efficiency lies in Latin America’s low overall tax rates, in some case, among the lowest in the world. Over the next decade, tax rates should be progressively boosted, although, as noted above, States currently lack the capacity to provide the immediate results in terms of improved public services that citizens will expect in return for higher taxes.

The capacity for consensus-building at the political level in Latin America is also very low. The regions’ political stakes are high; the benefits of being in power contribute to the fear of losing power. This, in turn, acts against the pursuit of long-term policies and consensus-building. It is imperative for the opposition and incumbents to provide mutual guarantees regarding the rules governing succession and rotation in power. The media has had a persistently polarizing effect in this area, pitting parties against one another, which has had direct repercussions on the efficiency of democratic governance.

See NGD Track 1 Report - The Americas at www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org
Asia-Oceania Working Group Conclusions

With India and China accounting for over more than one-third of the world's population, and the latter country providing an anti-democratic narrative that has won over many enthusiasts, the Asia-Oceania region’s role in shaping the future of democracy and human rights cannot be over-emphasized. The region is indeed characterized by extreme heterogeneity in democratic performance, which calls for sub-regional approaches with regard to developing the NGD agenda.

One of the biggest hindrances in deepening democracy in this region comes from weak state capacities. Democracy has remained mostly procedural, insofar as voting once in five years or so has become a ritual, while the state-citizen interface remains the weakest link. This is largely due to weak governance institutions, dysfunctional and self-serving bureaucracies, and the low priority given to enforcement of the rule of law, among other reasons. With the exception of Oceania and certain Asian countries such as Japan, abysmal or very low state capacity is without doubt a key reason why democracy remains merely symbolic for most of the population in South Asia and some parts of Southeast Asia.

In this context, the biggest banes for democracy in the Asia-Oceania region are populism and patronage-based politics, which flourish under the presence of state subsidies and handouts to prospective voters, despite the shortsightedness of such policies. Indeed, this trend has undermined the economies of most democracies in the region.

Values and Institutions

Universal suffrage is an irreversible reality in the region, and elections at regular intervals have been institutionalized even within most autocracies. However,
electoral integrity remains very weak in several democracies in the region, owing to factors such as the growing political fragmentation, the politics of mobilization, and a winner-takes-all political culture. The idea of liberal authoritarianism enjoys widespread popular appeal in the region, and ostensibly independent institutions are often politically managed by ruling elites through the provision of incentives and other coercive tactics.

Asia-Oceania offers two opposite trends with regard to political participation among various strata and social groups. In part due to affirmative-action measures, the democratic process has deepened the political participation of hitherto oppressed or disadvantaged populations, providing them with a voice and opportunities to move up political ladders previously restricted to the feudal and landed classes. Yet at the same time, exclusionary barriers against the political participation of religious and linguistic minorities (for example in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Malaysia), women and aboriginals are increasingly being raised in the region.

With growing telephone and internet penetration in the region, especially among young people, social media and similarly transformative tools are increasingly influencing democratic processes. The internet and social media have offered limitless possibilities for the conduct of political mobilization (witnessed in the Delhi elections 2013, the Sahbhag movement in Bangladesh, and in South Korea). However, the disruptive power of social media is also an area of serious concern.

With some exceptions (Japan, Australia and New Zealand, or Singapore and Malaysia with respect only to the functioning of the market economy), the rule of law is somewhat weak in Asia-Oceania. Executive fiat and discretionary decisions are common governing patterns, rather than independent judicial oversight based on the rule of law.

Access and Inclusiveness

Asia-Oceania is also one of the most unequal regions in terms of economic growth and redistribution. Given its long history of feudal dominance and the hierarchical nature of societies, most democracies suffer from the consequences of a concentration of wealth in few hands. This has had serious impact on the sustainability of democratic regimes in the region.

A continuing lack of adequate inclusionary mechanisms and of long-term vision among leaders and public officials has accelerated trends toward inequality, which is harming social cohesion and intra-regional peace.

Increasingly, economic elites are capturing political processes in order to better control the economy. Already in countries such as India, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, signs have emerged of economic oligarchs or plutocrats controlling
parties or even governments, thus impeding equal access to the benefits of the market economy.

Management and Policies

Incidences of political polarization and cleavage-based politics have become more common even in advanced democracies such as Australia and New Zealand, impeding broad economic and political reforms. Current trends offer scant hope that the next 15 years will produce any consensus-building institutions or value systems able to bridge political divides in many of the region’s democracies.

