CONCLUSIONS

MADRID+10
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
27-28 October 2015

www.stoppingviolentextremism.org

#GlobalConsensus
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Foreword
Club de Madrid President - Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga ........................................ 4
ICSR Director - Peter Neumann ........................................................................... 7

## Madrid+10 Keynotes
H.M. King Felipe VI ...................................................................................... 10
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon ................................................................. 13

## About Madrid+10
Introduction to the Global Consensus - Danilo Türk................................. 19
Toward a Global Consensus - Stop Violent Extremism! ............................ 23
10 Goals for a Comprehensive Response to Violent Extremism ............. 29
MADRID+10 Online Platform ......................................................................... 30
Framing the Madrid+10 Workshops ................................................................. 32
  Workshop 1: Role of Women in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism .......................................................... 34
  Workshop 2: Educators in Dialogue, Youth in Debate: Countering Violent Extremism ....................................................... 39
  Workshop 3: Building Peace through Interreligious Dialogue .......... 49
  Workshop 4: Online Radicalization ............................................................... 53
Infographics ............................................................................................................... 58

## Annexes
Introducing the Policy Briefs - Lord John Alderdice ................................. 61
Annex I: Working Group and Global Consensus Committee ....................... 68
Annex II: Policy Briefs ......................................................................................... 70
Annex III: Madrid+10 Program ......................................................................... 101
Annex IV: 2015 Policy Dialogue MADRID+10 ................................................ 105
Annex V: Visibility and Media Impact .............................................................. 118
Annex VI: Inaugural Ceremony with H.M. King Felipe VI ....................... 119

## About
Partners .................................................................................................................. 123
Club de Madrid Policy Dialogues ................................................................. 126

## Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................. 131
Foreword

MADRID+10

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
Foreword

The World Leadership Alliance-Club de Madrid (WLA-CdM) had the privilege to organize on October 27-28 our Policy Dialogue ‘Madrid+10: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’, jointly with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at King’s College London and with our partners, the European Commission, the King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) and the U.S Department of State.

This year’s Policy Dialogue was to continue the work launched ten years ago, convening the International Summit on Democracy Terrorism and Security, a unique conference that brought together more than 1,000 political and thought leaders to analyze the causes of terrorism and find better, more sustainable ways of confronting it. The result was the Madrid Agenda - a document which had a profound impact on the global debate, giving rise to a new consensus while destroying the illusion that the political and social divisions that produce and provide justification for terrorism could be resolved through military means alone.

Today, radicalization and extremism of fundamentalist groups at different parts of the world continue to undermine human rights and democratic values. The turmoil in the Middle East and the rise of violent extremist attacks in France, Belgium, Denmark, Myanmar, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, or Australia has deeply shaken the international community. The vicious cycle of violence triggered...
by extremism could be more damaging and destabilizing to global peace and will require joint efforts and commitment to an action plan by both national and international interlocutors.

Both the Madrid Agenda and the Global Consensus assert our belief that law enforcement and military means alone - without adequate mid and long-term grassroots engagement, multi-faceted national strategies and foreign policy - will not be enough to tackle the multiple conflicts, root causes and extremist ideologies narrative that are feeding the current situation. In this sense, it is crucial to further discuss non-traditional security approaches and ensure the contribution of increasingly active and influential actors as well as the use of effective media and communication tools in preventing violent extremism, including constructive engagement with youth, local communities, religious and community leaders, women and families.

The goal of the Policy Dialogue was to mobilize policy makers, opinion formers, civil society and grassroots organizations around the urgent need for a positive counter narrative to prevent and counter radicalization and violent extremism; increase public engagement; and promote grassroots initiatives. With the leadership of almost 40 WLA-CdM Members and the contributions of current political leaders and key international actors like the King of Spain, Don Felipe VI, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, we convened 250 practitioners, policy makers and experts of diverse backgrounds and parts of the world to (re)examine the driving factors of radicalization enabling extremists to gain new recruits, and to present an alternative narrative through community based work.
The active engagement of every participant was essential for the elaboration of the outcome document of the Policy Dialogue: the Global Consensus which frames a narrative of principles for preventing and countering violent extremism and for building peaceful and inclusive societies. The #GlobalConsensus is available on the Madrid+10 online platform where interlocutors and partners can read and sign on to it, sustaining the commitment and engaging in a debate on how its principles can be translated into concrete policies and measures.

We, at the WLA-CdM, will be following up on many of the recommendations, proposals, and ideas that were expressed during this Policy Dialogue through our activities, projects and advocacy.

On behalf of the WLA-CdM I wish to thank our partners and all participants for joining us, the city of Madrid for hosting us and especially our main sponsors and supporters for their commitment to this most pressing issue.

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga
President of the WLA-Club de Madrid and President of Latvia (1999-2007)
On behalf of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), I am delighted to introduce you the final conclusions to the Club de Madrid’s Policy Dialogue on “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” which ICSR assisted in organizing.

I first became involved with the Club de Madrid more than ten years ago. Back then, Spain and especially the city of Madrid were reeling from one of the worst terrorist attacks in recent memory: the train bombings in Atocha which cost the lives of 191 people. On the first anniversary of this tragic event, the Club de Madrid organized a Global Summit that brought together the world’s smartest and most influential voices – more than 1500 experts and policymakers from 80 countries – who worked together to produce the Madrid Agenda. I am proud of having served this effort.

The Madrid Agenda was a unique document which helped to change the global conversation away from fighting terrorism by purely military means towards using all the levers of national and international power, civil society and the power of individual people. It advocated tackling deep-rooted grievances, countering extremist ideas, as well as strengthening and empowering communities. In other words: it formulated the Countering Violence Extremism (CVE) approach long before it became an acronym.

Today’s challenges are no less profound. Violent extremism hasn’t gone away. It poses a threat to more societies – and, therefore, more people, more livelihoods, and more futures – than ever before. Yet again, it seems clear that the horrific violence that is perpetrated by extremists is symptomatic of deeper problems that need to be fought in smarter and more comprehensive ways than had hitherto been the case. And yet again, it is time to bring together smart and influential people to take stock and chart a new way forward. To do this – and to create a new Global Consensus for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism – we met in October 27-28 for the Policy Dialogue ‘Madrid+10, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’.

My organization, ICSR, has supported this process from its inception. Founded in 2008 and based at King’s College London, our mission is to produce first class, rigorous research that helps educate the public and allows policymakers to find more intelligent solutions in tackling radicalization and political violence. In short,
our aim is to bring together knowledge and leadership, and we are honored to have been asked by the Club de Madrid to join this partnership.

My team and I have contributed our insight and intellectual resources in order to define the Policy Dialogue’s program, content, and work streams. Throughout this process, we have emphasized how important it is for this discussion not to be purely “academic”, or to result in declarations that are laden with acronyms and government speak. We are delighted, therefore, that this year’s Policy Dialogue features not just experts and politicians but also the ones who are “doing” prevention: grassroots initiatives and projects from across the world – brave men and women who are sometimes risking their lives to confront violence and extremism.

We are immensely grateful to all the Club de Madrid Members, sponsors, partners and experts for being able to make time and take part in the Policy Dialogue. This report aspires to reflect their contribution to this crucial initiative.

Professor Peter Neumann
Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation King’s College London
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
Palabras de su Majestad el Rey Felipe VI
Madrid, 27 de octubre de 2015

Es un placer dirigirles por primera vez la palabra como Rey, y hacerlo con motivo de este nuevo encuentro y asamblea anual del Club de Madrid.

Hace 10 años nos reuníamos en este mismo lugar para hacer frente, desde la razón, a la barbarie terrorista que, un año antes, había segado la vida o mermado la integridad física de cientos de personas en Madrid. Aquellos actos terroristas, delezables y cobardes, sumieron a España y al mundo entero en un inmenso dolor. El dolor que otros muchos atentados ya provocaron, - y que lamentablemente siguen provocando-, en tantas ciudades y países del resto del mundo; con grados de horror que escapan de lo imaginable en como ultrajan y atentan contra la dignidad y el respeto que merece el trato entre seres humanos.

“That meeting was announced and organized by the Club of Madrid, which has —since its foundation in 2001— been involved in a wide range of activities focused on defending democracy, human rights and the rule of law. With well over a hundred Members —former heads of state and of government of over 70 countries, to whom I extend here my warmest regards my admiration and my gratitude— this institution has accumulated an extraordinary wealth of experience, which it places at the service of the promotion of democratic values and leadership.”
“La acción policial y el uso de medios militares, siendo necesarios, no son suficientes, sin embargo, para prevenir y afrontar plenamente los numerosos conflictos que están en la raíz del fenómeno terrorista. Y que, por tanto, se impone la necesidad de analizar y poner en práctica una estrategia que incorpore medidas de seguridad no tradicionales, acciones concertadas de política exterior y la incorporación de actores fundamentales en la prevención del extremismo violento, como son los jóvenes, las mujeres, las familias y las comunidades locales”

A los miembros del Club de Madrid y a sus donantes y asociados les quiero expresar mi agradecimiento por su esfuerzo y por su ayuda desinteresada. Felicito igualmente a Diego Hidalgo que, con generosidad y altura de miras, puso en marcha esta iniciativa que merece toda la admiración. Y agradezco al Ayuntamiento de Madrid su apoyo a este proyecto que lleva el nombre de nuestra querida Capital del Reino.

En esta oportunidad el Club de Madrid, nos lanza una llamada de atención sobre el peligro que la violencia y la radicalización suponen para nuestras democracias y para la Humanidad en su conjunto, no solo como riesgo externo o lejano, sino como uno que se presenta también como serio y cierto en el seno mismo de nuestras sociedades.

Efectivamente, el foro que nos convoca, organizado por el Club de Madrid en colaboración con el ICSR (International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence), se centra en los medios para prevenir y combatir el extremismo violento desde los elementos que nos aporta la experiencia acumulada. Hoy, nuevas formas de radicalización y extremismismo trascienden las fronteras nacionales, adquieren a veces base
En 2005 más de un millar de líderes políticos y de opinión, expertos, organismos internacionales y sociedad civil analizaron las causas del terrorismo e identificaron los medios más eficaces para hacerle frente. De aquella cumbre surgió lo que se denominó la “Agenda de Madrid”, un documento que tuvo gran impacto en el debate internacional y que dio lugar a un nuevo consenso cuyos principios y recomendaciones fueron hechos suyos por las Naciones Unidas, la Unión Europea y otras organizaciones internacionales y Gobiernos.

España siempre ha sabido que la amenaza terrorista exige respuestas legislativas firmes y sólidas, y que la dignidad de las víctimas ha de ser honrada y respetada en todo momento. En este sentido, mi país ha impulsado medidas como la creación del Comité contra el Terrorismo en NNUU o la convocatoria de una reunión especial del CSNU sobre víctimas del terrorismo. Antes incluso del lanzamiento de la Agenda de Madrid, España ya había forjado unos principios y valores que habrían de regir su acción en este terreno.

En la actualidad no podemos sino corroborar la validez de una de las principales conclusiones de la Agenda de Madrid: que la acción policial y el uso de medios militares, siendo necesarios, no son suficientes, sin embargo, para prevenir y afrontar plenamente los numerosos conflictos que están en la raíz del fenómeno terrorista. Y que, por tanto, se impone la necesidad de analizar y poner en práctica una estrategia que incorpore medidas de seguridad no tradicionales, acciones concertadas de política exterior y la incorporación de actores fundamentales en la prevención del extremismo violento, como son los jóvenes, las mujeres, las familias y las comunidades locales.

De ahí que este diálogo que hoy nos congrega tenga como objetivo canalizar el conjunto de ideas, experiencias y voluntad política de los miembros del Club de Madrid, y de responsables políticos y líderes de opinión de todo el mundo, para la creación de un amplio consenso global. Un consenso concebido para afrontar la radicalización y el extremismo violento dentro del respeto de los valores democráticos y el Estado de Derecho con una visión que contenga los principios sobre los que se puedan asentar unas sociedades más pacíficas e inclusivas.

Por ello, y porque todos los aquí reunidos compartimos esos valores y el firme compromiso de preservarlos, estoy seguro que los trabajos del Club volverán a poner de manifiesto los principios y las acciones que inspiraron la Agenda de Madrid, pero adaptándolos ahora a los retos actuales. Les animo a que trabajen para lograr un nuevo consenso con el objeto de combatir, con la mayor eficacia posible, el extremismo, la radicalización y la violencia que lastran el futuro de una Humanidad que busca la concordia y la paz.

Muchas gracias.
I am honoured to be invited to address you on this important and timely topic. The Club de Madrid has long distinguished itself as a useful forum where former leaders can continue to contribute their unique perspectives on the pressing challenges of our time.

Violent extremism poses a direct threat to international peace and security. Extremist groups – such as Daesh, Al Shabaab and Boko Haram – undermine universal values of dignity and the worth of the human person. They reject the call of the United Nations Charter to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.
Terrorism is a threat in all countries — from Norway to Thailand; from the United States to Iraq.

I commend Spain’s leadership against terrorism and violent extremism, including in the Security Council as President this month.

I also want to commend the determined commitment of Spain to supporting victims of terrorism.

I am pleased to join you today to express the support of the United Nations to fighting terrorism while upholding the core values of human rights and the rule of law.

Spain has suffered terrorism from within its society, and attacks inspired from beyond its borders.

We will never forget the train bombings in Madrid on 11 March, 2004, that killed 191 people and wounded 1,800 more.

We share the grief and outrage of the people of Spain.

One year after those terrible events, the Club de Madrid convened an International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security.

Political leaders and civil society united to develop the Madrid Agenda -- a call to action to confront terrorism through a global democratic framework.

At that meeting, my predecessor, Kofi Annan, announced the key elements of what became the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2006.

The Strategy took into account the Madrid Agenda.

Yet, despite all our efforts, terrorism is on the march.

The violent extremist ideas that fuel it are spreading.

Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon.

It is neither new nor exclusive to any one region or system of belief.
Violent extremism, which breeds terrorism, poses a direct assault on the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the values on which the United Nations was founded.

It affects all areas of the work of the United Nations.

It undermines international peace and security and threatens to reverse important development progress.

Violent extremist groups are responsible for egregious human rights violations, including mass executions, mutilations, torture, rape, the selling of women and sexual slavery.

They control territory, impeding humanitarian access and targeting humanitarian actors.

Their actions have contributed to the highest number of refugees and displaced persons since the Second World War.

Countering this threat through effective security responses should remain a priority.

But we must recognize that our response needs to be unified and multi-dimensional.

Human rights must be at the forefront of our response, to avoid breeding the problems we are trying to solve.

And our efforts need to be complemented by prevention.

As we have seen around the world, failure to resolve conflict nurtures extremists and can even lead to them becoming so powerful they end up driving the conflict.

That is why conflict prevention is one of the best tools for preventing violent extremism.

We also have to address other underlying drivers of violent extremism.

We must ask ourselves: what is the attraction of extremist ideologies?
Most of those recruited by terrorists are young men, although we are also seeing women fall under the influence.

Many are frustrated with the few avenues available to them to pursue productive lives and find their place in society.

Many are galvanized and then radicalized by what they see around them or on social media.

This includes violence, injustice and heavy-handed security responses.

It includes failures of governance, inequality and injustice.

These abuses and real or perceived marginalization can make individuals susceptible to violent extremist ideologies and recruitment by terrorists.

We must show them another way, a better way.

That includes working to end poverty, inequality, exclusion and lack of opportunity.

And it means upholding human rights and providing peaceful channels for the resolution of grievances.

Extremist groups often paint themselves as an alternative to poor governance and corruption – in the justice sector, in the security sector, and across all state institutions.

We must strengthen these areas, as a preventative measure, to stop the spoilers of peace from holding sway over underserved and neglected populations.

I am convinced that good governance is essential to countering terrorism in the long-term.

That is why I urge you to speak out against human rights breaches and social injustice wherever your encounter them.

I ask you, too, to do more to amplify the voice of the moderate majority so we may drown out those who preach violence and hatred.

I have been deeply disturbed by the latest spread of extremist violence.

That is why, in the months ahead I will present to the General Assembly a comprehensive Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.

The Plan will call for an “all of Government”, “all of society” and “all of UN approach” to systematically address the drivers of violent extremism at the global, regional, national and local levels.

It will also put forward recommendations on how the UN system can better support Member States in this effort.

One important priority will be to engage youth.

“Human rights must be at the forefront of our response, to avoid breeding the problems we are trying to solve”
Young people are the main targets for recruitment by violent extremist groups.

But they can be our best allies to promote understanding.

The United Nations -- including through my Envoy on Youth and through the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations -- is seeking to harness the idealism, creativity and energy of young people to oppose violence and promote tolerance.

The Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism will also recognize the important role of civil society, women, and religious leaders in stitching together the social fabric.

This past April, I convened a high level thematic debate along with the President of the General Assembly and the High Representative of the Alliance of Civilizations, to discuss with religious leaders how best to respond to these challenges.

I was moved by the commitment of these leaders to build bridges.

I saw, yet again, that what unites us can be far stronger than our differences.

Such bridge-building efforts need to continue.

I hope Member States, through the General Assembly, will take up the call in the Plan of Action to issue a strong consensus resolution on the prevention of violent extremism.

I welcome the emphasis that the Club de Madrid is now putting on this topic.

Other international initiatives, such as the United States-led countering violent extremism process that culminated in September with the Leaders’ Summit convened by President Obama on the margins of the General Assembly, show that we agree on the gravity of the challenge.

We will need decisive leadership and political will to implement concrete actions to roll back this threat.

The Statesmen and Stateswomen of the Club de Madrid can play a significant role in mobilizing this political will.

I count on you to support my forthcoming Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, in the same way that the Club de Madrid contributed to the development and adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ten years ago.

Thank you.
Ten years ago CdM hosted a global summit to discuss the scourge of terrorism and the ways of countering what was understood as a major threat to international peace and security.

Today’s challenges are still more profound. Violent extremism is killing the innocent and destroying the hopes of men and women across many countries. And although 82 percent of acts of violent extremism take place in just five countries – as we were reminded by our President, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga and Peter Neumann in a recent article published in El Pais – the effect are felt all over the world. In our globalized world and in our time of instant communication the effects of the crimes of terrorism and violent extremism in general are our common, global concern.

We have gathered in Madrid to analyze this concern and to define the most necessary responses. While there is no universal formula, it is increasingly clear which are the main drivers and underlying conditions - conducive to the rise of the violent extremism of our era.

We have expressed our thoughts and made our recommendations in a concise document aiming at a global consensus to stop violence and to
stop it now. We understand that governments, civil society, thought leaders and, indeed, all the concerned citizens of the world need to redouble their efforts for an effective action against violent extremism. A new framework for this broad partnership is needed and the major contours of that framework are offered in the appeal to the world emerging from the Club de Madrid’s Global Policy Dialogue.

Some of the basic building blocks of our appeal to the world are not new. In fact, there is no better protection against chaos and human tragedies than the maintenance of territorial integrity and political independence of sovereign states.

However, in our era protection of these basic conditions of statehood has to be earned. It has to be earned by good governance, by responsible exercise of state sovereignty, by accountability of the government to the people, in other words, by constant efforts of the state to uphold its legitimacy. Preventing and countering violent extremism requires a genuine commitment to practicing the values of accountable and open government, and respect for the rights of minorities and other democratic values.

It is understood that there exist different and sometimes competing sources of state legitimacy. In many countries elections based on the principle of one person one vote do not guarantee legitimate government. Respect for the rights of minorities and effective and transparent functioning of the government - as well as fairness to all citizens and their inclusion in policy making are the necessary ingredients of the legitimacy
of the state. And only when all ingredients of legitimacy are taken together one can expect an effective protection against violent extremism.

There are many aspects of policy making, ranging from security to development of the educational system where the legitimacy of state power represents the most important guarantee of its effectiveness. Importantly, the effectiveness in protection against violent extremism is best achieved in a preventive mode. Prevention and non-coercive means of tackling violent extremism have to be given priority by governments. The main emphasis has to be placed on the contribution of citizenry, men and women alike. Contributions of educators, thought leaders, religious leaders, community groups and the business community have to be mobilized in an effort to develop appropriate long term prevention strategies.

An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure: this time-tested wisdom applies to the countering of violent extremism as much as it applies to other social ills and pathologies.

Understandably, the emphasis on prevention does not diminish the importance of repressive measures – the police, intelligence services and – sometimes – the military. However, when used, these measures must be proportionate to the actual threat and carried out in conformity with domestic and international law.

The majority of acts of violent extremism have their roots in entrenched armed conflicts that have been characterizing much of the time since the...
adoption of Madrid Agenda a decade ago. In several parts of the world and in particular in the Middle East fighting has turned into a way of life. The flows of refugees have created populations that can become a fertile ground for further violent extremism.

The entrenched armed conflicts must be stopped. An intensified international effort is needed to break the current political and institutional deadlocks that prevent the resolution of these armed conflicts. Understandably, each armed conflict has its own dynamic, its own protagonists and its own modalities of ending. However, peace is indivisible and the international community must be able to pull its strengths together. The eyes of the world are turned to the United Nations and in particular the UN Security Council, a world body with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN member states have endowed the Security Council with formidable legal powers and an unparalleled international legitimacy. However, these assets imply an unparalleled level of responsibility.

It is high time to reestablish the necessary level of agreement within the UN Security Council. In fact, the deteriorating global security calls for a serious effort to build a global security compact involving all the permanent members of the Security Council. Such a compact would not have to be legally binding. But it will have to include an understanding on the ways to resolve the most acute armed conflicts of our era, in particular those in the Middle East, the global security fault line.

Paradoxically, it is not impossible to define the key components of such an approach. The expectations that a vigorous effort for peace will take place undoubtedly exist. Much good diplomatic work has already been done. Now is the time for political leaders to demonstrate their ability to take decisive steps for the restoration of peace.

Countering violent extremism requires action both at the national and at the international level. Individual efforts will not suffice. Collective efforts are clearly necessary. This is the time for determined multilateral action. And the global policy dialogue held in Madrid represents a significant contribution in that regard.
Toward a Global Consensus  
- Stop Violent Extremism!

Violent extremism is a scourge of our time. It kills the innocent. It kills our loved ones. It kills the hopes of women and men across many countries for better lives for their children and their communities. It must stop.

We, the women and men of the Club de Madrid, democratic former presidents and prime ministers, present these principles and recommendations in the pursuit of a Global Consensus on preventing and countering violent extremism, domestic and international - an urgent and shared need.

We urge leaders and citizens everywhere to join us in a concerted effort to put an end to a reality that is causing so much pain and devastation.

As democratic political leaders who believe that democracies must be accountable to their peoples and deliver tangible results, we endorse the following principles that we commend to all for implementation in all our respective communities.

We seek human security, economic, social, and political inclusion, and the protection of human rights.

We seek fairness and social justice, and respect for all women and men and their beliefs.

We seek order and liberty, excluding no one.

We seek public accountability, transparency, and equality for all under the law.

We seek shared societies, safe for difference.
A New Framework

There are many explanations, theories and models for why individuals and groups become radicalized. While there is no universal formula, we are increasingly clear as to the drivers and underlying factors conducive to the rise of violent extremism.

Having listened to hundreds of voices – experts, political leaders, and civil society – we present elements for a new and effective framework for the prevention and countering of violent extremism.

Legitimacy

We know violent extremism can thrive where there is poor or weak governance, or where the government is seen as illegitimate. Where these conditions persist, grievances are often left unaddressed, and frustrations can easily be channelled into violence.

“Preventing and countering violent extremism requires women and men to make a genuine commitment to practising democratic values and human rights, open and accountable government, and respect for the rights of minorities.”

Inclusion

Fighting poverty is a moral imperative, even if there is little empirical evidence of a direct causal link between poverty, unemployment, marginalisation and violent extremism. But where systematic exclusion creates injustice, humiliation and unfair treatment, it can produce a toxic mix that allows violent extremism to flourish.

“Political leaders everywhere have a duty to represent all their citizens, empower women and young people, and ensure that every individual, group and community has equal access to economic development and other opportunities. They must avoid and reject setting citizens against each other for the sake of political gain.”
Faith and Ideology

Religion is rarely the only factor that explains the rise of violent extremism. No religion is a monolithic entity. Religious motivations are usually interwoven with those that are socio-economic, political, ethnic and related to identities.

Religion can intensify conflicts or be a force for good. It is the way that beliefs are held and ideologies are exercised that makes the difference.

“No religious tradition in and of itself can or should be blamed for violent extremism. However, religious and thought leaders have a responsibility to be role models, tackle tough and sometimes uncomfortable questions, promote inter-faith dialogue, and engage with disenfranchised youth”.

Education

Quality education is vital for human development. While there is no simple correlation between educational achievement and violent extremism, education that does not lead to employment, enterprise and human wellbeing creates resentment that can be exploited by extremists.

Likewise, religious educators that fail to emphasise tolerance, within and amongst religions, while promoting their faith, contribute to radical and narrow mind-sets that make extremist ideologies resonate.

“Governments need to understand the link between education, employment and opportunity, and remove barriers and facilitate social mobility and connectivity. Religious educators need to offer people a firm grounding not only in their own religious tradition but also in universal human values and tolerance”.
Technology

Information technology – especially the Internet, smart devices and social media – has improved the lives of billions of people. But it has also given violent extremists opportunities to disseminate their ideology, connect with supporters, and mobilise resources.

“Governments, civil society and private corporations must commit to strategies that facilitate freedom of expression – even of controversial and contentious views. However, they must also prevent the use of these tools to further radicalization and extremism, and collaborate in challenging extremist narratives and galvanising ‘counter-speech’. 

Prevention

Government approaches that are short term, overly repressive, and ignore the complex causes of violent extremism rarely succeed, and may – in fact – be counterproductive. There continues to be a lack of emphasis on prevention and non-coercive means of tackling violent extremism, and the potentially enormous contribution by women, educators, thought leaders, community groups, and the business community.

“Each government should have a long-term prevention strategy, and commit serious political and financial resources to its implementation. They must also collaborate internationally, sharing new approaches, strategies, innovative practices, and lessons learned”.
Entrenched Conflicts

The vast majority of violent extremism is found in the context of entrenched and unresolved conflicts, where violence begets violence. Numerous studies have documented vicious and self-destructive cycles of revenge, economies of war, and ‘cultures of death’ in which violence becomes a way of life.

“Governments and international organisations, such as the United Nations, must do everything in their power to break the political and institutional deadlocks that prevent conflicts from being resolved. In an interconnected world, governments need to prioritise conflict prevention, resolution, and capacity building, even when those conflicts appear distant”.

Regional Solutions

Driven by short-term interests, governments have at times furthered the rise of violent extremist groups, with disastrous consequences. These interventions have in many cases unleashed forces beyond their control, and fuelled proxy wars that have caused massive human suffering while creating a platform for violent extremists.

“Political leaders must recommit to regional dialogue and cooperation as the principal means to address rivalries and conflicts. They must recognise that the enemy of their enemy is not always their friend, and that the long-term consequences of short-sighted politics may come back to haunt them. This is true for both regional and international interventions”.

OUTCOMES

CONCLUSIONS
Security

The fight against violent extremism requires the lawful use of police, intelligence services, and – sometimes – the military. In many cases, however, their excessive or unlawful use has exacerbated conflicts and been a cause of radicalization in its own right.

“The key test for the responsible and effective use of security measures is whether they foster the conditions that allow societies to become stable, cohesive and peaceful in the long-term. Repressive means are unavoidable, but they must be used in accordance with domestic and international law, and be balanced with outreach, counter-messaging, efforts to build economic and social inclusion, community resilience, de-radicalization programs, and meaningful political dialogue”.

Practising What We Preach

The challenge that is outlined in this document requires the mobilisation of major community, national and international resources, not only of governments but of civil society and the private sector. It calls for imagination and the continuous re-examination of our own assumptions, and in some cases major policy change. To reverse the spread of violent extremism will take foresight, patience, political will and long-term commitment.

“The most important elements in this struggle are courage and credibility. We cannot instil the virtues of democracy, pluralism and tolerance in young women and men if we are not practising these qualities ourselves. The challenge is urgent. We call on all leaders and citizens everywhere to commit to these principles, join us in addressing this essential challenge of our time, and shape a more constructive future”.

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
10 Goals for a Comprehensive Response to Violent Extremism

Thought Leadership from *Towards a Global Consensus – Stop Violent Extremism!*

A Global Policy Dialogue co-organised by the [Club de Madrid (CdM)](https://www.clubdemadrid.org) and the [International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)](https://www.iscr.ac.uk)

We urge:

1. All leaders to have a genuine commitment to open and accountable government, and respecting the rights of minorities.
2. Political leaders to ensure that every individual, group and community has equal access to opportunity.
3. Religious leaders to serve as role models and engage with disenfranchised youth.
4. Educators to promote meaningful employment, human wellbeing, the empowerment of women, as well as tolerance and pluralism.
5. Governments, civil society and the private sector to adopt online strategies that encourage free expression while challenging extremist ideologies.
6. Governments to introduce well funded national prevention strategies and collaborate internationally.
7. All leaders to renew their commitment to conflict resolution.
8. All leaders to engage in genuine regional dialogue and cooperation.
9. Political leaders to make sure that security measures are lawful, balanced, and foster peaceful and cohesive societies in the long-term.
10. All leaders to act with courage and credibility, and practise what they preach.
The Madrid+10 Policy Dialogue marked the launch of an online platform where different interlocutors and partners can read and sign on to the #GlobalConsensus, sustaining the commitment and engaging in a debate on how its principles can be translated into policies and measures. The platform highlights good practices, trends and challenges, initiatives, policies and raises awareness of the work done by key experts and interlocutors, realizing the Global Consensus ideas in their own community, society or country.

The Madrid+10 Online Platform seeks to act as a hub for information and learning and as a tool to help frame a narrative of principles for building peaceful and inclusive societies. It also serves as a global platform for promoting a coordinated and sustainable response to PVE/CVE giving space for Club de Madrid Members, all of them former Presidents
and Prime Ministers, grassroots organizations, opinion formers, international institutions, civil society and private sector representatives to contribute to this debate.

The online platform aims at maintaining the engagement of these different stakeholders to the #GlobalConsensus document. By joining it they become part of a global network committed to the common goal of fighting and preventing radicalization violent extremism.
Introduction to the Workshops

The idea behind four parallel thematic workshops implemented during the Policy Dialogue was to bring together, in small working groups, Members of the Club de Madrid, policy makers, practitioners, grassroots and NGO representatives using different tools and working to combat various forms of radicalization and extremism, particularly, through community-based initiatives.

The workshops were designed to have a vibrant, interactive, and outcome oriented discussion. The objective was to provide participants with a practical, hands-on approach and material they could use or adapt to their specific context and facilitate a learning process and experience that would increase their understanding and skills in the specific workshop area. This knowledge would address the multi-faceted aspects of radicalization from local community work all the way to national policies. The workshops had a duration of 180 minutes and ran during two 90 minute breakout sessions on the afternoon of October 27th and the morning of October 28th. Each session focused on a specific challenge covering four thematic issues:

**Workshop 1:**

**Role of Women in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism** aimed to advance the countering violent extremism (CVE) debate and expand on good practice and policy frameworks by articulating specific programmatic and policy recommendations on the role of women in this scenario. The workshop objectives were pursued in two panels. The first explored the process of radicalization in women and girls, and identified possible interventions aimed at preventing them from engaging in violent extremism. The second discussed the varied roles women can play in countering radicalization and violent extremism in order to better understand if/how they can more effectively engage in developing more nuanced and targeted efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE).
Workshop 2: Educators in Dialogue, Youth in Debate: Countering Violent Extremism. The workshop presented two different perspectives one based on the experience of youth and the other on the education system. The first panel presented research and innovative methodologies, developed by the Anna Lindh Foundation, to better support the empowerment of youth and thus countering the risk of young people falling into the trap of radicalization leading to violent extremism. The panel presented a unique platform for discussion on a pioneering theory of change and a roadmap for investment in youth. The second panel, organized by IEMED, discussed ways to address the gap between the value system, and the social and political reality. It also looked at original policies aimed at transforming and improving education practices and the challenges being faced in both the north and the south of the Mediterranean.

Workshop 3: Building Peace through Inter-Religious Dialogue provided a platform for interactive discussion highlighting the potential of interreligious and intercultural dialogue in building peace and social cohesion. The workshop sessions focused on experiences from two different parts of the world: the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Middle East (Syria and Iraq). Religious leaders and policy-makers from both regions served as speakers in both sessions and provided a different perspective on the challenge of CVE in two diverse regions facing the same problem.

Workshop 4: Online Radicalization addressed the radicalization and recruitment of individuals through social media and the internet. Hosted by TRENDS and ICSR, it highlighted successful grassroots initiatives that have mobilized communities to engage in “counter-speech”, that is, standing up to and challenging violent extremism through innovative projects and messages. The first session addressed the roles and responsibilities of governments and technology companies, while the second highlighted successful initiatives and examples of counter-speech, messaging, and innovative projects from across the world.

The organizers of each of the four workshops prepared a brief report on the findings, best practices and recommendations identified in the various sessions. The workshops provided numerous new ideas inspiring or improving practical projects; promoting networks and connections that didn’t exist before; and putting forth recommendations for policy that emerged directly out of practical experience. The entire workshops report is available in the next pages.
Workshop 1:

Role of Women in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism
Organized by Hedayah, 27-28 October 2015

Speakers/Experts:

Panel 1: Radicalization and Recruitment of Women and Girls.

- Laura Chinchilla, CdM Member, President of Costa Rica (2010-2014)
- Andrés Pastrana, CdM Member, President of Colombia (1998-2002)
- Farah Pandith, Strategic Advisor, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (USA)
- Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University (USA)
- Sara Zeiger, Senior Research Analyst, Hedayah (UAE)
Panel 2: Role of Women in Countering Violent Extremism Policy and Programs.

- **Alejandro Toledo**, CdM Member, President of Perú (2001-2006)
- **Timothy Phillips**, CdM Advisor, co-founder and chair of Beyond Conflict
- **Georgia Holmer**, Director, CVE, Rule of Law & Peacebuilding, US Institute of Peace (USA)
- **Mariam Safi**, Founding Director, Organization for Policy, Research, and Development Studies (DROPS), (Afghanistan)
- **Edit Schlaffer**, Founder and Executive Director, Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), (Austria)

**Moderator: Maqsoud Kruse**, Executive Director, Hedayah

**Overview**

This workshop focused on the role of women in countering radicalization and violent extremism, and aimed to expand on the existing international policy and good practices frameworks through articulating specific programmatic and policy recommendations. The workshop consisted of two panels, each of which was followed by a discussion session to generate recommendations and solutions.

With opening remarks by **Laura Chinchilla**, CdM Member, President of Costa Rica (2010-2014) and **Andrés Pastrana**, CdM Member, President of Colombia (1998-2002), the first panel explored the process of radicalization in women and girls and identified possible interventions to prevent women and girls from becoming involved in violent extremism. Speakers considered recruitment techniques by violent extremists aimed at women and girls, and then highlighted the different ways women and girls passively or actively support violent extremism.