There is a growing danger that radical ideologies, religious extremism, terrorism and the radicalization of political space will damage democracy in the region. Even comparatively well-functioning democracies such as India and Indonesia face serious threats from internal insurgencies and terrorism. Considering the weakness of state capacities, the question of how to secure democracies in the midst of ethnic conflict and religious tensions is a crucial one for the region’s future.

Last but not least, one of the most visible impediments to democracy is the presence of deep and widespread corruption, which erodes every aspect of governance and state legitimacy in the region (including within authoritarian regimes).

Elements for the NGD regional agenda

_Improve the economic health of democracy_ - Economic growth in leading democracies, if oriented to the reduction of inequalities across the region and among various social groups, can provide an effective counter-narrative to China’s authoritarian “growth miracle.”

_Promote good governance and strengthen state-citizen relations_ - A top priority among democracies, especially those with weak governance institutions, has to be governance reforms aimed at addressing the disconnect between citizens and the State (such as the establishment of accountability and transparency tools, investments in capacity-building, the implementation of e-governance tools, and the creation of mechanisms for the redress of grievances). Sub-national levels of governance should also increase their responsiveness to citizens. Policymakers should start by addressing marginalized and excluded populations, in part through affirmative-action programs (e.g., special packages/quotas for women and social or religious minorities).

_Reduce political polarization and strengthen institutions and values_ - The role of intermediary organizations such as civil-society groups, the independent
press and of course the judiciary should be strengthened. A basic consensus around democratic values, including implementation schemes, would help reduce the incidence of cleavage-based politics. To this end, civic education and awareness-raising campaigns among citizens and elites, focusing on democracy, constitutional principles, rights, rules, procedures and the rule of law, would be of great use.

**Regional integration** - The Asia-Oceania region needs regional organizations that are engaged in democracy-building. Although the region is home to a number of regional associations such as ASEAN and SAARC, they have yet to take a formal role in this regard, or to pledge open commitment to democracy building. The NGD should seek to place democracy, the rule of law and human-rights protection at the forefront of every single regional program or agenda.

**Sharing best practices on democracy** - Within the larger Asia-Oceania region, the degree of exchange of ideas and best practices with regard to democracy-building is very low. Representatives from the region’s democracies need to meet more often for this purpose, and learn from each other. The creation of regional and sub-regional resource centers on democracy would be helpful in this regard.

See NGD Track 1 Report - Asia Oceania at [www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org](http://www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org)
**Wider Europe and Post-Soviet Eurasia Working Group Conclusions**

Wider Europe (WE) and Post-Soviet Eurasia (PSE) are two vast regions with a diversity of national experiences. Democratic challenges throughout this area are distinct, and solutions need to fit varying national and regional realities; however, there is a common underlying theme that democratic systems must be updated to match new challenges, and that democratic transitions must be given new vigor if they are to be sustained.

**Difficult conditions**

Economic globalization affects democratic politics by limiting the scope of choice available to elected governments. With the onset of the global financial and euro zone crises, furthermore, the advantages of economic globalization have been called into question, as this economic system has seemed increasingly less capable of delivering growth and jobs. Particular within the most developed countries, the capitalist system no longer appears able to provide tangible benefits to ever larger shares of the population, a perception that might carry long-term implications for the shape of democracy.

The geopolitical environment is growing tenser, as Europe and Russia renew competition for spheres of influence – which places strains on countries in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space – and narratives that offer an alternative to Western liberal democracy emerge. Whether the model is Russia or China, illiberal or authoritarian political systems become more attractive as they appear to be better able to sustain growth and respond to people’s expectations than the West, an assertion that has yet to be tested in the medium to long term.
The Wider Europe region, as well as PSE and other regions of the world to some extent, is experiencing three democratic gaps:

*The politics-economics gap* - The liberalization of capital flows has triggered competition among states for investment, with implications for fiscal and labor policies among other sectors. Such competition has to some extent constrained the policy choices available to democratic governments.

From a different standpoint, this gap is also evident with regard to the confrontation between alternative ideas – the heart of democratic politics – and the role of “guardian” technocratic and independent institutions tasked with overseeing the implementation of rules and/or their enforcement. These might be international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the European Central Bank, or national ones such as domestic regulatory agencies.

*The expectations-experience gap* - Citizens, particularly in WE, feel that governments are increasingly less able to meet their expectations. Their actual experience is by and large one of decreasing or stagnant living standards. The gap between many citizens’ experiences and expectations is eroding the social contract that has formed the basis of democratic systems in Europe since the post-war period. The decline in so-called output legitimacy – what democracies deliver for their citizens – represents a serious problem if there is a perception that non-democratic systems are faring better.