The second panel was opened by **Alejandro Toledo**, CdM Member, President of Perú (2001-2006) and **Timothy Phillips**, CdM Advisor, co-founder and chair of Beyond Conflict. Speakers discussed the roles women can play in countering violent extremism and if/how in these roles they can be more effective than their male counterparts. This panel also examined the risks and benefits of a more inclusive approach to ensuring women and girls are active participants in CVE programming and policy. The workshop concluded with a number of ideas generated by the discussion, as follows

1 The recommendations in this paper reflect the outcomes of the discussions and debates that took place at the Global Policy Dialogue, and do not necessarily represent the views of Hedayah.
Key Challenges and Gaps

The first panel and subsequent discussion noted that recruitment and radicalization of women and girls into violent extremism is complex, just as with their male counterparts, and there are sometimes marked differences between males and females in these processes. There is an urgent need to develop effective policies that:

- Do not assume that women cannot be perpetrators of violent extremism. There are a number of cases\(^2\) from Syria and Iraq to Chechnya, Nigeria, France, Spain, Australia, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Rwanda, the United States and others where women and girls actively and willingly participate in violent extremism and terrorism;

- Recognize the nuanced dynamic between the role of women and girls as victims of violent extremism and perpetrators of violent extremism, as these roles are not mutually exclusive. Effective responses might consider multi-variable motivations for women and girls to participate, including coercion and/or survival, but also revenge or atonement for past behavior (e.g. rape, sexual assault);

- Recognize that women in many cases can make value judgements and behavioral decisions based on relationships, and CVE programs and policy can utilize this in interventions. This dynamic could have both positive and negative effects on their involvement in violent extremism and in preventing violent extremism. For example, women may become involved in terrorism because their husband, brother or father is involved. On the other hand, women may be more effective at dissuading a family member from joining a terrorist group because of a strong relationship with that family member;

- Recognize that mothers are the family’s first educator in many cases, and the radicalization (or the reverse) of mothers can have ripple effects into the family. Similarly, when women play roles as trusted community members (such as teachers or health care workers), the radicalization (or the reverse) of these individuals can have ripple effects into the community.

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Priority Policy Recommendations

The speakers and subsequent discussion from the second panel concluded that women may have a key role to play in preventing and countering violent extremism efforts. Some of the recommendations resulting from deliberations include:

- If CVE is essentially about relationship-building and creating networks of individuals that are resilient to violent extremism, then women may be well-placed (although not always) to facilitate these networks naturally. Mothers and teachers, for example, may be particularly well-placed in this regard if given the proper resources and tools to carry out CVE effectively;

- When it comes to engaging women in CVE efforts, a bottom-up security strategy is crucial to ensure buy-in and locally-generated solutions. This means creating regular feedback mechanisms to ensure grassroots organizations and key influencers are part of the design, implementation and assessment phases of the policy or program;

- Before devising a national policy or set of programs on CVE, it is important to assess the divergent effects of violent extremism on women (which may vary even within one locality or region). This is to ensure that the subsequent Counter-Terrorism and CVE policies and programs that affect women do so in a way that is not causing more harm than good;

- National Action Plans in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions that focus on Women, Peace and Security should be better linked and complementary to the National Counter-terrorism and CVE strategies. Similarly, regional and international policies and strategies should also make this explicit link at the policy level, and better coordinate at the programming level. However, this is not to say that including women in peace and security efforts necessarily or always counters violent extremism. Governments should work to identify the ways in which advancing the Women, Peace
and Security agenda can also make CVE polices and strategies more effective and fit their own country’s context. For example, countries may develop programs for female police officers and/or better ensure that women’s safety and security concerns (for example, sexually-based or domestic violent) are addressed in the community:

- Engaging women in CVE efforts, particularly in conflict zones, should be done in an indirect way (i.e. not necessarily labeled as CVE) to protect against securitizing trusted spaces and putting the lives of key influencers at risk. While this is also the case with respect to engaging local partners in CVE in general, women and women’s organizations should be recognized as one of the number of actors that may need discretion when labeling a work with them as CVE;

- There are a number of good initiatives engaging women in CVE programs, but there is a significant lack of funding to scale up and expand these programs. If the role of women in preventing violent extremism is seen as a policy priority, funding opportunities should be provided.

Workshop 2:

Educators in Dialogue, Youth in Debate: Countering Violent Extremism. Day 1
Organized by the Anna Lindh Foundation, 27 October 2015

Speakers/Experts:

- **Zlatko Lagumdzija**, CdM, Prime Minister of Bosnia Herzegovina (2011-2002)
- **Jerry Jones**, CdM Advisor, SVP and Chief Legal Officer, ACXIOM (USA)
- **Haythem Kamel**, Young Arab Voices trainer and co-founder of SDA, the Sustainable Development Association (Egypt)
- **Meghann Villanueva**, Director of the Peace and Human Rights Programme of Fundacio Catalunya Voluntario (Spain)
- **Steven Stegers**, European Association of History Educators (EUROCLIO) Deputy Director (Netherlands)
- **Noureddine Erradi**, Chairman and Interculturalisation Coordinator of IFA: Integration for All (Belgium)
- **Fadi Daou**, Chairman and CEO of Adyan, Lebanese Foundation for Interfaith Studies (Lebanon)

**Moderator: Eleonora Insalaco**, Anna Lindh Foundation Programmes Manager/Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Report on Intercultural Trends
Overview

Educators and Youth, both to the south and north of the Mediterranean, are central to any strategy aimed at countering the underlying causes of violent extremism. Effective formal and non-formal education programmes equip young people with the values, knowledge, skills and attitudes which are essential for an active “intercultural citizenship”, resisting radicalization and building an alternative regional narrative to extremist views. Equally as important is to promote a debate through which the youth are empowered to become the leaders of tomorrow and active agents of change in their societies. This first thematic workshop on October 27th regarding “Educators and Youth: Countering Extremism” presented research and innovative methodologies developed by the Anna Lindh Foundation, the central institution for intercultural dialogue in the Mediterranean. From the flagship debate programme “Young Arab Voices” to the forthcoming “Educators for Intercultural Citizenship”, Foundation presented a unique platform for discussion on a pioneering theory of change and a roadmap for investment in youth.

Key Challenges and Gaps

Today, the target group for radicalization is young people who feel a loss of identity and find purpose among radical groups. This loss of identity results in feelings of oppression and rejection, feelings that make them susceptible to radical groups who pretend to offer a sense of purpose and identity and then manipulate recruits into reacting violently against the society that has made them feel so rejected. The lesson we have learned as trainers and educators is to work diligently to avoid the creation of a gap between the youth and the society in which they live.

It is essential that this group be the main target of government and institutional programs and efforts. Currently, there exists a wide funding gap for youth activities in the Arab region, especially considering that it has the largest youth population in the world. What little is spent on youth and non-formal education and intercultural programs in the region is very limited. The Anna Lindh Foundation focus on this issue can be seen in its programmes and especially in its unique publication on intercultural communication which directly tackles the issue of alienated youth and provides clear examples and educational modules.

The definition of ‘radicalization’, which all school staff must understand and identify, is also unclear. ‘Radicalization’ is frequently seen as a special kind of process essentially linked to terrorism. However, as research has shown, many terrorists are not radicals and most radicals are not terrorists.
Good Practices & Success Stories

The Young Arab Voices programme, which reached out to young people and widened the range of their involvement in Arab countries that lacked interactive programs designed to raise their capacity in critical thinking and provide a safe environment to express themselves. There is also DAWRAK – Citizens for Dialogue, a pioneer programme working to develop intercultural dialogue skills for civil society.

The counter-terrorism guidelines in England and the Netherlands have placed teachers firmly on the front line of the war against radicalization, both as monitors and challengers of extreme beliefs in the classroom. Teachers were already required to safeguard their pupils from harm and physical or emotional abuse; the guidelines are in some ways an extension of these safeguarding duties. Teachers, alongside parents, are now expected to be able to spot radicalization and report a student’s interest in extreme ideologies. Head teachers and school governors are now required to make sure their teachers are trained to know more about their student’s culture and to better spot radicalization.

These experiences, recorded in documentaries that demonstrate this reality, clearly show that “mutual respect helps develop common attitudes”. But this mutuality will never fully develop unless a larger issue is addressed, integrating local populations in the immigrant’s culture and needs. This program has helped many teachers, trainers, directors and policy makers understand what it means to be a foreigner in a society that does not understand your language and cultural background.
Priority Policy Recommendations

• It is important to direct much more funding towards youth programs. Comparing the funding that goes to fighting terrorism, it is important to invest in education as a long-term solution towards an existing problem.

• Developing a pan-Arab youth focus is very important. Learning from the experience of existing European programs will be very helpful.

• Religious and interfaith education is essential to broadening the vision of youth on understanding and respect the others.

• Offering parents the opportunity to participate in trainings to spot radicalization.

• The work of the Anna Lindh Foundation as a Mediterranean foundation can play a pivotal role in transferring the experience and coordinating regional programs on education and intercultural dialogue for young people in the Arab region, which can act as a long-term solution towards extremism and radicalization.
Workshop 2:

Educators in Dialogue, Youth in Debate: Countering Violent Extremism. Day 2
Organized by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 28 October 2015

Speakers/Experts:

- **Cassam Uteem**, CdM Member, President of Mauritius (1992-2002)
- **Fauozia Charfi**, former Secretary of State for Higher Education and Scientific Research (Tunisia)
- **Kelly Simcock**, The Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace, European Commission, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (UK)
- **Lynn Davies**, Emeritus Professor of International Education, University of Birmingham (United Kingdom)
- **Ivo Veenkamp**, Deputy Executive Director, Hedayah (UAE)

Moderator: **Senén Florensa**, Executive President, European Institute of the Mediterranean
Overview

Besides preparing our youngsters to enter into a university or vocational program or getting ready for the labour market, the educational system should aim at forging responsible, engaged and tolerant citizens. Education, as stated by UNESCO, should “equip youngsters with the values, knowledge and skills that are based on and instil respect for human rights, social justice, diversity, gender equality and environmental sustainability and empower them to be responsible global citizens”.

This is even more important when the world faces new challenges with the growing threat of violent extremism. Much too often educators and schools are confronted with identity conflicts and complex societal issues that might potentially shape the future of children and youngsters, highly vulnerable to the widespread message from terrorist organizations that employ social media platforms and other means of propaganda with increasingly sophisticated techniques. Therefore, it is essential that education becomes a tool to promote a free, tolerant and inclusive society and to prevent the threat of radicalization processes.

Identity is at the core of the debate on countering radicalization, and the education system should provide the elements that educators and learners need in order to reconcile different layers in the construction of the self, including awareness of hybridity. Besides, knowledge on religion, secularism and a critical political education are paramount to avoid dangerous dissociation between “theory” and reality. In terms of methodologies, much can also be said concerning teaching methods that empower learners with critical thinking and promote freedom of expression that might allow them to challenge beliefs while respecting them.

The ultimate goal is avoiding a gap between the value system, on the one hand, and the social and political reality, on the other, and countering the risk of young people falling into the trap or radicalization leading to violent extremism. It is a global challenge that educators, the educational community and different institutional organizations must face together through teaching and practising democracy, human rights, respect, tolerance, active and dynamic citizenship and critical thinking. This workshop shed some light on the challenges that the educational system faces – regarding methodologies, curricular contents, learning processes and social and educative mechanisms - both in the North and in the South of the Mediterranean and suggested some ways forward in terms of prevention of violent extremism.
CONCLUSIONS

Approaching the issue from different perspectives:

1. Dynamic secularism in education:
Religious conflicts are more intractable than other conflicts and are more difficult to negotiate. Educators need to break the spiral in which religion confers superiority to the believer at the expense of the non-believer, an easy path to intolerance. Secularism is a way to protect religious plurality and is different from atheism; it is a system that allows accommodating all religions. Secular education is a safeguard against extremism as well as critical religious education.

2. Developing resilience in young people and educators:
It is necessary to equip educators so that they can hold “difficult” conversations. Developing critical thinking is important but it must be combined with genuine dialogue. Besides, it will be essential to develop an environment suitable for dialogue and for managing difficult situations. The challenges at school level are multiple:

- Developing a framework with policies and procedures enabling dialogue.
- Teaching conflict resolution and teacher-training in conflict resolution.
- Creating a support network for teachers who are already under considerable pressure. The tools to counter violent extremism must be available to all teachers, not only those teaching religion.
- Curricula development: including critical thinking and teaching young people to make informed decisions.
- Building agency in young people – offering them an alternative that helps them cope with complex identity issues.

3. Education and curricula reform in Southern Mediterranean countries:
When referring to CVE in Southern Mediterranean countries, it is important to remember the specific educative context of these countries. An example of a country where education has been a priority is Tunisia where a serious attempt was made to harmonize the relationship between state, society and education. This attempt has aimed to train citizens on issues of identity, language and religion in order to counter extremist visions. The problem is that a freer society also allows more room to maneuver and educational efforts are thus confronted with widespread voices promoting intolerance.
Dealing with the push/pull factors and engaging with families, communities and non-formal education actors:

A critical aspect of countering violent extremism is dealing with the push and pull factors, i.e., the reasons why youngsters are recruited. We need to pay attention to unemployment and lack of education. In CVE it is necessary to explore not only the role of formal education but also that of the broader community and families. Education is not limited to school - it is important to look at how families teach, and how extra-curricular activities (sports, arts, culture) can be shaped into a comprehensive support programs. Values are transmitted not only by school but also by families and friends and there should be coherence in value transmission at home and at school.

The solution cannot come only from education. It must also involve employment offering an alternative narrative. If there is a mismatch between education and the labor market risks will be higher. Thus, there is an urgent need for developing vocational training programs as well as promoting collaboration between education institutions and the private sector.

Key Challenges and Gaps

- **Urgent task at four levels:**
  - Foster secularism and promote secular education.
  - Flexible, secular governance.
  - Education policies to avoid segregation.
  - Encourage young people to express themselves and participate.

- **Teachers are at the frontline but cannot do everything.** NGOs can provide support and engage with policy-makers and governments. The challenge is defining what constitutes a successful experience, establishing measureable (targets, timelines, assessments and resources required) as well as investing in teacher training programs that enable them to intervene effectively.

- **There is a need to think about the overarching message to be delivered in schools.** Sometimes language might be an obstacle, and sometimes it is better referring to dialogue and safe spaces rather than to violence and radicalization. At a public level, it is important to educate people about CVE. At a government level is important to establish adequate frameworks and engage young people.

- **In Southern Mediterranean countries there is an urgent need for curricular reform, in order to introduce the notions of moderation, tolerance and critical thinking.** Likewise a revision on the past history is transmitted through school curricula must be undertaken:
students need to understand their past and their history as to understand the heritage of others. Emphasis must be placed on civic education, on individual and collective freedoms, rights and duties. The sciences must however should not be ignored on the mistaken belief that emphasis must be placed on humanities teaching. Curricula should reaffirm the transfer of knowledge in a manner that avoids a sharp distinction between scientific education and the humanities, so that youth is prepared to deal with complexities. Finally, there should be a more balanced educational system destroying ideas of intangible truths.

• Push and pull factors.

• The gap between education and labor market.

• Lack of alternative narratives for social engagement.

Good Practices & Success Stories

• The European Union RAN PREVENT Network with around 1500 members across EU member states bringing together practitioners, policy-makers and experts.

• RAN Manifesto, with a focus on education including recommendations.

• The Abu Dhabi Memorandum on Good Practices for Education and Countering Violent Extremism.

• 1989 education reform in Tunisia.

• Rehabilitation programs of former extremist fighters putting them back in school as part of education programs where critical thinking and vocational training were encouraged.
Priority Policy Recommendations

- Create safe spaces at school for a free, open and frank dialogue that allows for complex conversations.

- Avoid the securitization of schools and preserve the natural role of teachers who when perceiving problems should resort first to families and other mechanisms before interventions at the security level.

- Secular education should include learning the basics of different religions, emphasizing diversity over rituals.

- Reinforce the teaching of values, tolerance, identity conflict resolution.

- Enable teachers to know about their community, identify its leaders and trends.

- Get young people involved in community change. Young people want quick changes (part of the appeal of extremism). This impulse for change should be transformed into a positive energy for activism. It is a way of enabling people to feel anger and channel it towards social change.

- Promote informal education and the intervention of communities, and families in CVE.

- Establish vocational training programs to avoid the gap between the education system and the labor market.

- Enable a policy framework guaranteeing resources and support for teachers and educators.

- Involve youth in training and CVE: developing skills of young people to work with state actors, security forces and other stakeholders.

- Promote joint reflection between young people and educators.