*The pluralism-aggregation gap* - New technologies have given citizens access to vast amounts of information, while connecting those sharing similar priorities and concerns through networks and communities. At the same time, levels of confidence and rates of membership in political parties have dropped dramatically, in parallel with the waning of identification with traditional political ideologies. The implications and impact of new technologies for democratic politics must be analyzed in order to avoid a vicious circle.

Society is increasingly segmented or granular when it comes to political views and opinions, with issue-based networks lobbying for specific dossiers and new political movements using the web as their platform. These networks or movements are proving more effective at criticizing mainstream politics than at offering viable alternative recipes. However, the prospect of aggregating increasingly diverse inputs stemming from a variety of channels into a comprehensive political proposition, and of mediating between competing interests – functions traditionally performed by political parties – is a serious challenge. On the other hand, new technologies are a useful tool in establishing transparency and accountability, for example through the provision of open data that enables scrutiny of public-resource use.


Democracy and the European Union

The image and public perception of the European Union (EU) have been seriously affected by the economic crisis. The EU is today often regarded as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The two basic features of a democratic system – the ability of voters to vote governments out, and the translation of voter’s preferences into government actions through elections – are not evident at the EU level, or are so in only a very partial way. Moreover, there is little evidence of empathy, solidarity and reciprocity, which are central to democratic politics, at the European level. In this context, it is not surprising that voter turnout in European elections has declined over the last 30 years in parallel with the European Parliament’s acquisition of more powers.

How the EU’s democratic credentials and legitimacy can be strengthened in ways consistent with the Union’s unique political structure remains an open question. However, Europe’s core rationale and level of ambition must be renewed, not least in response to growing populist pressures. The divide between moderate parties working within “the system” and “anti-system” political forces (often equated to the contraposition between pro- and anti-Europeans) is characterizing national politics these days as strongly as is the traditional left-right divide.

The resilience of democratic systems within the EU itself is an issue as well, with concerns voiced particularly with regard to democratic regression in Hungary. More broadly, the European Union is very strict on the application of democratic standards during the process of accession for new countries, and even in its relations with third countries, but countries’ performances once they become members is much less relevant. The current mechanisms for sanctioning bad practices are neither effective, nor used effectively.

Challenges in Wider Europe and Central Asia

The economic and political crisis engulfing the European Union and the renewed geopolitical competition with Russia in Eastern Europe are affecting democratic progress within non-EU countries in WE and the PSE. Enlargement, which for a long time was considered the EU’s most successful foreign-policy undertaking, has lost momentum, and new accessions are considered unlikely at least for the next five years. Anchoring democratic reforms and progress to the prospect of EU membership may thus not be possible, even for the Western Balkans.

There is also uncertainty with regard to revamping the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership as frameworks for the support of good governance, the rule of law and human rights in Eastern Europe, as well as on the appropriate approach to the rest of the PSE. In this sense, intensive training and even “pedagogical” investment is necessary in Central Asia with the aim of familiarizing citizens with the basic concepts of liberal representative democracy. Support for the expansion of the practice of democracy is needed. This could be
facilitated through South-South cooperation, for example with India. However, progress will take time and will also depend on democratic institutions’ capacity to deliver better economic prospects.

Initial elements for a NGD agenda

The challenges facing democracy in WE and PSE are diverse, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to address them. Not just formal institutions, but also the practices of democracy must be adapted to changing social and economic conditions and new technologies. Since the economic crisis resulted in a significant increase in the power of independent regulatory bodies concerned with the achievement of economic stability, there is a particular need to strike a new balance between party-political and technocratic governance.

The culture of democracy and accountability has to evolve and become more deeply rooted. The fight against various forms of corruption is a key aspect of this process, not least so that confidence in public institutions can be reestablished or strengthened. Democratic political systems must also be equipped to respond more effectively to citizens’ needs and expectations, or their legitimacy will increasingly be contested.

The role of political parties remains critical; thus, new options should be explored to make them more appealing to disenchanted voters, and to connect them more effectively with the proliferation of bottom-up political activist movements. Using social media to enable inclusive deliberations, and connecting these discussions to the role of parties in structuring the political debate, may be part of the solution.

The availability of more information does not necessarily translate into a better public appreciation of current issues and the options available to manage them. The quality of public debate needs to improve; this should start with the provision of better information and the use of awareness-raising mechanisms. For example, citizens could be provided with accessible graphics showing how their taxes are used, from the local to the national level. Sensitive issues such as migration flows also require a better-informed debate, for example with regard to the actual employment levels of migrants and their contribution to the national welfare.