- There is no “one size fits all”, so strategies must be adapted to each specific context.
Workshop 3:

Building Peace through Interreligious Dialogue
Organized by KAICIID, 27-28 October 2015

Speakers/Experts:

- **Kjell Magne Bondevik**, CdM Member, Prime Minister of Norway (1997-2000; 2001-2005)
- **Luis Alberto Lacalle**, CdM Member, President of Uruguay (1990-1995)
- **Rexhep Meidani**, CdM Member, President of Albania (1997-2002)
- **Ambassador Alvaro Albacete**, Deputy Secretary General for External Relations, International Dialogue Centre KAICIID (Spain)
- **Mr. Sylvain Demangho**, Charge d'affairs, Representative of Minister of Reconciliation (Central African Republic)
- **Rev. Nicolas Guerekoyame**, Head of the Evangelical Community (Central African Republic)
- **Imam Oumar Kobine**, President of the Islamic Community (Central African Republic)
- **Bishop Elias Toumeh**, Greek Orthodox Bishop of Wadi al Nasara (Syria)
- **Ms. Vian Dakhil**, Member of the Iraqi Parliament, Representative of the Yazidi Community (Iraq)
- **Sheikh Dr. Abed El Fattah Al Samman**, Preacher, Author and Programme Presenter (Syria)
- **Mr. Mesrur Mohialdeen, Commissio**, Iraqi Institute for Human Rights (Iraq)

**Moderator: Prof. Mohammed Abu-Nimmer**, Senior Advisor, International Dialogue Centre KAICIID
Overview

The workshop provided a platform for an interactive discussion that highlighted the potential of interreligious and intercultural dialogue in building peace and social cohesion. The workshop was split into two 90-minute sessions each focused on experiences from two different parts of the world: Central African Republic (CAR) and Syria and Iraq. KAICIID invited religious leaders and policy-makers from these regions as speakers. The objective of the workshop was to raise awareness on the importance of interreligious dialogue in building peace, as well as to identify best practices and challenges in the field. The workshop convened both representatives of religious communities and policy-makers who emphasized the importance of their collaboration in promoting reconciliation among different religious communities. The session ended with final remarks from the moderator, incorporating the conclusions of the workshop and reflections on best practices and recommendations gathered during the interactive sessions.

Key Challenges and Gaps

Building relations across communities is the biggest challenge in interreligious peacebuilding.

The participants of the workshop concluded that the biggest challenge that must be addressed is communication between the representatives of different groups in conflict zones. Leaders of religious communities, with their influence and community outreach, have a unique role in reconciliation. This role should be mainstreamed and they should be supported in their efforts to build peace. More specific challenges and needs include:

- Limited resources to support current and possible initiatives to build cross community relationships.
- Sustaining long term engagement in joint interreligious initiatives.
- Focusing on those who are already convinced and difficult-to-reach more conservative or extremists.
- Limited interest and space for engaging religious institutions on the part of policy makers.
- Limited capacity (skills and strategies) among religious leaders in how to work with policy makers.
Good Practices & Success Stories

One of the good practices emphasized in both sessions of the workshop was the establishment and work of interreligious dialogue platforms that provide a positive environment for exchange among representatives of different communities. These platforms contribute to the rapprochement of communities in conflict zones. They also provide an opportunity for safe, continuous and constructive dialogue with the “other”, ultimately reducing the capacity of extremist narratives. Other examples of good practices include:

• Launching interreligious dialogue platforms in conflict zones can reduce the capacity of violent extremist groups to manipulate religion. Local religious leaders have to take the lead in launching these platforms as opposed to total reliance on external agencies (international or local).

• Interreligious peacebuilding requires leaders to take risk and make sacrifice in order to sustain peace and the dialogue itself.

• The commitment and sincerity of policy makers in supporting interreligious peacebuilding can make a significant difference in mobilizing communities against extremist discourse.
Priority Policy Recommendations

• Interreligious dialogue must be exercised within a context of respect for the “other”.

• Governments should be proactive in supporting religious leaders in their mission to establish relations between different communities and thus foster dialogue and social cohesion.

• There is always a personal risk and cost for religious leaders who are active in peace-building processes. It is thus crucial for governmental and civil institutions to guarantee the safety of religious leaders who act as mediators between communities in conflict.

• There should be a general progression from merely condemning the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and CAR to designing and carrying out concrete action in peace building.

• Interreligious peacebuilding should be accompanied with actions on the ground that affect the day to day concerns of local communities.

“If religious leaders don’t join forces and teach about diversity and the differences in society, extremism can easily develop”.

“A religious leader is like a doctor or a researcher, he is ready to prevent and take action. He doesn’t wait to solve the problem, he has to prevent, listen and perceive the developments in his community and react”.

Religious leaders should have the right conditions to meet all members of society, including radicalized, independent of their affiliation. Religious leaders need to talk to everyone and work on social cohesion with everyone!”.

“It is important for one community to be known by the other in order to establish contact between different religions”.

If religious leaders don’t join forces and teach about diversity and the differences in society, extremism can easily develop”. 
Workshop 4:

Online Radicalization
Organized by TRENDS Research & Advisory and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 27-28 October 2015

Speakers/Experts:

Panel 1: The Response by Governments and the Private Sector

• **Felipe Calderón**, CdM Member, President of Mexico (2006-2012)
• **Carlos Mesa**, CdM Member, President of Bolivia (2003-2005)
• **Peter Neumann**, Director, ICSR (UK)
• **Nick Pickles**, Head of Policy, Twitter UK (UK)
• **Chema Alonso**, Head of Security for Telefonica (Spain)
• **Hanif Qadir**, Head of Active Change Foundation (UK)
Panel 2: Grassroots Initiative to Counter Violent Extremism

- **Ricardo Lagos**, CdM Member, President of Chile (2000-2006)
- **Peter Neumann**, Director ICSR (UK)
- **Maura Conway**, Coordinator, VOX-POL (EU)
- **Shahmahmood Miakhel**, Head of Operations, United States Institute for Peace (Afghanistan)
- **Eliza Urwin**, Senior Programme Officer, United States Institute for Peace (Afghanistan)
- **Abdulaziz Al Hamza**, co-founder Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently (Syria)
- **Nick Kaderbhari**, Research Fellow, ICSR (UK)

**Moderator: Dr. Richard Burchill**, TRENDS Research & Advisory

**Overview**

The workshop addressed one of the greatest and newest challenges for understanding and addressing the radicalization and recruitment of individuals: the use of social media and the internet. The workshop brought together a mix of civil society, private sector and government to discuss the problems faced, latest approaches, and solutions. The objective was to bring the varying perspectives together in order to identify common ground, areas of weakness in our knowledge, and possible areas for cooperation. The workshop highlighted the need for effective engagement across, and among, key stakeholders. It was emphasised that civil society/grassroots initiatives have a key role in countering online radicalization with evidence of success in mobilizing communities to stand up to, and challenge, violent extremism through innovative projects and messages for countering violent radicalization.
Key Challenges and Gaps

The workshop addressed a range of challenges in how we understand the process of radicalization online and how it can be addressed. It was set out at the start that while the internet/social media pose challenges, face-to-face interactions remain a key feature in the radicalization process. It was also emphasized that we cannot separate the online and material worlds as if they are distinct and separate. Especially among young people, the space is one and the same and their interactions will thread between both. The business representatives stressed that they are businesses and not regulatory authorities. Furthermore, it must be remembered that online platforms are just that, only platforms, and as such, their content and information is provided by users and not the owner of the platform. The internet/social media is highly populist, as anyone can join and participate. This means that extremists are not using the internet/social media in illegal or nefarious ways, but in the same fashion as any other user. The internet/social media also fosters niches where small conversations can be held in a more private setting, an additional challenge for uncovering what is occurring. We are seeing in every day activity how the internet/social media can appeal to emotional feelings, allowing users to grab the attention of others. This online emotional link can then fracture face to face relations where individuals become isolated from friends and family.

This highlighted the need to find ways to engage with youth in a positive manner. It was further discussed how social media can be used to bring atrocities and falsehoods to light but sometimes it is difficult to differentiate between extremists and those attempting to counter extremism. This creates an additional, paradoxical challenge: the internet/social media is a global phenomenon, bringing together individuals and groups from a wide range of geographical locations, but the issues contributing to extremism are about local grievances and politics. We have to find ways to combine global and local efforts in an effective way to counter the use of online methods for radicalization.
Good Practices & Success Stories

The workshop identified a wide range of good practices coming from civil society/grassroots organizations. These civil society practices seek to form communities of like-minded people using technology in the same ways for the same reasons. This is very similar to the use of the internet/social media by extremists, but it appears that positive messages gain substantive traction and wider followings. The key feature behind good practices appeared to be the discussion and debate that is created where people share ideas and views in a manner where differences are accepted and the debate is not constrained in any way. Further good practice was evident in programmes where young people were actively involved as participants and not just objects. The Active Change Foundation is a strong success story in this regard. “The Raqqa is being Slaughtered Silently” campaign showed the power of using personal testimony from victims and those who have left extremist organizations, as well as the importance of revealing facts and reality in countering the messages being used by extremists.
Priority Policy Recommendations

- Governments cannot expect internet/social media providers to monitor and report on content and activities; there needs to be effective partnerships in the pursuit of mutual objectives;

- Shutting down or limiting the use of the internet/social media is not a policy option, instead online platforms should be actively utilized to gain intelligence and to counter the messages being used;

- Need to work with community leaders, and religious leaders, to help further the debate and discussion of the sources being used to justify violence;

- Research in this area needs to be improved with an emphasis on content and how content is being used across different platforms;

- Governments must work with civil society and business to anticipate shifts in popularity between online platforms in order to claim the space;

- Must realize that young people are the key for understanding how online radicalization occurs and how social media is effective.
### #GlobalConsensus

**Leadership**

Ban Ki-moon

**Democracy**

women

**rights and security**

**On line radicalization**

counter-narrative

**Financing**

counter-narrative

**positive narratives**

**Youth**

Faiths and values

**extremism**

Economics and opportunity

**education**

**#CVE**

**#PVE**

**University**

Participants

Countries represented (including CdM Members countries)

Organizations, think tanks, academia

OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES

Total number of debate hours

- Government representatives: 69
- Former Prime Ministers and Presidents (CdM Members): 35
- Private sector representatives: 12
- Accredited media: 80

MADRID+10 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

CONCLUSIONS
MADRID+10
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Annexes
More than ten years on from the horrific bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the world is a very different place, but it is not a better place.

The bombings, which were together the worst terrorist incident in Europe since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and indeed one of the worst ever in Europe, were widely regarded as having been inspired by Al Qaeda in reprisal for Spain’s involvement in the US-led alliance that invaded Iraq. The timing certainly appeared to be an attempt to affect the upcoming election in Spain, and in the event the Government of incumbent PM José María Aznar, which had appeared to be a few percentage points ahead, was defeated in the elections three days later. If damaging the Aznar government was indeed the agenda, their violence was horrifyingly effective.

Partly because this was an especially outrageous attack on parliamentary democracy, to which the Club de Madrid is so fully committed, and also because the attacks took place in the city that gives the organization its name, it was decided to hold an “International Summit on Democracy, Security and Terrorism” in Madrid in March 2005. The preparation of papers and the attendance at the event itself involved hundreds of internationally significant scholars and experts as well as Members and advisors of the Club de Madrid, and the outcome was a three volume Madrid Summit Working Paper Series and the Madrid Agenda – a very substantial commitment to a range of principles and policy recommendations that attempted to address the concerns about what it called ‘the global threat of terrorism’. It called on global leaders to give their support to an agenda for action for governments, institutions, civil society, the media and individuals.

Ten years on the Members of the Club de Madrid were troubled that their hopes for the success of the Madrid Agenda had not been fulfilled. Indeed while Al Qaeda was a lesser threat, the intervening decade had seen a deterioration in global security and the appearance of an AQ successor network.
of extremists calling itself IS (Islamic State), Daesh and various other names relating to the geographical context of the particular nodes of the network. Daesh was not only conducting attacks of extreme violence but also taking over and governing territory in various parts of the wider Middle East and North Africa and promulgating a message of fundamentalist extremism and violence that resulted in devastation across huge tracts of Iraq and Syria, with refugees numbered in the millions, increasing instability in neighbouring states and a spiralling deterioration in geo-political relations.

It seemed to the Members of the Club de Madrid that it was time to look again at the Madrid Agenda, and recognize that the issue could no longer be satisfactorily described merely as terrorism. Indeed it was apparent that focusing on what had been termed the ‘War on Terrorism’ had if anything made the situation worse. After consultation they approached Professor Neumann (Kings College London) who had been involved in organizing the 2005 conference and asked him to liaise with a number of senior colleagues around the world and bring academics, experts and political leaders back to Madrid, ten years on, to address the broader challenge of countering violent extremism.

When Professor Neumann asked me to assist him in this task I was honoured to do so. He has become an increasing effective and impressive researcher and contributor to understanding the field and working with him is always a learning experience. He identified a number of significant colleagues and we approached them and asked for papers in four key areas – Economics and Opportunity; Politics and Identity; Faith and Values; and Rights and Security.

Why these four areas?

**Economics and Opportunity**

Poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and lack of education undoubtedly contribute to enormous human misery and hardship worldwide, and there is a moral imperative to energetically address these problems, but there is little empirical evidence of a direct causal link with terrorism or violent extremism. Indeed some supporters of extremism are to be found among more affluent well-educated socio-economic groups. However where economic and social exclusion contribute to a sense of injustice and unfair
treatment, they do become part of the toxic mix that contributes to violent extremism. The other common elements are a sense of humiliation or profound disrespect and the absence of genuine opportunities to improve the circumstances of a community through participation in their own governance. This may be through weak or corrupt states or authoritarian government.

Addressing these problems is not straightforward. In some situations a poor community with low educational achievement has attributed their unhappy circumstances to their low educational status. When they have been able to improve their educational standing but still found themselves seriously disadvantaged and unable to better themselves in comparison with their neighbours, they became more angry and resentful because of the sense of unfair discrimination compared with their more fortunate community nearby. A partial improvement in their circumstances led to greater discontent and resentment, because there was no clear path for future progress.

In the Middle East and North Africa the increased prosperity of some countries led to increased discontent because significant groups (possibly the majority of the population) felt that they were not getting their fair share in the increasing wealth of their countries because a small elite of business people and politically-connected groups were reaping the benefits and leaving the majority, especially young people, rural dwellers and women, behind. Unable to identify with the success of their country, finding no way out of their poor circumstances and feeling a sense of unfairness and humiliation such marginalized people will become increasingly angry, and some, particularly the young, will channel their emotions, not least their anger, into violence.

In short, while there are other issues, social and economic exclusion does create fault lines that can be exploited by those intent on fomenting extremism and violence.

**Politics and Identity**

In addition to economic inequity, the people of the Middle East and North Africa have seen many set-backs and false dawns. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Caliphate were followed by modernising and liberalizing forces, but these failed to restore independence, pride and
success in the Arab world. They were followed by Socialist and Baathist parties, but the pan-Arab nationalism and socialism championed by Gamal Abdul Nassar and others was defeated in the 1967 war and followed by repressive authoritarian rulers in Government and a growth of conservative Islamism in the communities across the region.

These authoritarian rulers have failed to deliver prosperity or restore pride in the Arab world and the new opportunities of the internet and social media have opened up, for young people in particular, opportunities and expectations which exploded into significance with the Arab Awakening. The failure of this recent revolution to deliver democracy or stability and the continuing interventions of the West have weakened any belief that democracy can deliver and have strengthened amongst young people a more radical ‘collective’ or ‘large group’ identity.

Disseminated by means of sophisticated information and communication technologies, the persistent and highly emotional messages and violent videos of Daesh induce terror, inspire a sense of power, and affect the thinking of some young people in search of excitement, identity and belonging, not only in the region, but in Western countries too.

An idealized past is created and the prospect of being part of a new and glorious future is offered. Meantime, the rapid changes of globalization, combined with the pressure in Western societies for minority Muslim communities to assimilate have contributed to anxieties about the loss of Muslim identities of minorities in the West and in some cases resulted in an over-zealous adoption of an identity in which a disturbed view of religion plays an important role.

While the problem of violent extremism is not just about the Middle East and North Africa and should not be over-identified with the religion of Islam as a whole, the history of political failure in that region, which is largely Muslim, and the use of sectarianism within Islam as well as between Muslims and others has contributed to instability and extremism.

**Faith and Values**

However the religious features of Muslim identity are not well understood by a Western leadership, which in Europe is largely sceptical of all religion and does not understand it, or in the USA is itself often somewhat fundamentalist in its Judaeo-Christian beliefs. In particular there is little appreciation of the difference between mature, sophisticated and tolerant faith thinkers and communities, and those (religious or otherwise) who hold their beliefs with fundamentalist certainty. Islamist extremists have been particularly successful at appealing to young Muslims under the age of 35 who naturally, in every community and generation, are drawn to countercultural movements, defying their elders and breaking with convention.

It is difficult for people from stable mature societies to understand how those who adopt the horrible, terrifying and murder-
ous tactics of Daesh believe themselves to be doing the work of God/Allah in destroying the infidels, forgetting that Europe too had its religious wars and inquisitions in previous centuries. Those who ally themselves with Daesh, as with other groups who use terror as a tool, know they are breaking the law and shocking the powerful global establishment, but believe that they are doing it in the cause of righting even greater wrongs.

Finding ways of challenging ideology – however religiously cloaked – in the region and in the West – that contradicts or undermines or contradicts universal principles of human dignity, must surely be the key aims and objectives of any programme to combat violent extremism.

**Rights and Security**

While the natural response to violent extremism is a wish to attack back with overwhelming and crushing force, we must understand that this is precisely the response the terrorist seeks. Indiscriminate and disproportionate violence intensifies the moral outrage of the community that suffers it and legitimates the terrorists, even when they have provoked it. In addition to this, recent experience has increasingly demonstrated the limits of success in the use of military force.

However just because there is no military or security solution to the problem of terrorism, does not mean there is no military or security role. The role is to protect the human rights of all citizens, and build sustainable long-term peace and stability. This requires fairness and equality before the law and professionalism in police services and security forces who demonstrate fair treatment, competence, non-corruption, and democratic accountability. Where special powers need to be invoked they must not be abused and should be transparent, transient and used only when necessary and appropriate.

There is a profound need to win over hearts and minds, with counter-messaging, education, narratives that combat manipulation of history, individual engagement, and in addition and very importantly, addressing the underlying socio-economic and political problems which are at the root of many of the problems – the deep sense of injustice, disrespect, disempowerment and intractable disadvantage.
If there is simply an attempt to put down the violence, and especially if there is an over-reaction by the state the result may be an increase in popular radicalization. The challenge is not just to stick with what is lawful, but with what is seen to be fair and protective of everyone’s human rights.

The issue is not just sticking with international law, which gives significant leeway to states, but also acting in a way that is perceived as ‘fair’. Given a history of violence and repression, most police services and law enforcement agencies (including the judiciary) need to help to change the way they use force and the law, and many such communities also have to learn how to be policed.

**Practising what we Preach**

It is often said that religious leaders have a role in preaching moderation to their people. It is true that preaching incitement can make things worse, but preaching moderation rarely grasps the imagination of young people, especially angry frustrated young people, so not too much should be expected from that quarter, other than not exacerbating the problem.

There is also a problem that the secular nature of the western social and cultural structures does not help religious groups, especially Muslims, to develop a sense of belonging, and too much interference by secular states can appear as superficial manipulation and is unlikely to be blessed with success.

Finally, some former sympathizers and supporters of violent extremism who come from the West may be successfully encouraged to reject violence and not only re integrate back into society but also participate in producing and promulgating counter-violence narratives. Currently, the policies in many Western countries favour prison for non-violent Islamic State supporters who have broken terrorism laws, but sending these young people to jail not only increases the likelihood that their radicalism will persist, and perhaps be transmitted to other prisoners, when they could actually be very helpful in the process of de-radicalizing other young people, directly or through social media.

Much else can be done, by way of developing more inclusive and accountable economic institutions, modernizing and improving in the quality of education for young people, and empowering women. These communities need inclusive growth.
and social justice more than just rapid economic growth for the few, and their young people need to be inspired and enthused by encouraging their intellectual curiosity, open mindedness, freedom and respect of the other. However governments cannot instil such virtues in young people, if they do not display the same qualities themselves.

With these thoughts in mind a number of keynote papers were written and these are reproduced in this document. They were then circulated among other scholars and some political Members of the Club de Madrid, and their comments sought. The papers were used to develop a document which not only developed and elaborated the principles and analysis but also sought to lay out clear actions based on them, and the whole document was the subject of substantial discussion among these authors and commentators at a meeting Madrid. Key to the consideration was the intent to produce a document which was long enough to concisely set out all the key principles and actions, but short enough to hold the interest and attention to the global audience it hope to reach.

The following day the outcome was presented to the Club de Madrid Members, who were able to scrutinize it and add their own views, and finally a small senior group of academics, officials and political leaders refined the paper so that it could be published and presented by my co-chair, President Danilo Türk of Slovenia, and myself to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon at a public event in Madrid.

The UN Secretary-General gave an immediate welcome to this Global Consensus document – “Stopping Violent Extremism Madrid+10” – and undertook to include it in the proposals that he would bring to the UN in early 2016. In addition the CdM established a web-site through which ordinary members of the public could study and sign on to be part of a growing Global Consensus.

Within weeks another European capital, Paris, found itself the unwelcome focus of another horrible attack in January 2016, as if to emphasise that importance and salience of this issue.

We publish the study papers and comments because we believe that unless we understand better the profound threat that we face, we cannot hope to stop violent extremism and build peace stability and reconciliation in a world which is sliding further into global conflict – not a re-run of 1939, much less 1914 but a twenty-first century global conflict.

We encourage you to read this background thinking; use it to develop your own understanding and analysis; and commit yourself to doing what is needed to stem the tide of violence and stop violent extremism. Together we can start to have an effect. The alternative is too terrible to contemplate.

John, Lord Alderdice
Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford
Annex I

WORKING GROUP AND GLOBAL CONSENSUS COMMITTEE

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Most of the four thousand Western Muslims who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq have joined the Islamic State. These recruits could have joined other militias that are less illegal, less hated, or less demanding. Yet they flocked to the Islamic State rather than its competitors. Why?

The Islamic State’s success at recruiting Western Muslims makes sense once you know that most of them are under the age of 35. Youth the world over are drawn to countercultural movements because they want to break with convention, and nothing is more countercultural for Western Muslim youth at the moment than the Islamic State. It is not only at odds with Western culture; it is at odds with mainstream Islam that has adapted to Western culture. The more hated the Islamic State is and the more demands it places on its members, like turning over their passports, the more its countercultural allure increases. Similar to Neo-Nazi groups, the Islamic State’s pariah status is its selling point.

The Islamic State cultivates its countercultural appeal in two ways. It gleefully defies international norms of warfare, destroying antiquities, enslaving women, and slaughtering prisoners on camera. Then it justifies its brutality with passages from Islamic scripture unfamiliar to most Muslims in the West. The more shocking the act and the more obscure the scripture, the better. It forces Muslim youth to question whether the group or its critics are being more faithful to scripture. When Muslim scholars raise a hue and cry that such-and-such act is un-Islamic, the Islamic State cites chapter and verse, making youth wonder whether the State has the right of it.

Thus, the Islamic State is using violence and scripture to deliberately provoke a debate about authentic Islam, which creates a cognitive opening among some Muslim youth in the West. As a consequence, a few of them become more susceptible to Islamic State propaganda.
This is a coarsening of the “jihadi cool” phenomenon, the countercultural appeal of belonging to a terrorist organization, previously identified by terrorism scholar Marc Sageman as part of al-Qaeda’s allure. It is “jihadi cruel,” shocking acts of violence justified with scripture to provoke Muslim youth into questioning the values and authenticity of mainstream Islam. Western Muslims who carry out the gruesome acts themselves garner instant notoriety and force their young coreligionists back home to question their identity and convictions.

With this in mind, we can begin to understand why some Muslim youth who once celebrated Western culture and their place in it would later laud the Islamic State’s shocking violence. In their eyes, the violence defies convention so it must be more authentic than the complacent status quo they see around them. The greater the outrage of Muslims and non-Muslims, the more appealing the violence is. That’s why a new convert to Islam like 19-year-old Jaelyn Young in Mississippi or 17-year-old Ali Shukri Amin in northern Virginia, both of whom knew little about the intricacies of Islamic scripture, could be swayed by the Islamic State’s swagger.

There is an upper limit on the number of people who would be attracted to the Islamic State. Like Neo-Nazi groups, the State is not trying to cultivate mass support, even among Muslims. Doing so would undermine its jihadi cruel recruitment strategy.

Given the durable, if small, appeal of similar violent countercultural movements, can the Islamic State’s recruitment strategy be thwarted? Or should Western states and citizens focus instead on mitigating the damage its few recruits can cause? In other words, should we treat the problem of Islamic State recruitment in the West differently than we treat Neo-Nazi recruitment?
When grappling with the problem of Islamic State recruitment in the West, it’s important to keep four principles in mind:

• The countercultural allure of a group that thrives on being a pariah cannot be reduced by demonstrating it’s a pariah.

• A small number of youth will always be attracted to a violent countercultural group as long as it is in the news and feared by the establishment.

• When the establishment creates programs to reduce the appeal of a violent countercultural group, those programs can reinforce the countercultural status of their target.

• Most youth attracted to violent countercultural movements leave them when they get older and rejoin the establishment.

These principles lend themselves to policy recommendations, some of which are harder to implement than others. Reducing fear of the Islamic State and diminishing its prominence in the media would go a long way toward decreasing its countercultural appeal. But that’s unlikely given the State’s military successes in the Middle East and its knack for capturing media attention through creative brutality.

One might counsel that more should be done to expose the Islamic State’s cruelty. But the success of the Islamic State’s recruitment strategy depends on publicity for its cruel acts, which increases its countercultural allure.

Others might suggest that more religious education is required for at-risk youth. That might work if the counsellors know their scripture and can speak frankly. But many Muslim religious authorities in the West are fearful of talking about sensitive subjects like violence and scripture because they worry about attracting unwanted attention from the authorities. They also worry about discussing the subject publicly for fear of playing into negative stereotypes about Islam and violence.
Another approach might foster alternative countercultural movements that could appeal to Western Muslim youth. That might reduce the number of potential recruits but doesn’t necessarily do anything to reduce the countercultural appeal of the Islamic State. Moreover, the establishment could harm the alternatives if it gets too involved.

Other countercultural movements have faded when they were adopted by the mainstream, making them much less cool. But as with Nazism, that’s not likely in the case of the Islamic State. Still, if reports of Islamic State behavior make it seem inauthentic, hypocritical, and even laughable, its appeal could diminish.

Finally, Islamic State supporters from the West could be encouraged to rejoin the establishment, especially those who have not acted violently. That can be done by offering Islamic State supporters a way out of the movement and reintegrating into society through jobs, volunteer service, and so forth.

Currently, the policies in many Western countries favor prison for non-violent Islamic State supporters who have broken terrorism laws. Sending these youth to jail not only increases the likelihood that their radicalism will persist; it also communicates that the Islamic State is so fearful that even its non-violent sympathizers are beyond redemption. That will do little to reduce the group’s countercultural appeal.
Neither politics nor identity may necessarily have anything to do with radicalization into terrorism. Examples can easily be provided showing a lack of significant incidence, if not altogether the nearly complete absence, of both these issues along the process throughout which an individual who previously did not justify the use of terrorism undergoes a cognitive mutation that leads him or her to condone that form or tactic of violence, eventually making himself or herself available to actual involvement in terrorist activities. Yet, there are many cases of radicalization into terrorism where politics and identity proved indeed relevant.

To approach this matter, at least two major considerations are to be taken into account from the start. First, processes of radicalization may be linked to many diverse manifestations of transnational or international, even global terrorism. These include ethno-nationalist terrorism, left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism and religiously inspired terrorism, as in the example of current jihadist terrorism. Secondly, the conclusive evidence on radicalization accumulated over the past decade is still limited and findings from one type of terrorism might not be applicable to other types. Consequently, the tone of this discussion paper is deliberately generic and analytical in scope.

Politics can be related to terrorist radicalization in a number of markedly different ways. Terrorist radicalization may be connected by political structures, institutions, actors and processes. Political structures in terms of general attitudes and beliefs or basic fundamental norms about the distribution of power in a given society may, depending on country, inhibit or favor radicalization into terrorism among certain segments of the population. The working of political institutions can efficiently regulate social conflicts otherwise prone to the remit of some individuals, objectively or subjectively affected by grievances inherent to such antagonisms, into a process of radicalization leading to terrorism, same as the functioning of those institutional arrangements could have just the opposite impact.

Political actors, from elites and political parties to interest groups and social movements, exhibiting a plurality of orientations towards the structure and distribution of power, though this is highly dependent of the characteristics of a given regime, have
indeed capabilities to effectively contribute to the prevention of terrorist radicalization within the collectivities at risk inside the social sectors which fall under their corresponding influence. But some civil society entities may equally tolerate and even promote ambivalent, when not relying in openly favorable discourses on the morality and utility of terrorism, as well as on participation in organizations which, inside or outside the jurisdiction of a national state, systematically rely on terrorism tactics as part of their collective action repertoire.

As a whole, the multiplicity of possible interactions involving actors and institution in the respective national political processes can offer opportunities as well as constraints for radicalization agents and agencies to operate, targeting what they consider to be vulnerable individuals in selected locations. Although these opportunities and constrains are often contingent of the existing kind of polity, they have been observed in the context of primordial and secondary political socialization of people, electoral campaigns and public debates commonly amplified by means of the mass media or linked to protest mobilizations. Similarly in the context of the formulation and implementation of governmental public policies or the uncertain dynamics of regime transformations, mainly though not exclusively if they evolve from authoritarian rule.

But politics has an unavoidable international, nowadays often worldwide dimension. Issues of global governance, balances of power between states, ongoing disputes affecting the stability of entire geopolitical regions, as well as open conflicts involving armed confrontations such as in the case civil wars, may all provide ingredients for the narrative that terrorist organizations elaborate as part of their propaganda initiatives. This propaganda is now widely disseminated by means of Internet and the social media, with the purpose of widening the usually minority but not exceptionally more than significant support basis that terrorist organizations enjoy within their respective populations of reference. Political inaction facing this terrorist mobilization strategies, both at national and international level, facilitates the processes of radicalization in its numerous potential modalities to happen and hence recruitment.
When establishing connections between politics and radicalization leading to terrorism what can be at stake is simply and plainly an identity issue. Identities, more precisely collective identities, are usually framed and shaped in a given political context and amidst concrete political processes. Adopting and affirming a political or politicized collective identity, within which individuals may feel they better recognize themselves and can similarly be recognized by others, need by no means to be linked to violence and to terrorism. However, there are observable instances when the universally human quest of identity may become a major individual motivation to enter the radicalization process and even to become involved in some kind of terrorist behavior.

For a given identity to be associated with support or involvement in terrorism, this form or tactic of violence must be incorporated, either from the initial formative period of that identity or throughout its evolution under changing social and political conditions, as an exalted and glorified differential means of action among the core definitional elements of the ideology linked to such identity, though the concept itself may not be explicitly mentioned. Ideologies sanctioning the use of violence are likely to provide basis for the development of worldviews and cognitive frameworks under which the bond between identity acquisition or affirmation and terrorist action tends to occur.

These identities, whose adoption presumably runs in parallel to the internalizing of ideologies of violence in different degrees of depth or intensity, imply for a given individual conformity with a set of attitudes and conducts ranging from approval of terrorism to the eventual involvement in activities related to such a form or tactic of violence. As such, they can be promoted by governmental authorities, having usually a vigilante orientation inside their corresponding state jurisdictions and an insurgent character outside them. This is to be expected from rulers whose regimes were established as a result of violence or terrorism and were subsequently able to persist in a rather totalitarian configuration.

Sponsored by these kind of states or acting independently from them, fact is that armed organizations implicated in a contentious struggle for power which can take place at different levels, from the national to the global, commonly elaborate and disseminate propaganda which aims at mobi-
lizing needed human resources by, among other stimuli and incentives provided, offering to satisfy the need for identity and a sense of belonging. Today we know about adolescents and young adults who have been socialized, since their childhood years, into exclusive and bellicose mindsets, by organizations systematically involved in the practice of terrorism.

More often nowadays, these entities disseminate by means of sophisticated information and communication technologies a persistent series of messages intended to modify cognitive frameworks and introduce ideologies of violence appealing to vulnerable individuals in search of identity and belonging. These individuals, known to be very diverse as to their socio-economic characteristics or educational backgrounds, are to be found in many different locations throughout the world. Particularly at risk of terrorist radicalization seem to be adolescents and young adults affected by identity tensions as a result of living in nations where an odd balance between tradition and modernity exists. Likewise adolescents and young adults in a diaspora situation, awkwardly caught in between two cultures and societies.
Economics and Opportunity to Counter Violent Extremism
Hafez Ghanem

While there is very little empirical evidence directly linking poverty, unemployment, or education with violent extremism worldwide, there are strong indications that the violence and instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) today stem, at least in part, from a sense of injustice due to economic and political exclusion, as well as to a weak or predatory state that does not deliver for its citizens. This seems to be a core agreement among most observers.

How Do Economics and Opportunity Link to Violent Extremism?

The actual or perceived marginalization of important segments of society often provides a pretext for recourse to violence. For example, it could be argued that Daesh was able to grow by capitalizing on the perceived

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1 The author is Vice-President of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa Region. The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of the World Bank.

2 For a review of the empirical evidence, see World Bank (2015a).
marginalization of the Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria. The excluded or marginalized groups are not always identified by their religious or ethnic affiliations. In many countries youth are marginalized, with little prospects for productive employment, housing, marriage and limited voice in society. People living in lagging regions within a country (such as Western Tunisia or Upper Egypt) could feel marginalized. The Arab Spring started in Sidi Bouzid, a rural region of Tunisia with one of the highest rates of youth unemployment.

As MENA societies grew and prospered, large groups (possibly the majority of the population) felt that they were not getting their fair share. A small elite of business people and politically-connected groups were reaping most of the benefits, leaving the majority of young people, rural dwellers and women behind.

**Suggested key Principle**

The above implies that any program to counter violent extremism must include policies that aim at economic and social inclusion. Actions on the security and political fronts are important. But they should not divert attention from the economic and social problems that are among the root causes of violent extremism.

**Suggested Policy Recommendations**

The set of economic policies to counter violent extremism would include: developing more inclusive and accountable economic institutions; creating more opportunities for youth through reform of the framework for private sector development and the modernization of the education system; supporting the development of lagging regions and rural areas; and empowering women.

**Inclusive and accountable institutions.** Good governance requires institutions that are both inclusive and accountable; two areas where MENA countries are particularly weak and lag behind other nations of similar per capita income and level of development (Figure 1)\(^3\). Such lack of inclusiveness and weak accountability affect implementation of proj-
ects and programs. It also adds to the feeling of exclusion, as various groups in society are given no voice in decisions and policies that affect their daily lives.

There is a need to render economic institutions in MENA more inclusive and responsive to citizens’ needs. MENA countries could benefit from the example of successful East Asian economies who put in place consultative processes (including different government departments, the private sector and civil society) to agree on national development plans and monitor their execution. Effective implementation needs accountability. Each executing agency in charge of a particular sector or policy issue should be held accountable for implementation. There also needs to be a supervisory mechanism that secures the accountability of the institutions and ensure that things happen.

Figure 1: Voice and Accountability

Source: World Bank. Note: Governance estimates are measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond greater voice and accountability.