See NGD Track 1 Report - Wider Europe at www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org
See NGD Track 1 Report - Post-Soviet Eurasia at www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org
Broader MENA Working Group Conclusions

The events of the Arab Spring confirmed that MENA, or at least its Arab core, should be regarded as a political region. The security dynamics in the area also point to the need for a regional approach. Indeed, it is not possible today to talk about the problems in North Africa without referring to the Gulf and Iran. However, when discussing transformational policies and actions that should be part of an agenda for democracy, it may be useful at times to make a distinction between North African countries and those of the Arab peninsula.

The situation of democracy is not likely to improve in the MENA region during the next few years (with the exception of Tunisia), which to a great extent is due to challenges emanating from the rise of extremism. Security concerns in the region often result in the sharp curtailment of freedoms, which further exacerbates group grievances. The international community has not effectively contributed to easing local and regional tensions, as foreign armed interventions have focused on regime change, entailing the destruction of local livelihoods rather than effectively protecting victims or even securing funds for the basic needs of refugees.

The integration of political Islam is a prerequisite for the construction of democracy in MENA. With the vast majority of the population in these countries being Muslim, religious ideas need to be incorporated within the public space. In this regard, it is essential to find a way to separate religious structures, but not religion as such, from the State, so that legislation can be adopted by representatives of the people without a denial of religion and culture in the public space. This would of course require religious authorities to accept equality before the law and pluralism, principles that are, moreover, inherent to Islam.
Values and institutions

Securing democratic political and social participation will require a fundamental shift in the MENA countries. The space for civil society to operate remains mostly closed in the MENA region, as civil society has traditionally been seen as a threat to the state. As a fundamental starting point for a democratic agenda, MENA countries need to revise their laws and practices to allow civil society to operate as an independent government watchdog, so it can aid states in governing effectively.

Openness should extend to independent media institutions, which themselves need to be regulated through independent, non-government watchdogs, under the public-service broadcasting model. Proposals in this regard could potentially include creating a global broadcasting station for the Arab world, which would address issues relevant to Muslims without adopting a radicalizing discourse.

At the institutional level, security-sector reform measures would allow MENA countries to address security challenges more effectively. Improving civil-military relations, including community trust in the police and the military, would lessen group grievances, which would in turn diminish the appeal of extremist groups. Arab-Arab coordination and exchanges of best-practice examples on implementing good governance within the security sector would allow MENA countries to seek solutions responsive to the region’s particular context.

At the broader governance level, decentralization should be contemplated as a useful way to keep states together while also addressing the rural-urban divide and the issue of inclusion. In this regard, the specific political and social conditions within each MENA country would influence how decentralization would be operationalized; however, a model allowing different regions greater autonomy would lessen the burden on capital and central governments, and would potentially help diverse communities become more involved as citizens.

Access and inclusiveness

Neoliberal economic policies, in the MENA countries as elsewhere, have often meant that wealth was not distributed widely. Economic growth was largely limited to urban areas at the expense of peripheral and rural areas, increasing the gap between the haves and have-nots. Moreover, despite the effects of economic transformation, rentierism continues to be a pillar of many economies in the region.

When drafting an agenda for democracy in the region, it will be essential to ensure that countries committing to democracy experience economic growth, enabling them to offer opportunities for their citizens. A sort of positive conditionality scheme must thus be devised on the international level. Since countries with
weak economies remain dependent on foreign aid, there is an opportunity for countries outside the region to include good-governance requirements as prerequisites for striking trade, investment, or aid agreements. However, donors should not formulate their agendas in the absence of consultation with local MENA stakeholders. Agendas should be driven by the needs of local stakeholders themselves.

In this context, MENA countries need to engage with foreign countries through the creation of trade and investment agreements that can support their economies, while also pursuing regional economic-integration processes.

**Consensus building**

Inclusive democracies require participation by all members of a given society, as well as agreement on the parameters of political engagement. One of the main challenges in this regard is the need to incorporate those affiliated with old political orders (thus avoiding a repetition of the Iraq case) as well as diverse communities. MENA countries have indeed attempted this in very divergent ways, producing useful lessons for the future. Moreover, the experiences of countries such as South Africa that have been through the process of political transition can be brought to bear on Arab countries in transition, by adopting measures of transitional justice as opposed to persecution to deal with the old guard.

National-dialogue initiatives that bring together diverse groups including minorities and Islamist associations would be one way to design political engagement processes with broad national appeal. The Tunisian example can be used as an example of a national dialogue process in which pragmatism triumphed over ideology.

Engaging groups and individuals instead of cracking down on them would break the cycle of radicalization currently rampant in the Middle East, as groups persecuted by governments often become more extreme when they lack opportunities for mainstream political representation.

Consensus-building, as well as all democratization measures noted above, will thus directly contribute to addressing the challenge of radicalization faced in the MENA region today, so that a virtuous circle may result.

See NGD Track 1 Report - Broader MENA at www.nextgenerationdemocracy.org
ANNEX I - WORKING GROUP RAPPORTEURS

Rapporteurs

Working Group Sub-Saharan Africa:

Gareth Newham, Head of the Governance, Crime and Justice Division at the Institute for Security Studies.

Assistant Rapporteurs: Marinus Van Den Brink (European University Institute) and Ipek Velioglu (University of Florence).

Working Group Americas:

Adrián Bonilla, Secretary General of FLACSO.

Mathew Burrows, Director of the Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Assistant Rapporteurs: Alicia Isabel Saavedra-Bazaga and Leticia Diez Sánchez (European University Institute).

Working Group Asia-Oceania:

Niranjan Sahoo, Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Assistant Rapporteurs: Lorenzo Vai and Francesca Buratti (Istituto Affari Internazionali).

Working Group Wider Europe and Post Soviet Eurasia:

Giovanni Grevi, Director of FRIDE.

Assistant Rapporteurs: Cécile Bénoliel (European University Institute) and Petra D’Andrea (University of Florence).

Working Group Broader MENA:

Lina Khatib, Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center.

Assistant Rapporteurs: Joao Labareda (European University Institute) and Giulia Poi (University of Florence).

Coordination and Edition

Luis Peral, Senior Analyst, Global and Strategic Affairs, Club de Madrid
Monday, November 24th

PRESS CONFERENCE

Location: tbd

12:45 – 13:00

Speakers:
- Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia (1999-2007), President, Club de Madrid.
- Jorge Fernando Quiroga, President of Bolivia (2001-2002), Vice-President, Club de Madrid.
- Santiago Cantón, Executive Director, Partners for Human Rights, RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights.
- Joseph Weiler, President, European University Institute.

INAUGURAL LUNCH

Location: Badia Fiesolana. EUI. Sala Reffetorio

13:00 – 13:30

Setting the scene - the state of democracy

Welcoming Remarks:
- Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia (1999-2007), President, Club de Madrid.
- Frank La Rue, Director of the RFK Center European Operations.
- Brigid Laffan, Director, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.

13:30 – 14:30

Lunch

14:30 – 15:30

Next Generation Democracy - What, Why and How

What are the main obstacles to sustainable democratic governance in different regions of the world? Can we identify declining trends in democracy? How can we contribute to the advancement of democracy in a rapidly evolving global context?

A panel of experts, actively engaged in democratic governance, will kick-off the discussion on why identifying, analyzing and responding to disturbing trends in democratic development is imperative today.

Facilitator:
- Luis Peral, Senior Analyst, Global and Strategic Affairs, Club de Madrid.

Panelists:
- Joachim Chissano, President of Mozambique (1986-2005); Member, Club de Madrid.
- Hauke Hartmann, Senior Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- Enrique Iglesias, Former Secretary-General of the Ibero-American Secretariat (2005-2013); Honorary Member, Club de Madrid.
- Steve Killelea, Founder and Executive Chairman, Institute for Economics and Peace.

REGIONAL WORKING GROUP Session I

15:45 – 17:00

A tailored analysis of trends in democracy prepared jointly with the Bertelsmann Stiftung will frame a participatory discussion on the most significant challenges to democracy in different regions of the world. This analysis will pay special attention to outliers, i.e. countries evidencing patterns and trends in democratic development atypical in their particular region.

Working Group Sub-Saharan Africa

Location: Sala 2

Sponsored by Humanity United

Facilitator:
- Stefano Prato, Managing Director, Society for International Development

Overview:
- Siegmund Schmidite, Professor, Cultural and Social Studies, Landau University

Catalyst:
- Staffan I. Lindberg, Principal Investigator, V-Dem Varieties of Democracy
- Randy Newcomb, President/CEO, Humanity United
CONCLUSIONS - Next Generation Democracy: Looking Forward

CdM insight:
James Mancham, President of the Seychelles (1976-1977).
Member, Club de Madrid.