4 For example, see Sakamoto (2013) or Matsunaga and Ragheb (2015) for examples from Egypt where weak institutions were responsible for lack of implementation of economic plans and reform programs.
Institutional development should not be limited to public institutions. Private and civil society organizations play a critical role in ensuring voice for various stakeholders. Thus, potential beneficiaries of government programs could exert pressure to ensure that the programs reflect their needs and are properly implemented.

**Entrepreneurship for Inclusion.** MENA has the highest unemployment rate in the developing world, with the rate of youth and women double the average. The private sector is dominated by a few, large firms that hardly create any jobs (Figure 2). Most jobs are created in micro-enterprises, many of which operate in the informal sector, providing low wages and using low technology. While poor and uneducated youth have no option but to work in the informal sector, educated youth prefer to wait for a formal job. This could explain why youth unemployment rates increase with the level of education. Moreover, the informal sector is considered unsafe for women, because of the high incidence of sexual harassment. Unable to find formal jobs and denied entry into the informal sector, many women become discouraged and remain at home.

Inclusive growth can be achieved by shifting away from a system that favors large and established enterprises to one that focuses on developing small businesses and on creating more opportunities for young men and women. This would require a change in the legal and regulatory frameworks to ensure a level playing field for all, as well as institutional changes that aim at controlling corruption and ensuring that rules are applied fairly.

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5 Kharas and Abdou (2013) argue that inclusive growth in Egypt requires reforms of the regulatory framework to encourage the development of civil society organizations.
ANNEXES

CONCLUSIONS

Figure 2: Net Job Creation by Firm Size and Age

![Graph showing net job creation by firm size and age for Tunisia (1996-2010) and Lebanon (2005-2010).]


**Education for youth inclusion.** In addition to the lack of good jobs, there appears to be a mismatch between the skills that Arab youth acquire at schools and universities and those required by employers. The education systems in MENA do not prepare students for a life of entrepreneurship and risk-taking. They also do not instill in them 21st century skills and qualities like curiosity, teamwork, open mindedness, tolerance, and respect of the other.

MENA countries have made huge strides in expanding access to education and more young people than ever before are attending schools and universities. Moreover, MENA governments spend more than 5 percent of GDP on education, higher than what other middle-income regions spend, demonstrating a commitment to education. Quality of education should be the focus now. There is a need to improve the quality of basic teaching of literacy and numeracy skills, as well as to adjust curricula and teaching methods to reflect the skills and competencies demanded by today’s globalized labor market. There is also a need for institutional reforms that hold schools and teachers accountable for student learning.
Including smallholder and family farmers in lagging regions. Whole regions in MENA are excluded from the benefits of growth, and those regions are nearly all rural, and highly dependent on agriculture. Moreover, most (98 percent in Egypt, 79 percent in Jordan, 70 percent in Morocco) agricultural plots are small in size and are managed by smallholder family farmers. Hence, policies aimed at achieving inclusive growth need to include special programs and measures to support smallholders. Today nearly 80 percent of the extreme poor in Egypt live in rural Upper Egypt and rural poverty in Morocco is about 3 times higher than urban poverty.

Neglect of smallholder and family farmers in MENA reflects the fact that they have virtually no voice in economic decision-making. Producer organizations and cooperatives can play an important role in strengthening the governance system of the agriculture sector, particularly in developing and supporting family farmers. Problems caused by the large number of very small dispersed family farms in MENA countries can be tackled through the development of strong producer organizations that bring farmers together to ensure that their voice is heard in policy discussions and also help enhance access to technology, input and output markets, information, communication, and natural resources. Compared with other regions with similar per capita income (for example, Latin America or East Asia), producer organizations, as well as other civic society organizations that operate in rural areas, are still quite weak in MENA.
Including women. Women in MENA (including young women and women farmers) suffer more than men from exclusion. They have lower labor force participation rates, higher unemployment rates, limited access to credit, land and other productive assets. That is why programs that target women are critical for achieving inclusive growth.

The problem of female economic inclusion and labor force participation is complex and multi-faceted. It reflects social norms, legal restrictions on women, and economic conditions. Improving the economic status of women in MENA would require action in at least three areas. First, the legal and regulatory frameworks would need to be revised to abolish discrimination against women, and at the same time institutions will need to be strengthened to ensure that the new rules are actually implemented and the discrimination is effectively removed. Second, policies and programs to expand the formal private sector would help increase the supply of “decent” jobs that are considered “safe” for women. Third, a continued expansion of female access to quality education will increase overall labor force participation rates, since there is a positive correlation between a woman’s level of education and her decision to enter the job market.

6 The labor force participation rate for young Arab women stood at about 27 percent in 2003 compared to 64 percent in the Americas, 55 percent in Europe and 62 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa
Concluding Remarks

I believe that an almost exclusive focus on very divisive political and identity questions since the Arab Spring started in 2010 has contributed to the current malaise, and that it is high time for MENA governments and their international partners to focus on the economy. This does not mean that political, cultural, ethnic and religious issues are not important. However, they should not be emphasized to the exclusion of economic and social issues.

A key lesson from the Arab Spring and its aftermath is that the objective of economic policy should shift from “rapid growth” to “inclusive growth and social justice”. Developing more inclusive and accountable economic institutions; creating more opportunities for youth through reform of the framework for private sector development and the modernization of the education system; supporting the development of lagging regions and rural areas; and empowering women important areas for policy action to achieve inclusive growth and also to prevent violent extremism.

References


Rights and Security
Peter R. Neumann

The fight against violent extremism is not just one of ideas. It also needs to be fought with the traditional repressive instruments of the state: the police, intelligence services, and – sometimes – the military. Their use is essential, but also poses dilemmas and trade-offs that need to be addressed by the policymakers who guide their deployment and formulate the ‘rules of engagement’. This paper offers a brief summary of what we know about the use of force and its role in countering violent extremism. It highlights key issues and areas of conflict, and formulates a set of principles that is designed to help policymakers in navigating the trade-offs between rights and security.

The Argument(s)

For civil rights defenders, the choice between rights and security is a false one. They claim that rights and security are (positively) connected, and that any curtailment of liberties will lead to more insecurity, grievances, and – therefore – strengthen the support for those who challenge the state’s power and legitimacy. In the long term, they say, the state’s interests are best served by restraint and protecting rights and the rule of law,
even if – in the short term – this limits the security forces’ ability to arrest, kill, and/or capture everyone they suspect of being violent extremists.\(^7\)

Not least, civil libertarians stress the importance of preserving the ‘moral high ground’ and not becoming like the violent extremists that one wishes to defeat. The late Paul Wilkinson, a well known professor of terrorism studies at St Andrews University, put it as follows:

The primary objective of counter-terrorist strategy must be the protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that this aim overrides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence as such. Any bloody tyrant can ‘solve’ the problem of political violence if he is prepared to sacrifice all considerations of humanity, and to trample down all constitutional and judicial rights.\(^8\)

The opposite view is that violent extremists pose a different, more significant challenge than ‘ordinary’ criminals: they threaten state and society as a whole, and are seeking to create polarization, civil strife, and destroy the institutions that permit communities to live together peacefully.

The state’s response, therefore, needs to be strong and uncompromising. If governments permit violent extremists to take advantage of democratic protections and the legal system, the violent extremists will be emboldened. If ordinary citizens no longer feel the state has a monopoly on the use of force, and that its institutions are incapable of protecting people’s safety, their confidence will decline. This will undermine the state’s legitimacy, and in turn – provoke further attacks, leading to chaos, anarchy, and ultimately – the state’s demise. The strategist Nick Berry described this scenario as “power deflation”, and believed it would be as dangerous to democracy and stability as an overreaction. In his view, it risked

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producing “a kind of ‘reverse paranoia’ – a state of paralysis in which gov-
ernment feels it is powerless to disrupt a terrorist campaign, and that any
action it might take would only increase the fervor with which the terror-
ists are conducting their operations”.

The Evidence

In essence, therefore: is repression cause or cure?

There’s no shortage of cases where coercive means have played an impor-
tant role in thwarting extremist challenges to the state:

• In Germany, the government captured several generations of Red
Army Faction leaders until the group no longer had the capacity to
carry on. There was no compromise, no negotiation, and no peace
accord: the state fought its adversary until it was (effectively) defeated.10

9 Peter R. Neumann and MLR Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism (London: Routledge,

In Northern Ireland, repressive instruments were used to bring the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to the negotiating table. To a great extent, the group’s willingness to sit down with others and talk about peace resulted from the perception that its military advances had been thwarted and a compromise needed to be sought.\(^\text{11}\)

However, repression doesn’t always work. In many cases, its excessive use has been as a major cause for rebellion. As Mohammed Hafez, a scholar of social movements, points out, where repression is indiscriminate and targets not only the violent extremists but also their associates and sympathizers, it “antagonizes inactive supporters, ... [and pushes them] to seek the protection of radical groups.” It also “intensifies moral outrage,” giving violent extremists more opportunities to present themselves and their cause as “just” and legitimize their actions.\(^\text{12}\)

His colleague Jeff Goodwin went as far as saying that “armed insurgencies [always] result from the violent suppression of peaceful activities of aggrieved people who have the capacity and opportunity to rebel”.\(^\text{13}\)

According to Hafez, whether repression causes violent extremism to rise or decline depends on how it is used:

- How much;
- Against whom (targeting);
- When (pre-emptive or reactive);
- The constitutional context; and
- Its relationship with other, more accommodative strategies.\(^\text{14}\)


\(^{13}\) Goodwin, cited in ibid..

\(^{14}\) Hafez, op. cit., p. 34.
Principles and Recommendations

Based on the above, there are seven principles that ought to guide a state’s repressive response to violent extremism:

1. **Sustainability.** The strategic aim of counterterrorism and counter-insurgency should be to achieve sustainable success, which means: creating the conditions that allow for societies to be stable, cohesive and peaceful in the long-term. Though everyone recognizes that policymakers will sometimes have to authorize drastic measures based on imperfect information, and that mistakes will be made, every strategic and major tactical decision should involve a careful weighing of short-term effects and long-term consequences.

2. **Equality.** Security forces must be committed to upholding law and order for everyone regardless of ethnicity, race, and religion. If those who collectively exercise the state’s monopoly of force – the police, military, and intelligence services – are perceived to be representatives of a particular ethnic, religious or sectarian group and/or its interests, their actions may be seen as illegitimate, provoke the creation of rival militias and contribute to the emergence of civil strife.

3. **Professionalism.** All members of the security forces need to be trained to the highest level, and understand the importance of acting fairly and according to their forces’ ethos. They have to realize that incidents of physical abuse, corruption, mistreatment and discrimination – even if isolated – reflect badly on their units, and will undermine people’s trust in the security forces and the state as a whole. Not least, they have to be conscious that violent extremists are hoping to exploit such incidents, and that unprofessional behavior – even under stress – plays into their adversaries’ hands.

4. **Accountability.** The security forces are granted extraordinary powers, which can be justified only if they make extraordinary efforts to stop those powers from being abused. If individual members of the security forces have engaged in unlawful action, they need to be brought to court and tried. As with previous points, it is in the interests of the state and its campaign against violent extremism to preserve the security forces’ reputation and maintain the legitimacy of their efforts.
Transparency. Most people accept that emergencies require special powers. Both domestic and international laws recognize that there may be circumstances in which a state can be justified in curtailing individuals’ rights and freedoms. This is particularly true when large numbers of citizens are at threat, or the state’s survival is at stake. But such powers need to be exercised responsibly and transparently. People need to understand how special powers are being used, who is affected, and – most importantly – when and under what conditions states of emergency will be ended.

Focus. People’s support for counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency measures will drop when they feel that policymakers are using their powers for other – that is, opportunistic or political – purposes. When counterterrorism powers – and the language of fighting terrorism – is deployed against peaceful protesters or non-violent opposition movements, it undermines the legitimacy of the struggle against actual terrorists, undercuts resources that are needed elsewhere, and jeopardizes international support.

Complementarity. Very few conflicts can be resolved by coercive means alone. If anything, there seems to be overwhelming evidence that – unless terrorists are completely isolated from the population whose support they are hoping to gain – purely repressive solutions are likely to hit the wrong people, cause further radicalization, and create a new and potentially larger generation of militants. Where repressive means are used, they should be balanced by political and religious outreach, counter-messaging, attempts at creating community resilience, and deradicalization and disengagement programs. Moreover, where deep-rooted grievances are a conflict’s underlying drivers, these will have to be addressed through political outreach and dialogue.
Rights and Security: Avoiding the Terrorist Trap
Tom Parker

When faced with a major terrorist threat States seem to instinctively reach for the coercive tools in their policy toolkits, exacerbating the security situation in the process by sanctioning the abuse of human rights, polarizing society, and undermining the positive values of their own systems. This reaction is so common that Louise Richardson has even posited existence of a distinct pathology of state overreaction. Such policy responses are typically driven by frustration, by a lack of understanding of the nature of the threat terrorism poses, by an exaggerated faith in coercive action, and by a lack of faith that democratic values are flexible enough to allow for an effective counter-terrorism response. It is a response that terrorist groups both anticipate and seek to precipitate. This short discussion paper seeks to make the case that adhering to international human rights law and norms can prevent States from falling into the trap that has been set for them.

15 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (Random House; 2006) at 234.
Terrorism is often described as the weapon of the weak, and in terms of the strategic threat that it poses to most States this is a pretty apt description\textsuperscript{16}. Terrorism is an essentially contingent political tactic – any success depends in large part on the manner in which the state targeted chooses to respond to terrorist activity. From the emergence of terrorism as a viable political strategy in the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, terrorists have gone to great lengths to explain their motivation for adopting such violent tactics. This need to explain has generated a rich literature of manuals, communiqués, articles, speeches, interviews, courtroom testimony and memoirs. A number of common terrorist strategies emerge again and again from a close study of this material. One of the most enduring tropes is that terrorist groups don't simply just set out to engage and degrade the coercive organs of the State, they also actively seek to put them to work on their behalf. It is a strategy that has been described as “political jujitsu”\textsuperscript{17} and we can find clear statements of this intent present in terrorist writings from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day.

This strategic concept has its origins in a series of newspaper articles written by Karl Marx in 1850 (and later republished under the title \textit{The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850}) in which he reflected on the lessons that the revolutionary left could learn from the failure of the populist revolutions that flared briefly across Europe at the mid point of the nine-

\textsuperscript{16} Martha Crenshaw, \textit{The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13 No. 4 (1981) at 387.}

\textsuperscript{17} See Clark McCauley, \textit{Jujitsu Politics: Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, in Paul Kimmel and Chris Stout (eds.), Collateral Damage: The Psychological Consequences of America’s War on Terrorism (Praeger Publishers; 2006).}
teenth century, concluding that the socialist cause “made headway not by its immediate tragi-comic achievements, but on the contrary by the creation of a powerful, united counter-revolution, by the creation of an opponent, by fighting which the party of revolt first ripened into a real revolutionary party.”¹⁸

Marx’s insight would develop over time into doctrine, encouraging leftist terrorist groups like Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF) or Italy’s Red Brigades to set out provoke the State into acts that would further polarize society and radicalize the underground group’s base of support. At her trial in September 1974 Ulrike Meinhof spoke of the RAF’s efforts to unmask through their actions the true fascist nature of the West German State in order to provoke the masses to rise against it.¹⁹ The Italian left similarly labeled this concept of advancing revolutionary change “tanto peggio, tanto meglio”, literally “the worse, the better.”²⁰

Although Marx may have been the first to articulate such a strategy, its adoption was certainly not confined to his followers. One of the very first apostles of terrorist violence, the Russian nihilist Sergei Nechaev, advised readers of his Catechism of the Revolutionist (1869) that violent officials should be “granted temporary respite to live, solely in order that their bestial behavior shall drive the people to inevitable revolt.”²¹ Nechaev also notes in his catechism that once the government in power begins to realize the inevitability of a popular revolt it will use “all its resources and energy toward increasing and intensifying the evils and miseries of the people until at last their patience is exhausted and they are driven to a general uprising.”²²


²¹ Sergey Nechaev, Catechism of the Revolutionist, in Walter Laqueur (Ed.), Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Terrorists from around the world and Throughout the Ages (Sourcebooks; 2004) at 74.

Nechaev developed a theory of political provocation in which he aimed to push young student radicals into direct confrontation with the authorities resulting in “the traceless death of the majority and a real revolutionary formation of the few.” The anarchist philosopher Prince Peter Kropotkin picked up on the same theme in his essay *The Spirit of Revolt* (1880). Noting that in periods of popular unrest government repression “provokes new acts of revolt, individual and collective, it drives the rebels to heroism; and in rapid succession these acts spread, become general, develop.”

The Irish Republican Army integrated the lessons of the 1919-21 Anglo-Irish War into its operational doctrine, particularly how it had been able to exploit the atrocities committed by British police auxiliaries in rural towns like Tubbercurry, Templemore, Balbriggan and Limerick to its advantage. The *Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army* issued during the 1956-62 cross border campaign noted that the wider population would bear “the brunt of the enemy’s reprisal tactics” in the aftermath of IRA operations, and that experience of this repression would help to inspire those affected “with the aims of the movement.”

During the Algerian war of independence, the National Liberation Front’s Ramdane Abane promoted an approach to the conflict in 1956-57 that actively sought to provoke the French authorities to “accelerate repression” arguing that harsh French counterterrorism measures would force the Algerian population into the arms of the FLN. Abane believed that only the way to separate the Algerian population from the French colonial system, with all its cultural baggage, was to precipitate, in Martha Crenshaw’s words, a

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23 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* (Oxford University Press; 2011) at 152


“sharp and brutal break.” Abane also showed a preference for attacks on civilian targets, which he knew would provoke a more aggressive response, coining the cynical aphorism: “One corpse in a jacket is always worth more than twenty in uniform.”