Working Group Americas
Location: Sala Teatro
Facilitator:
Kenneth Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute (NDI)
Overview:
Peter Thiery, Director, Institute of Political Science Ruprecht-Karls, Heidelberg University.
Catalyst:
Héctor Schamis, Professor, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University; Columnist, El País.
CdM insight:
Kim Campbell, Prime Minister of Canada (1993). Member, Club de Madrid
Andrés Pastrana, President of Colombia (1998-2002). Member, Club de Madrid

Working Group Asia-Oceania
Location: Emeroteca
Facilitator:
Charles Chauvel, Parliamentary Development Advisor, UNDP.
Overview:
Aurel Croissant, Professor, Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University.
Catalyst:
Larry Diamond, Director, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University.
Rafendi Djamin, Representative of Indonesia, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.
CdM insight:
Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia (2007-2010, 2013). Member, Club de Madrid

Working Group Wider Europe and Post Soviet Eurasia
Location: Sala Capitolo
Facilitator:
Thomas R. Hanson, Former US Diplomat; Foreign Policy Consultant, Partnership for Change
Overview:
Martin Brusis, Managing Director, KomPost Network, Munich University

Catalyst:
Bianca Del Genio, Director, Legal and Corporate Affairs, Microsoft.
Andrew Rzepa, Senior Consultant, Gallup.
CdM insight:
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1982-1994). Member, Club de Madrid.
Rexhep Meidani, President of Albania (1997-2002). Member, Club de Madrid.
George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece (2009-2011). Member, Club de Madrid.

Working Group Broader MENA
Location: Sala 3
Facilitator:
Sean Cleary, Executive Vice Chairman, Future World Foundation.
Overview:
Jan Claudius Völkel, Professor, Faculty Economics and Political Sciences, Cairo University.
Catalyst:
Eduard Soler, Research Coordinator, Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB).
Jan Teorell, Principal Investigator, V-Dem Varieties of Democracy.
CdM insight:

17:00 – 17:15
Coffe Break

REGIONAL WORKING GROUPS
Session II
17:15 – 18:30
Advancing Democratic Values and Transforming Institutions
Democratic values and institutions are the foundations of good governance. Potential threats to the hardware of democracy are emerging in different regions of the world, but adequate and effective responses do not seem to be in place.
What practices and forward-looking tools and actions can best respond to these disquieting situations and realities?
CONCLUSIONS - Next Generation Democracy: Looking Forward

Working Group Sub-Saharan Africa

Location: Sala 2

Sponsored by Humanity United
Facilitator:
Stefano Prato, Managing Director, Society for International Development

Catalyst:
Diego Hidalgo Schnur, Founder and Honorary President, FRIDE.

Roelf Meyer, Former Minister, Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, South Africa; Director, In Transformation Initiative.

CdM insight:
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria (1999-2007). Member, Club de Madrid.

Working Group Americas

Location: Sala Teatro

Facilitator:
Kenneth Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute

Catalyst:
Beatriz Merino, Former Prime Minister of Peru (2003); President, Peruvian Hydrocarbon Society.

CdM insight:

Working Group Asia-Oceania

Location: Emeroteca

Facilitator:
Charles Chauvel, Parliamentary Development Advisor, UNDP.

Catalyst:
Robert Schwarz, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung.

I Ketut Putra Erawan, Executive Director, Institute for Peace and Democracy

CdM Insight:
Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia (2007-2010, 2013). Member, Club de Madrid

Working Group Wider Europe and Post Soviet Eurasia

Location: Sala Capitolo

Facilitator:
Thomas R. Hanson, Former US Diplomat; Foreign Policy Consultant, Partnership for Change

Catalyst:
Philippe Schmitter, Emeritus Professor, Political Science, European University Institute.

CdM insight:
Valdis Birkavs, Prime Minister of Latvia (1993-1994). Member, Club de Madrid.

Tarja Halonen, President of Finland (2000-2012). Member, Club de Madrid.


Working Group Broader MENA

Location: Sala 3

Facilitator:
Sean Cleary, Executive Vice Chairman, Future World Foundation

Catalyst:
Rolf Alter, Director, Public Governance and Territorial Development, OECD.

Emma Jeblaoui, Consultant, Support to Parliamentary and the National Dialogue Process, Tunis, UNDP.

CdM insight:

DINNER

20:30 – 22:30
The Future of Authoritarianism

Location: The Loft

Presented by:
Carlos Westendorp, Secretary General, Club de Madrid

Introduced by:
Larry Diamond, Director, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University.

Comments:
Luis Alberto Lacalle, President of Uruguay (1990-1995); Member, Club de Madrid


Ismail Serageldin, Director, Library of Alexandria; Co-Chair, Nizami Ganjavi International Center.

Joseph Weiler, President, European University Institute.
Tuesday, November 25th

REGIONAL WORKING GROUPS
Session III

09:00 – 10:15
Advancing Access and Inclusiveness in Democracy
Non-discrimination and equal access are fundamental democratic rules. The quest for more representative and inclusive societies manifests itself differently in various countries. Yet, across the board, democracies seem unable to cope with the growing expectations of ever more empowered citizens. What practices and forward-looking tools and actions can best respond to these disquieting scenarios?

Working Group
Sub-Saharan Africa

Location: Sala 2
Sponsored by Humanity United
Facilitator:
Nathalie Delapalme, Director, Mo Ibrahim Foundation.
Catalyst:
Celine Charveriat, Director, Advocacy and Campaigns, Oxfam.
CdM insight:
Joachim Chissano, President of Mozambique (1986-2005). Member, Club de Madrid.

Working Group
Americas

Location: Sala Teatro
Facilitator:
Gerardo Noto, Team Leader, Democratic Governance, UNDP
Catalyst:
Bruno Stagno, Deputy Executive Director, Advocacy, Human Rights Watch
CdM insight:
Osvaldo Hurtado, President of Ecuador (1981-1984). Member, Club de Madrid.
Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile (2000-2006); Member, Club de Madrid.

10:15 – 10:30
Coffe Break
Democratic values will only prevail if they are embedded in sound policies. These policies, however, can only be effective when coupled with good management. Transitional democracies often appear dysfunctional, and modern multi-level democracies tend to develop administrative bottlenecks. In both cases, the perception of democratic legitimacy is tainted.

What practices and forward-looking tools and actions can best respond to these disquieting scenarios?

### Working Group Sub-Saharan Africa

**Location:** Sala 2

- **Sponsored by:** Humanity United
- **Facilitator:** Nathalie Delapalme, Director, Mo Ibrahim Foundation
- **Catalyst:** Mohammed Abdirizak, Founder, Somali One
- **Federico Bonaglia,** Deputy Director, OECD Development Centre

**CdM insight:**
- John Kufuor, President of Ghana (2001-2009); Member, Club de Madrid
- Antonio M. Mascarenhas Monteiro, President of Cape Verde (1991-2001); Member, Club de Madrid

### Working Group Americas

**Location:** Sala Teatro

- **Facilitator:** Gerardo Noto, Team Leader, Democratic Governance, UNDP
- **Catalyst:** Kevin Casas-Zamora, Secretary, Political Affairs, OAS
- **Jennifer McCoy,** Director, Americas Program, the Carter Center

**CdM insight:**
- Luis Alberto Lacalle, President of Uruguay (1990-1995); Member, Club de Madrid
- Alejandro Toledo, President of Peru (2001-2006); Member, Club de Madrid

### Working Group Asia-Oceania

- **Location:** Sala 3

- **Facilitator:** Robert Schwarz, Project Manager for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index at the Bertelsmann Stiftung
- **Catalyst:** Bill Sweeney, President and CEO, International Foundation for Electoral Systems
- **Political insight:** Radha Kumar, Director-General, Delhi Policy Group

### Working Group Wider Europe and Post Soviet Eurasia

**Location:** Sala Capitolo

- **Facilitator:** Brigid Laffan, Director, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute
- **Catalyst:** Alfonso Zardi, Head, Democracy, institution-building and Governance, Council of Europe
- **Grzegorz Ekiert,** Director, Center for European Studies, Harvard University

**CdM insight:**
- Phillip Dimitrov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria (1991-1992); Member, Club de Madrid
- Roza Otunbayeva, President of Kyrgyzstan (2010-2011); Member, Club de Madrid

### Working Group Broader MENA

**Location:** Sala 3

- **Facilitator:** Jerry Jones, Executive Vice President, Acxiom; Advisor, Club de Madrid
- **Catalyst:** Richard Youngs, Senior Associate, at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- **Political Insight:** Ziad Bahaa el Din, Former Deputy Prime Minister and International Cooperation Minister, Egypt

### SPECIAL PLENARY SESSION

**Location:** Badia Fiesolana. EUI. Sala Teatro

12:00 – 13:30

**Democracy, Human Rights and Foreign Policy**

How can foreign policy be adapted to advance democracy and human rights in different regions? How can we better achieve a value-based global consensus that reflects the needs and expectation of citizens in
different regions, without imposing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ democracy?

A panel of political leaders and civil society representatives will review the links between democracy, human rights and foreign policy.

**Designed by:**
RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights

**Facilitator:**
Santiago Cantón, Executive Director. Partners for Human Rights at the RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights

**Panelists:**

Rafendi Djamin, Representative of Indonesia, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.

Mo Ibrahim, Founder and President, Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

Frank La Rue, Director of the RFK Center European Operations.