Another key theorist of provocation was the Basque nationalist Federico Krutwig who, in the early 1960s, developed what he termed the theory of ‘Action-Repression-Action’ with the aim of securing Basque independence from Spain. Krutwig greatly influenced the operational thinking of the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA). In his most influential work, *Vasconia* (1963), Krutwig outlined his three-stage proscription for action: in stage one ‘the guerrillas’ carry out a provocative violent action against the State; in stage two the State responds in a heavy-handed fashion with repression against ‘the masses’; and in stage three ‘the masses’ respond in turn with a mixture of panic and rebellion, at which point ‘the guerrillas’ carry out a new attack to begin the cycle again and push ‘the masses’ into further acts of insurrection.

Yasir Arafat’s Fateh evolved an explicit concept of operations that came to be known as *al-taffir al-mutasalsil* or “consecutive detonation”. Khalid al-Hasan explained the logic of this strategy: “our military action provokes

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an Israeli action against our people, who then become involved and are supported by the Arab masses. This extends the circle of conflict and compels the Arab governments either to join us or stand against us.”

As one early *Fateh* publication noted: “Any act of liberation that does not take conscious entanglement of the masses into account will fail at the outset because it has overlooked the strongest active force in the battle.”

Finally, Al Qaeda has also adopted a similar approach, perhaps best articulated in Abu Bakr Naji’s *The Administration of Savagery* (2004) written to explain Al Qaeda’s post 9/11 strategy in detail to its supporters around the world. Naji wrote that Al Qaeda set “a trap” for the United States in Afghanistan, which the United States then fell into - by seeking revenge for the 9/11 attacks, Naji asserted, the United States committed itself to operations that will intensify over time and provoke a backlash from the Muslim community. It is hard to argue that Naji’s confidence was misplaced.

If we accept the contention that terrorist groups are consistently seeking to provoke States into adopting repressive measures as a means to further polarize society and attract support, we might reasonably conclude that an established regime of international legal obligations that places limits on States’ abilities to adopt such tactics is actually helping to prevent those States from falling into the trap set by terrorist strategists.

However, this is only part of the equation I have been asked to address. We also need to consider whether or not lawful investigative and intelligence-gathering practices are sufficient to combat terrorism. To begin, it is worth recalling just how extensive these powers are, and the range of special investigation techniques, forensic tools and technical capabilities that even less developed countries cur-

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rently have at their disposal. International human rights law recognizes the threat that criminal activity in general, and terrorism in particular, poses to individual liberties and requires States to protect their citizens from such threats.

In reality, international law accords States considerable latitude in responding to terrorist threats. At both the individual and the national level the right to defend oneself in the face of attack is accorded particular prominence. Investigative resources are limited for the most part only by the requirement that they are defined in law, that due process is observed in their application, and that they are used in a manner that is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the threat posed by criminal activity. A state can recruit informants, conduct sting operations, intercept communications, deploy electronic surveillance measures, detain and confront suspects, and even use deadly force – it just has to do so lawfully. International law recognizes that on rare occasions grave circumstances may arise which may require the temporary suspension of some protected rights, it simply requires that any such suspension must be done in lawful manner. When opportunities to prevent attacks are missed, this typically reflects a failure of competency, imagination, or capacity on the part of the authorities, rather than an institutional shortfall in investigatory powers. The 9/11 attacks are just one compelling example of this truism.

However, international human rights law does also establish some fundamental redlines that States cannot cross in any circumstances. For example, States cannot detain suspects indefinitely without trial, States cannot torture suspects or render them to be tortured, and States cannot murder suspects with impunity. So the question we need to answer is simple: do States need to have the capability to torture, disappear or murder (as distinct from lawfully using of force in self-defense) potential terrorists to defeat terrorism?
We know from the literature that over the past 150 years such tactics have certainly held no terrors for terrorist groups. As Nikolai Morozov, a leading member of the nineteenth century Russian populist group Narodnaya Volya, noted in his 1880 essay The Terrorist Struggle (1880): “Force is only dreadful to the obvious enemy. Against the secret one it is completely useless.”31 Indeed, we know that terrorists have actively sought to provoke States to use these tactics, knowing that many innocents will be caught up in the process and that this will outrage and radicalize their key constituents. This insight is further supported by extensive social science research on the drivers of radicalization and terrorist recruitment, and such concepts as feuding and micromobilization, which I do not have the space to address here but would be very happy to discuss in more detail. Suffice it to say that terrorist groups seem to instinctively grasp and exploit the very factors that the social science suggests motivates young men and women to turn to violence, while governments seem, almost just as instinctively, to exacerbate them.

We also know that there is very little evidence that such tactics provide much tactical or strategic advantage for the democratic States that have flirted with them. We know that many terrorists have withstood torture. We know that many terrorist organizations have withstood the disappearance or murder of leadership figures. We know also that such tactics

31 Nikolai Morozov, The Terrorist Struggle, in Walter Laqueur (Ed.), Voices of Terror (Sourcebooks Inc.; 2004) at 77.
hand an easy propaganda victory to the terrorist side. As General David Petraeus observed in an interview in 2010, “Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are non-biodegradable. They don’t go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick.” Finally, we know that States that embrace such unlawful tactics make it increasingly difficult for allies, at least those wedded to democratic values, to work as closely with them as before.

It must be admitted that there may be a tipping point for such tactics. Some authoritarian States that have employed such measures have enjoyed short-term, even medium-term, success suppressing terrorist groups. However, the price paid by democracies that go down this path is a high one – they are rarely democracies at the end of their journey. The military junta that defeated the Tupamaros in Uruguay also overthrew one of the most stable and successful democratic States in Latin America. The Sri Lankan government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa was able to defeat the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) through the overwhelming and quite brutal exercise of force, but this success also emboldened President Rajapaksa to usher in a campaign of terror and intimidation against journalists, human rights activists and political opponents within his own community. Tellingly, when President Rajapaksa was unseated in a surprise electoral defeat in January 2015 he is reported to have contemplated launching a coup to stay in power.

Leaving moral and legal considerations aside for a moment, the cost benefit analysis is pretty simple: There is a high price to be paid by democratic States that adopt coercive or repressive tactics and ignore established human rights norms, and marginal, if any, benefits to be gained by adopting them. Those who like to talk glibly of ‘existential threats’ often forget that existentialism is a branch of philosophy that turns the gaze inward on one’s self. That’s instructive. Terrorism cannot change our societies unless we let it, we have to look inward and find the strength and resilience not to follow the terrorists’ playbook – a playbook they have described in great detail. International Human Rights Law can play a crucial role in keeping States from falling into the terrorist trap when their nerve begins to waiver.


Annex III

PROGRAM

Tuesday, 27th October 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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| 13:30 – 15:00 | ‘Madrid+10’ Policy Dialogue Lunch  
Roma Room - Palacio Municipal de Congresos  
Welcome Words:  
**Peter Neumann**, Director, International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College  
**Fernando Frutuoso de Melo**, Director-General International Cooperation and Development - DG DEVCO |
| 15:30 – 16:00 | Inaugural Ceremony  
Madrid Room - Palacio Municipal de Congresos  
**Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga**, President of the Club de Madrid. President of Latvia (1999-2007)  
**Manuela Carmena**, Mayor of the City of Madrid, Institutional Member of Club de Madrid  
**Jorge Fernández Díaz**, Minister of Interior, Government of Spain  
**Keynote:** H.M. King Felipe VI |
| 16:00 – 16:30 | Coffee Break |
| 16:30 – 18:00 | Beyond Counterterrorism: New Approaches towards Preventing Violent Extremism  
Madrid Room - Palacio Municipal de Congresos  
**Moderator:**  
**Peter Neumann**, Director, International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College  
**Panelists:**  
**Faisal Bin Abdulrahman Bin Muaammar**, Secretary-General of International Dialogue Centre KAICIID  
**Élisabeth Guigou**, President of the Anna Lindh Foundation and President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly  
**Hanif Qadir**, Active Change Foundation  
**Sarah Sewall**, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, United States  
**Fuad Siniora**, Member of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of Lebanon (2005-2009) |
**CONCLUSIONS**

**MADRID+10**

**Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism**

**ANNEXES**

**Tuesday, 27th October 2015**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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| 18:15 – 19:30 | Thematic Workshops  
Palacio Municipal de Congresos |
|            | **Workshop 1** – Role of women in countering radicalization and violent extremism  
Organizer: Hedayah  
Berlin Room |
|            | **Workshop 2** – Educators in dialogue, youth in debate: countering violent extremism  
Organizer: Anna Lindh Foundation  
Amsterdam Room |
|            | **Workshop 3** – Building Peace through Interreligious Dialogue  
Organizer: KAICIID  
Paris Room |
|            | **Workshop 4** – Online Radicalization  
Organizer: ICSR & Trends  
London Room |
| 21:00 | Dinner  
Casino de Madrid |

**Keynote:** Habib Essid, Prime Minister, Government of Tunisia
### Wednesday, 28th October 2015

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:00 – 10:30</td>
<td><strong>Managing Turmoil the Middle East in Transformation</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Palacio Municipal de Congresos - Madrid Room</strong>&lt;br&gt;Moderator: Farah Pandith, Strategic Advisor to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University&lt;br&gt;Panelists: Sadig Al Mahdi, Member of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of Sudan (1966-1967; 1986-1989)&lt;br&gt;Scott Atran, Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique&lt;br&gt;Javier Solana, Member of Club de Madrid, Secretary General of NATO (1995-1999), Secretary General of the Council of the EU (1999-2009)&lt;br&gt;Volker Türk, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection (UNHCR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30 – 11:00</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
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<td>11:00 – 12:30</td>
<td><strong>Thematic Workshops</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Palacio Municipal de Congresos</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Workshop 1 – Role of women in countering radicalization and violent extremism</strong>&lt;br&gt;Organizer: <em>Hedayah</em>&lt;br&gt;Berlin Room</td>
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<td><strong>Workshop 2 – Educators in dialogue, youth in debate: countering violent extremism</strong>&lt;br&gt;Organizer: <em>IEMed</em>&lt;br&gt;Amsterdam Room</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Workshop 3 – Building Peace through Interreligious Dialogue</strong>&lt;br&gt;Organizer: <em>KAICIID</em>&lt;br&gt;Paris Room</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Workshop 4 – Online Radicalization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Organizer: <em>ICSR &amp; Trends</em>&lt;br&gt;London Room</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Wednesday, 28th October 2015

#### 13:00 – 14:30

**International Jurisdiction on Terrorism as a Preventive Tool**

*Lunch*

**Palacio Municipal de Congresos - Roma Room**

*Moderator:*
- **Laura Chinchilla**, Club de Madrid Member, President of Costa Rica (2010-2014)

*Panelists:*
- **Bogdan Lucian Aurescu**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Romania
- **Jean-Paul Laborde**, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
- **José García-Margallo y Marfil**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Spain

#### 15:00 – 16:30

**Moving Forward: Obstacles and Opportunities in the Fight Against Violent Extremism**

**Palacio Municipal de Congresos - Madrid Room**

*Moderator:*
- **Jennifer M. Shipley**, Vice President of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of New Zealand (1997-1999)

*Panelists:*
- **Anne Aly**, Founding Chair of People against Violent Extremism, Professor Edith Cowan University, Associate Professor Curtin University
- **John Bruton**, Member of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of Ireland (1994-1997)
- **Hafez Ghanem**, World Bank Vice President for MENA, nonresident senior fellow in Brookings
- **Hugo Martínez Bonilla**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of El Salvador
- **Loretta Napoleoni**, Expert on terrorist financing and money laundering

#### 16:30 – 18:00

**Closing Session**

**Palacio Municipal de Congresos - Madrid Room**

*Danilo Türk*, Member of Club de Madrid, President of Slovenia (2007-2012)
*John Alderdice*, House of Lords/ICSR

*Keynote:*
- **Ban Ki-Moon**, Secretary General of the United Nations

*Closing remarks:*
- **José García-Margallo y Marfil**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Spain
- **Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga**, President of the Club de Madrid. President Latvia (1999-2007)
Annex IV

2015 POLICY DIALOGUE
MADRID+10: PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Madrid, Spain • 27-28 October 2015
A Policy Dialogue co-organized by World Leadership Alliance-Club de Madrid & The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence

Club de Madrid Members

- Valdis Birkavs, Prime Minister of Latvia (1993-1994)
- John Bruton, Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland (1994-1997)
- Felipe Calderón, President of Mexico (2006-2012)
- Laura Chinchilla, President of Costa Rica (2010-2014)
- Philip Dimitrov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria (1991-1992)
- Alfred Gusenbauer, Chancellor of Austria (2007-2008)
- Felipe González, President of the Government of Spain (1982-1996)
- Hamadi Jebali, Prime Minister of Tunisia (2011-2013)
- Mehdi Jomaa, Prime Minister of Tunisia (2014-2015)
- Wim Kok, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1994-2002)
- Luis Alberto Lacalle, President of Uruguay (1990-1995)
- Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile (2000-2006)
- Zlatko Lagumdžija, President of Bosnia & Herzegovina (2001-2002)
- Yves Leterme, Prime Minister of Belgium (2008, 2009-2011)
- James Mancham, President of the Republic of Seychelles (1976-1977)
- Rexhep Meidani, President of Albania (1997-2002)
ANNEXES

• Carlos Mesa, President of Bolivia (2003-2005)
• Roza Otunbayeva, President of the Kyrgyz Republic (2010-2011)
• Andres Pastrana, President of Colombia (1998-2002)
• Percival Noel James Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-2006)
• Sebastián Piñera, President of Chile (2010-2014)
• Jorge Fernando Quiroga, President of Bolivia (2001-2002); Vice President, Club of Madrid
• Iveta Radičová, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic (2010 - 2012)
• Petre Roman, Prime Minister of Romania (1989-1991)

Club de Madrid Honorary Members

• Enrique Iglesias, Secretary-General of the Ibero-American Secretariat (2005-2013)

Members of Constituent Foundations

• Diego Hidalgo Schnur, Founder and Honorary President, FRIDE
• Anthony Jones, Vice-President and Executive Director, GFNA
• José Manuel Romero, Vice-President, FRIDE

Club de Madrid Advisors

• Rut Diamint, International Security Professor, University Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT); Researcher, National Council of Scientific and Technological Research (CONICET)
• Jorge Domínguez, Chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, Harvard University.
• Jerry Jones, SVP and Chief Legal Officer, ACXIOM
• Peter Neumann, Director, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
• Timothy Phillips, Co-Founder and Chairman of the Board, Beyond Conflict
• Ted Piccone, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution
Keynote Speakers

- H.M. King Felipe VI of Spain
- Habib Essid, Prime Minister, Government of Tunisia
- Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General, United Nations
- José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Spain
- Jorge Fernández Díaz, Minister of Interior, Government of Spain
- Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of State
- Fernando Frutuoso de Melo, Director General, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), European Commission
- Manuela Carmena, Mayor of the City of Madrid, Institutional Member of Club de Madrid

Participants

- Abdelhameed Ahmed Mohamed Abdalla, Ambassador, Embassy of Sudan in Spain
- Carlos Abella y de Arístegui, Director General for International Relations and Foreigners, Ministry of Interior, Government of Spain
- Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Director, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
- Fonsi Acevedo, Head of Events, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
- Olusola Olayinka Akinlude, Consular and Information, Embassy of Nigeria in Spain
- Hissa Abdulla Ahmed Al-Otaiba, Ambassador, United Arab Emirates Embassy in Spain
CONCLUSIONS

- Ahmed Al Hamli, President & Founder, TRENDS Research & Advisory
- Álvaro Albacete, Deputy Secretary General for External Relations, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
- Lord John Alderdice, Member of the House of Lords; Middle East Advisor, University of Oxford.
- Belén Alfaro, Special Ambassador of Spain, United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAoC)
- Abdelaziz Alhamza, Co-founder, Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently
- Mustafa Y. Ali, Secretary-General, Global Network of Religions for Children
- Rza Aliyev, International Relations Analyst, Nizami Ganjavi International Center
- Chema Alonso, CEO, Eleven Paths, Telefónica
- Rogelio Alonso, Director of the Master on Terrorism, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
- Anne Aly, Founding Chair, People Against Violent Extremism
- Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, PhD candidate in Political Science, LUISS “Guido Carli” University
- Musa Amer Odeh, Ambassador, Embassy of Palestine in Spain
- Veronique Andrieux, Senior Program Officer, Club de Madrid
- Arantza de Areilza Churuca, Dean, International Relations and Humanities, IE Business School
- Miles Armitage, Counter-terrorism Ambassador, Government of Australia
- Hatem Atallah, Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation
- Scott Atran, Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
- Larry Attree, Head of Policy, Saferworld
- Bogdan Lucian Aurescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Romania
- Matthijs Balder, Political Affairs, Embassy of the Netherlands in Spain
- Ilie Bănică, Minister Counsellor, Adjunct Chief of Mission, Embassy of Rumani in Spain
- Stefan Bantle, First Counsellor for Political Affairs, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Natalia Basterrechea, Head of Public Policy for Spain and Portugal, Facebook
- Wadee Batti Hanna, Ambassador, Embassy of Iraq in Spain
- Andreas Baumgartner, Partner, Tony Blair Associates
- Carol Bellamy, Chair, Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), and former head of UNICEF
- Mohamed Iqbal Ben Rejeb, President, Rescue Association of Tunisians Trapped Abroad
- Faisal Bin Abdulrahman Bin Muaammar, Secretary-General, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
- Richmond Blake, Advisor in the Office of the Under-Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights, U.S. Department of State

• **Sebastian Bloching**, Head of Policy, European Partnership for Democracy
• **Matthew Boland**, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Spain
• **Jasmina Bosto**, Partnership Assistant, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
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• **Richard Burchill**, Director of Research and Engagement, TRENDS Research & Advisory
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• **Marcelino Cabanas**, Ambassador of Spain, Special Mission for Preventive Diplomacy
• **Anders Carlsson**, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Sweden in Spain
• **Emilio Cassinello**, Director, Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax)
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• **Nourane Chalaby**, Assistant to Head of Executive Office, Anna Lindh Foundation
• **Faouzia Charfi**, Former Secretary of State, Tunisian Ministry of Education and Research
• **Wacef Chiha**, Ambassador, Embassy of Tunisia in Spain
• **Kobsak Chutikul**, Secretary General, Asia Peace and Reconciliation Council (APRC)
• **Sean Cleary**, Executive Vice-chair, Future World Foundation
• **Alison Coburn**, Co-Founder and Deputy Chief Executive, Common Purpose International
• **Matt Collier**, Assistant Legal Attaché, United States Embassy in Spain
• **Maura Conway**, Principal Investigator in VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction
• **Vian Dakhil**, Yazidi Parliamentarian, Iraqi Parliament
• **Justin Dangel**, Founder, voter.com
• **Fadi Daou**, Chairman and CEO, Adyan Lebanese Foundation for Interfaith Studies
• **Lynn Davies**, Emeritus Professor of International Education, University of Birmingham
• **Nathalie Delapalme**, Executive Director of Research and Policy, Mo Ibrahim Foundation
• **Arancha Díaz-Llado**, Institutional Relations Director, Telefónica
• **Philip Divett**, Program Officer, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
• **Elsbeth Dixon**, Chief Executive, Common Purpose South Africa
• **Berivan Dosky**, First Secretary, Embassy of Iraq in Spain
• **Christian Dussey**, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
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• **Christer Elfverson,** Special Adviser to Secretary-General of United Nations, World Tourism Organization
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• **Noureddine Erradi,** Interculturalisation Coordinator and Chairman of IFA (Integration For All)
• **Laila Ezzarqui,** Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
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• **Senén Florensa,** Executive President, IEMed
• **Frank Foley,** Lecturer in International Relations, King’s College London
• **Florian Forster,** Head of Immigration and Border Management, International Organization for Migration (IOM)
• **Monica Frassoni,** President, European Center for Electoral Support
• **Francesca Friz-Pryuda,** Representative of ACNUR
• **Shafik Gabr,** Chairman, ARTOC Group for Investment and Development
• **Galgano Galgani,** Deputy Chief of the Italian State Police, Italian Central Service for Counterterrorism
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• **Pepijn Gerrits – Director of Programmes,** Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
• **Hafez Ghanem,** Vice President for the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank
• **Elyes Ghariani,** Counsellor for Diplomatic Affairs, Government of Tunisia
• **Mohamed Ghorbal,** Protocol Director, Government of Tunisia
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• **Ken Godfrey,** Executive Director, European Partnership for Democracy (EPD)
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• Busaya Mathelin, Ambassador, Embassy of Thailand in Spain
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CONCLUSIONS

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• Barah Mikail, Associate Professor at Saint Louis Universit and Senior Researcher, FRIDE
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ANNEXES

- **Robert Ocholar**, Journalist, Street Radio for STRIVE Horn of Africa
- **Ayo Oke**, Special Envoy, President of Nigeria
- **Noha Omar**, Bibliotheca Alexandrina
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- **Gundega Pumpure**, First Secretary and Executive Head of Mission, Embassy of Latvia in Spain
- **Hanif Qadir**, President, Active Change Foundation
- **Christopher Quade**, Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Spain
- **Ebrahim Rasool**, Founder, World for All Foundation
- **Pedro Rojo Pérez**, President, Al Fanar Foundation
- **Eric Rosand**, Counselor to the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State
- **Antonio Ruiz-Giménez**, Cofounder, Public Foundation
- **Mariam Safi**, Director, DROPS
- **Kasen Sailneman**, Embassy of Thailand in Spain
CONCLUSIONS

• Yves Edouard Saint Geours, Ambassador, Embassy of France in Spain
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• Francisco Javier Sanabria Valderrama, General Director for United Nations and Human Rights of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
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• José María Sanz-Magallón, Institutional Relations and Sponsorship Director, Telefónica
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• Habib Sayah, Security Consultant, Aktis Strategy Ltd
• Alfred Schandlbauer, Executive Secretary, Inter-American Committee against Terrorism
• Edit Schlaffer, Founder and Executive Director of Women without Borders/SAVE
• Aylin Sekizkok, Head of Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Turkey
• Ismail Serageldin, Founding Director, Bibliotheca Alexandrina; Co-Chair, Nizami Ganjavi International Center (NGIC)
• Kelly Simcock, Director of Commissions, Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace
• Mark Singleton, Director, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
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• Michael Swain, Ambassador, Embassy of New Zealand in Spain
• Raymond Tam, Vice President of the Asia Convention, World Economic Council
• Ronald Tam, Head of Asia Corporate Finance, Jeffries & Co

ANNEXES
ANNEXES

- Jimmy Tao, CEO, Vitargent International Biotechnology Limited
- Catalina Tejero, Associate Director, Middle East & Africa, International Development at IE Business
- Peter Tempel, Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Spain
- Boris Teteriev, Founder, Inara & Boris Teteriev Foundation
- Gonzalo Torrico Flores, Former Minister, Government of Bolivia
- Montserrat Torrija, Director, Victims of Terrorism Foundation
- Elias Toumeh, Bishop, Greek Orthodox Church of Wadi al Nasara
- Henry Tuck, Programme Coordinator, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
- Volker Turk, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, UNHCR
- Krishna R. Urs, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Spain
- Eliza Urwin, Senior Program Officer, United States Institute for Peace
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- Adriaan Van der Meer, Head of Unit, Instrument for Stability, Nuclear Safety, DG for Development and Cooperation, European Commission
- Jorge Vázquez Costa, Coordinador de la Unidad para asuntos del Mediterráneo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain
- Ivo Veenkamp, Deputy Executive Director, Hedayah
- José María Vera Villacién, Director General, Intermon Oxfam
- Irene Vergara, Program Officer, Club de Madrid
- Andre Vervooren, Director Department of Public Safety, City of Rotterdam
- Lurdes Vidal, Editor-in-Chief of afkar/ideas and Head for the Department of the Arab and Mediterranean World, The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)
- Meghann Villanueva, Director of Peace and Human Rights Programme, Fundacio Catalunya Voluntària
- Pedro Antonio Villena Pérez, Director-General, Casa Árabe
- Ion Vilcu, Ambassador, Embassy of Rumania in Spain
- Paul Walton, Head of the Executive Office and Communication Manage, Anna Lindh Foundation
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- Wayne Wang, Assistant to Chairman, Kingold Group
- Liu Wei, Staff of the Division of Canadian and Oceanian Affairs, Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
- Robert Wesley, President, Terrorism Research Initiative
- Yuli Mumpuni Widarso, Ambassador, Embassy of Indonesia in Spain
- Hassan Wirajuda, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Indonesia
- Katy Wright, Head of Global External Affairs, Oxfam International
CONCLUSIONS

MADRID+10 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

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Madrid+10 Policy Dialogue Team

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• Maram Anbar, Senior Program Officer, Club de Madrid
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• Nick Kaderbhai, Senior Research Fellow, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
• Borja Lucas, Club de Madrid
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• Katie Rothman, Head of Operations, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
• Irene Sánchez, Events Manager Assistant, Club de Madrid
• Carlos Westendorp, Secretary General, Club de Madrid

ANNEXES
Annex V

VISIBILITY AND MEDIA IMPACT

The Club de Madrid 2016 Policy Dialogue “Madrid+10 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” was the event that received the greatest media coverage of those run by the organization in 2015.

The high topic addressed, the participation of the King of Spain Philip VI and the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, plus 40 former Presidents and head of State and 250 high level experts propelled the visibility of the event both in the Spanish and international media.

All the relevant press agencies in the world (AP, Reuters, AFP, XINHUA, EFE, KUNA) were present in the event as well as correspondents from Tunisia, China, Ireland, Russia, United States, France, United Kingdom, Colombia, México, Bolivia or Venezuela. The Madrid+10 conference appeared in more than 70 news stories in the audiovisual sector including every major TV and radio national shows and internationally with stories shown in the Russian, Chinese and Tunisian or Colombian channels.

Only in four days, 3,473 impacts were registered in the Spanish written press, blogs, webs, tv’s and social media. The peak day impacts wise was the 27th of October with more than 1500 impacts, mainly due to the presence of the King of Spain in the inaugural session. The online media devoted its attention to cover Ban Ki-moon’s final remarks, Mayor of the City of Madrid, Manuela Carmena’s speech, in which she expressed her wish of creating a “Peace Institute” in the capital and the proposal of the Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain, José García Margallo, to coordinate the interreligious dialogue, among other topics.

Articles and stories on Madrid+10 can also be found in the main national newspapers (El País, El Mundo, La Razón, ABC) in both their printed and online versions as well as in the main regional outlets.
Annex VI

MULTIMEDIA

Inaugural Ceremony with HM King Felipe VI

Vaira Viķe-Freiberga, President of the Club de Madrid. President of Latvia (1999-2007)
Manuela Carmena, Mayor of the City of Madrid, Institutional Member of Club de Madrid
Jorge Fernández Díaz, Minister of Interior, Government of Spain

Keynote: H.M. King Felipe VI

http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/noticia/watch_now_inaugural_ceremony_with_hm_king_felipe_vi

Closing session

Danilo Türk, Member of Club de Madrid, President of Slovenia (2007-2012)
John Alderdice, House of Lords

Keynote: Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations

http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/noticia/watch_now_closing_session_with_ban_ki_moon
New Approaches towards Preventing Violent Extremism

**Moderator:**
Peter Neumann, Director, International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College

**Panelists:**
Faisal Bin Abdulrahman Bin Muaammar, Secretary-General of International Dialogue Centre KAICIID
Élisabeth Guigou, President of the Anna Lindh Foundation and President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly
Hanif Qadir, Active Change Foundation
Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, United States
Fuad Siniora, Member of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of Lebanon (2005-2009)


Managing Turmoil-the Middle East in Transformation

**Moderator:**
Farah Pandith, Strategic Advisor to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University

**Panelists:**
Sadig Al Mahdi, Member of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of Sudan (1966-1967; 1986-1989)
Scott Atran, Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Javier Solana, Member of Club de Madrid, Secretary General of NATO (1995-1999), Secretary General of the Council of the EU (1999-2009)
Volker Türk, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection (UNHCR)

International Jurisdiction on Terrorism as a Preventive Tool

**Moderator:**
Laura Chinchilla, Club de Madrid Member, President of Costa Rica (2010-2014)

**Panelists:**
Bogdan Lucian Aurescu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Paul Laborde, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Director, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
José García-Margallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Spain

http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/noticia/watch_now_international_jurisdiction_on-terrorism_as_a_preventive_tool

Moving Forward: Obstacles and Opportunities in the Fight Against Violent Extremism

**Moderator:**
Jennifer M. Shipley, Vice President of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of New Zealand (1997-1999)

**Panelists:**
Anne Aly, Founding Chair of People against Violent Extremism, Professor Edith Cowan University, Associate Professor Curtin University
John Bruton, Member of Club de Madrid, Prime Minister of Ireland (1994-1997)
Hafez Ghanem, World Bank Vice President for MENA, nonresident senior fellow in Brookings
Hugo Martínez Bonilla, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of El Salvador
Loretta Napoleoni, Expert on terrorist financing and money laundering

http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/noticia/watch_now_moving_forward_obstacles_and_opportunities_in_the_fight_against_violent_extremism

ANNEXES
Partners

“MADRID+10: The Policy Dialogue on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” is a two-day conference mobilizing policy makers, opinion formers, civil society and grassroots organizations around the concept of preventing and countering radicalization and violent extremism, increasing public engagement and fostering grassroots initiatives.

The MADRID+10 Initiative is a participatory and collaborative process, possible thanks to the valuable contributions and collaborations of our partners and supporters.

Organizers:

World Leadership Alliance-Club de Madrid

The Club de Madrid is the world's largest, independent group of democratic, political leaders, committed to addressing the challenges of democratic transition and consolidation where they can make a difference.

The principal added value of the Club de Madrid is a unique membership of more than 100, democratically elected, former Presidents and Prime Ministers, from over 60 countries, willing and able to share their individual and collective experience, diverse expertise and networks in support of democratic values and leadership worldwide. As former Presidents and Prime Ministers, no longer in public office, Club de Madrid Members are not politically constrained and thus freer to share their experience and offer strategic advice.

www.clubmadrid.org
@CLUBdeMADRID

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)

ICSR’s mission is to bring together knowledge and leadership. Producing first class, rigorous research, our aim is to educate the public and help policymakers and practitioners find more intelligent solutions in dealing with radicalisation and political violence.

http://icsr.info/
@ICSR_Centre
Partners

European Union

The European Commission is the European Community’s executive body. Led by 27 Commissioners, the European Commission initiates proposals of legislation and acts as guardian of the Treaties. The Commission is also a manager and executor of common policies and of international trade relationships. It is responsible for the management of European Union external assistance.

http://ec.europa.eu
@EU_Commission

KAICIID Dialogue Centre

KAICIID is an intergovernmental organization that promotes dialogue to prevent and resolve conflict, and to enhance understanding and cooperation between people of different cultures and followers of different religions. Founded by Austria, Spain, and Saudi Arabia with the Holy See as a founding observer, its Board of Directors comprises prominent representatives of five major world religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism). Through its programmes in the Central African Republic, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Tanzania, KAICIID supports peacebuilding and increases dialogue skills and capacity to foster cooperation and support reconciliation. KAICIID brings together religious leaders and policy makers to sustainably address contemporary challenges.

http://www.kaiciid.org/
@KAICIID

United States of America - Department of State

The U.S. State Department’s mission is to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere. This mission is shared with the USAID, ensuring we have a common path forward in partnership as we invest in the shared security and prosperity that will ultimately better prepare us for the challenges of tomorrow.

http://www.state.gov/
@StateDept
Knowledge Partners:

Hedayah

Hedayah was established to serve as the premier international institution for training, dialogue, collaboration, and research to counter violent extremism in all of its forms and manifestations, in support of long-term, global efforts to prevent and counter terrorism.

http://www.hedayah.ae/
@Hedayah_CVE

Anna Lindh Foundation

The Anna Lindh Foundation is an inter-governmental institution bringing together civil society and citizens across the Mediterranean to build trust and improve mutual understanding.

http://www.annalindhfoundation.org
@AnnaLindh

The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)

The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), founded in 1989, is a consortium comprising the Catalan Government, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and Barcelona City Council. It incorporates civil society through its Board of Trustees and its Advisory Council formed by Mediterranean universities, companies, organisations and personalities of renowned prestige.

http://www.iemed.org/
@IEMed_

TRENDS Research & Advisory

TRENDS Research & Advisory is an independent and progressive research center, based in Abu Dhabi, UAE, established in August 2014. TRENDS Research & Advisory is committed to building a global network of research associates across a range of subject areas and disciplines. TRENDS aims to help improve policies and decision-making processes through rigorous research and analysis.

http://trendsinstitution.org/
@TrendsRA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation - Spain

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation plans, directs, implements and assesses Spain’s foreign policy and development cooperation policy, following the Government’s guidelines and applying the principle of unity of external action.

@SpainMFA
Club de Madrid Policy Dialogues

Members combine a wealth of unique, individual and collective experiences, particularly interesting in the analysis and generation of new ideas in the democratic management of today’s urgent challenges. Every year the Club de Madrid with the support of major partners, convenes a global conference that brings together experts, practitioners and leaders to discuss a topic of global interest.
CONCLUSIONS

MADRID+10 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

2009
The Political Dimensions of the World Economic Crisis Spain

2008
Global Forum on Leadership on Shared Societies The Netherlands

2007
Democratizing Energy: Geo Politics and Power Spain

2006
The Challenges of Energy and Democratic Leadership Spain

2005
International Summit on Democracy, Security and Terrorism Spain

2004
Democracies in Danger: Diagnoses and Prescriptions Spain
CONCLUSIONS

2003
The Role of the IMF and its Contribution to Democracy Spain

2002
Democratic Transition and Consolidation Spain
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who contributed and participated in this event. The success of the 2015 Policy Dialogue on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism was made possible through the support, assistance, dedication, and commitment of the Club de Madrid Members, the driving force implementing it and making it happen; the donors who believed in the idea and the process; the partners who contributed to the knowledge sharing; the Working Group and Global Consensus drafting team who enhanced the process with their ideas and policy briefs; and all the panelists and participants who contributed to the deliberations making the exchange a true dialogue.

It goes without saying that organizing such an event required the support of many unknown ‘soldiers’ including the secretariat of the CdM, the staff of ICSR, representatives of the Spanish government and ministries, the Royal House of Spain, the City of Madrid, the United Nations CTED and CTITF, all the knowledge partners and donors, reporters and media representatives, and a unique group of volunteers from the Instituto Empresa and the Instituto Superior de Protocolo y Eventos.

Last but not least, this publication is now before you thanks to the generous support of the German Government through their Embassy in Madrid.

In short, it would not have been possible to organize this Policy Dialogue and present its outcomes without everyone’s valuable help, cooperation and support.
MADRID+10:
PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
27-28 October 2015 / Madrid, Spain

#GlobalConsensus

www.stoppingviolentextremism.org