**13:30 – 15:00**

**Lunch**

**Location:** Badia Fiesolana. EUI. Sala Reffetorio

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**PLENARY SESSION**

**Location:** Badia Fiesolana. EUI. Sala Teatro

**15:15 – 17:00**

**Next Generation Democracy -**

**A Call to Action**

On the basis of the regional analysis, Working Group Rapporteurs and CdM Members will share innovative ideas to shape Next Generation Democracy Regional Agendas for the advancement of democracy.

**Elements for NGD Regional Agendas:**
Adrián Bonilla, Secretary General of FLACSO. Working Group Americas.


Giovanni Grevi, Director, FRIDE. Working Group Wider Europe

Lina Khatib, Director, of the Carnegie Middle East Center. Working Group Broader MENA

Gareth Newham, Head, Governance, Crime and Justice Division, Institute for Security Studies. Working Group Broader Sub Saharan Africa

Niranjan Sahoo, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Working Group Asia Oceania

**Facilitation / Elements for the NGD Global Agenda:**
Ted Piconne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution. Advisor, Club de Madrid

Brechtje Kemp, Acting Head, State of the Democracy Program, International IDEA

**Panelists:**

Kim Campbell, Prime Minister of Canada (1993). Member, Club de Madrid

Radha Kumar, Director-General, Delhi Policy Group.

Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile (2000-2006); Member, Club de Madrid

Boris Tadić, President of Serbia (2004-2012). Member, Club de Madrid

**17:00 – 17:30**

**Coffe Break**

**Location:** tbd

**17:30 – 18:30**

**Next Generation Democracy for a Sustainable Future**

**Location:** Badia Fiesolana. EUI. Sala Teatro

**Sponsored by:**
Partnership for Change (PfC)

**Facilitator:**
Jorge Fernando Quiroga, President of Bolivia (2001-2002), Vice-President, Club de Madrid

**Introduced by:**
Felipe Calderón, President of Mexico (2006-2012). Member, Club de Madrid

John Kufuor, President of Ghana (2001-2009). Member, Club de Madrid

**Comments:**
George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece (2009-2011). Member, Club de Madrid

Ingrid Stange, Founder & Chair, Partnership for Change

Charles Chauvel, Parliamentary Development Advisor, UNDP

**CLOSING REMARKS**

**Location:** Badia Fiesolana. EUI. Sala Teatro

**18:30 – 19:00**

Santiago Cantón, Executive Director, Partners for Human Rights, RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights

Jorge Fernando Quiroga, President of Bolivia (2001-2002), Vice-President, Club de Madrid

Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia (1999-2007), President, Club de Madrid

**RECEPTION**

**Location:** Badia Fiesolana. EUI.

**19:00 – 20:00**

Offered by:
European University Institute
## ANNEX III - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

### Club de Madrid Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valdis Birkavs</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Latvia (1993-1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bruton</td>
<td>Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland (1994-1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerzy Buzek</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Poland (1997-2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Calderón</td>
<td>President of Mexico (2006-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Campbell</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joachim Chissano</td>
<td>President of Mozambique (1986-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Dimitrov</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Bulgaria (1991-1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonel Fernández</td>
<td>President of Dominican Republic (1996-2000; 2004-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarja Halonen</td>
<td>President of Finland (2000-2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osvaldo Hurtado</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luis Alberto Lacalle Herrera</td>
<td>President of Uruguay (1990-1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ricardo Lagos</td>
<td>President of Chile (2000-2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zlatko Lagumdžija</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina (2001-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruud Lubbers</td>
<td>Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1982-1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Mancham</td>
<td>President of the Seychelles (1976-1977)</td>
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<td>Antonio M. Mascarenhas Monteiro</td>
<td>President of Cape Verde (1991-2001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rexhep Meidani</td>
<td>President of Albania (1997-2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Festus Mogae</td>
<td>President of Botswana (1998-2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>President of Nigeria (1999-2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roza Otunbayeva</td>
<td>President of Kyrgyzstan (2010-2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Papandreou</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Greece (2009-2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrés Pastrana</td>
<td>President of Colombia (1998-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romano Prodi</td>
<td>President of the Council of Ministers of Italy (1996-1998; 2006-2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jorge Fernando Quiroga</td>
<td>President of Bolivia (2001-2002); Vice-President, Club de Madrid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petre Roman</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Romania (1989-1991)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Rudd</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Australia (2007-2010, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris Tadic</td>
<td>President of Serbia (2004-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jigme Yoser Thinley</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Buthan (2008-2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>President of Peru (2001-2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaira Vike-Freiberga</td>
<td>President of Latvia (1999-2007); President, Club de Madrid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrique Iglesias</td>
<td>Former Secretary-General of the Ibero-American Secretariat (2005-2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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